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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
1.1 The road to European integration
The official membership, in 2004 and 2007, of 10 countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) in the European Union (EU) marked the culmination of a process of
European integration started more than half century earlier. After the two world con-
flicts that divided Europe in the first half of the XX century, a desire for peace and
economic cooperation spread among the main political powers of the Old Continent.
In 1951, the sovereigns of six countries (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg and Netherlands),
"[...] Convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital Europe
can make to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful rela-
tions, recognising that Europe can be built only through practical achievements
which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of
common bases for economic development, [...], resolved to substitute for age-
old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing
an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for insti-
tutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared [...]"1
signed the Treaty of Paris instituting the European Coal and Steel Community.
Only six years later, the first milestone in the road to European economic integra-
tion was set when the same countries signed the Treaty of Rome, giving birth to the
1 Extrait from the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
signed in Paris on April 18th, 1951. 3
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European Economic Community (EEC), characterized by the free movement of cap-
ital, goods and people. While more countries joined the EEC (Denmark, Ireland and
the United Kingdom joined in the 1970s, Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s,
Austria, Finland and Sweden in the1990s, Cyprus and Malta in 2004), the Schengen
Agreement dismantled national borders in 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty instituted
the EU in 1993, paving the way for full monetary integration, which culminated in
1999 with the introduction of the Euro and the creation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU). 2
During the first three decades of Western European efforts towards a common
path to economic cooperation and development, the Cold War was still ongoing, and
countries to the East of the Iron Curtain were subject to communist regimes and poli-
cies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disruption of the Soviet bloc put the
Central and Eastern European countries3 on the path of transition from a centrally
planned to a market economy. Creating free markets where they were previously
highly regulated entailed a drastic redefinition of the countries’ institutions, laws and
regulations both within countries and in their international relations. On the domes-
tic side, a massive restructuring involved all areas of the economy, from production
to financial sectors. On the international dimension, the transition process led to the
dismantlement of economic structures characterized by isolation from the rest of the
world, and marked the beginning of an era of increased economic and financial inte-
gration between Eastern and Western Europe. The process of economic restructuring
was so efficiently managed that, not even two full decades later, the CEE economies
2 The Euro was initially adopted by 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001,
Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia in 2008 and Estonia in 2011.
3 In what follows, I consider in the CEECs group the countries that joined the EU in the two waves
of enlargement of 2004 and 2007, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
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were granted membership in the EU: while the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia entered in 2004, Bulgaria and
Romania followed three years later. The process of integration between Eastern and
Western Europe is still ongoing, as full monetary integration with the Euro Area (EA)
has been achieved so far only by few formerly transition economies (the Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia and Estonia), while their fellows intend to join the EMU as soon as
they will meet the conditions imposed by the Maastricht Treaty in terms of inflation,
exchange rate and government finance.
Figure 1.1: European Union and Euro Area in 2011
While Croatia joined the existing 27 members of the EU on July 1st 2013
and Latvia adopted the common currency on January 1st 2014, increasing the EA
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member states to 18, more countries (mainly from ex-Yugoslavia) are applying for
membership in the EU.
1.2 Macroeconomic convergence
Prospects of EU membership played a pivotal role in the transition process of the 10
CEECs, constituting both the reason and the catalyst for a rapid and successful trans-
formation of economic structures, and convergence to Western European standards.
On one side, countries were stimulated to enact fast reforms in order to participate in
the EU and enjoy the benefits of membership in terms of free trade and movement
of capital and people. On the other hand, prospects of participation in a commu-
nity characterized by democratic structures, sound macroeconomic policies, free and
open markets provided domestic and international investors with stable expectations
on the future economic outlook. Such stability of expectations encouraged invest-
ment in the region, both in physical and human capital, which was of key importance
in sustaining the transition process.
During the transition period and the years preceding EU membership, the CEECs
engaged in a catching-up process to align their macroeconomic performance to that
of their Western peers. The convergence process was further incited by the require-
ment to comply to the Maastricht criteria, as a necessary prerequisite for EMU mem-
bership.4 The extent of the catching-up process is evident from Figure 1.2, which
depicts real per capita GDP in the New Member States (NMS) both in absolute terms
(Purchasing Power Standards) and as a percentage of the EU average. In 1996, the
average purchasing power-adjusted per capital income in the NMS was 46% of that
of the EU. However, important cross-country differences existed: while Czech and
4 The Maastricht criteria impose a set of rules on macroeconomic stability, defined in the Maastricht
Treaty, countries have to comply to in order to be eligible for membership in the EA. These criteria
involve aspects related to price stability, sustainability and soundness of public finances, exchange
rate stability and long-term interest rate convergence.
6
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
Slovenian per capita GDP were higher than 70% of EU real per capita GDP, Bulgaria
was considerably poorer, followed by the Baltic countries and Romania. However,
by 2003, real per capita GDP increased substantially, reaching, on average 54% of
the EU average. By 2007, and even more in 2011, real per capita convergence fur-
ther increased. However, cross-country differences still persist: while some countries
(the Czech Republic and Slovenia) display real per capita GDP equal to 80% of the
EU average, the Bulgarian and Romanian population are around 50% poorer than the
average EU inhabitant.
Figure 1.2: Real per-capita GDP in PPP and as a percentage of EU average
Purchasing Power Standards As percentage of EU27 average
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. .
The speed of convergence varied across countries, as shown in Figure 1.3: in
line with the convergence hypothesis, countries starting at a low level of income (i.e.
the three Baltic countries and Bulgaria) grew faster than countries characterized by a
higher initial income (i.e. the Czech Republic and Slovenia). The figure highlights a
clear negative relationship between the level of real GDP per capita in 1996 (y axis)
and the average per capita real GDP growth in the decade 1997-2007 (x-axis).
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Figure 1.3: Real GDP convergence
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A bird’s eye picture of the overall process of convergence can be drawn by
looking at Figure 1.4, which depicts the dispersion of the main indicators of nominal
convergence, namely inflation, short and long term interest rates, from the 1997 to
2011.
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Figure 1.4: Standard deviation of main nominal convergence indicators across NMS
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. The countries considered are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. .
At the beginning of the transition process, all countries were characterized by
high inflation, which in most cases reached double-digit figures. However, in a short
time period all countries managed to curb inflation and to bring it closer to the EA
average. A similar pattern of convergence can be observed in short and long term
interest rates, represented by the blue and purple dashed lines in Figure 1.4 respec-
tively.
1.3 Trade and Financial Integration
The transition process was accompanied by an increasing degree of trade openness
of the CEE economies, reflected in both trade and financial flows.
Table 1.1 shows the time evolution of the degree of openness, defined as the ra-
tio between the sum of imports and exports of goods and services as a percentage of
GDP, for the NMS and the Euro Area. As it is evident, the CEE countries are char-
acterized by a high degree of trade openness, which is much greater than the average
9
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Table 1.1: Trade opennes in the NMS: sum of imports and exports as a percentage of
GDP (period averages)
1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007
Bulgaria 115.5 105.8 122.5
Czech Republic 103.6 121.6 128.9
Estonia 148.5 157.5 153.5
Latvia 97.7 93.5 107.8
Lithuania 102.9 104.5 120.3
Hungary 115.8 138.1 145.6
Poland 51.9 62.1 79.7
Romania 59.4 74.5 76.5
Slovenia 101.6 109.7 128.9
Slovakia 123.9 150.0 164.2
Euro Area 61.8 71.3 75.9
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data.
of Euro Area countries. Furthermore, the degree of trade openness is increasing over
time: being on average 102% in the period 1996-1998, it reached 122% between 2003
and 2007. However, large cross-country differences are noticeable. While Estonia
and Slovakia exhibit significant degrees of openness since the mid-1990s, countries
like Poland and Romania are relatively more closed.
Considering more specifically the trade relations between the NMS and the
EA, Table 1.2 reveals a tightening of the trade ties between the two areas. The ta-
ble presents the time evolution of bilateral trade shares, defined as the ratio of im-
ports and exports of each country from/to the Euro Area as a percentage of total
imports/exports. It is quite evident that the EA has become an increasingly important
trade partner for the NMS. With the exception of Estonia (whose main trade partners
are Sweden, Latvia and Russia, other than Finland), in 1999 exports (imports) to the
EA accounted for, on average, 54% (51%) of total NMS’ exports (imports). Over-
all, the total EA import/export share in NMS’ imports and exports increased during
the past decade. Finally, the table reveals that not only the EA is an important trad-
ing partner for the NMS, but the reverse is also true. The last two rows of table 1.2
10
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Table 1.2: Import and export shares of the NMS vis-à-vis the Euro Area
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Trade shares with Euro Area
CZ
Imports 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.52
Exports 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55
EE
Imports 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Exports 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
HU
Imports 0.58 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48
Exports 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.47
LV
Imports 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.39
Exports 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.31
LT
Imports 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.30
Exports 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.30
PL
Imports 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53
Exports 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.51
RO
Imports 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47
Exports 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.51
SI
Imports 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.53
Exports 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.50
SK
Imports 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.36
Exports 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.46
Total NMS
Imports 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.27
Exports 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.29
Trade share EA with NMS
EA
Imports 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Exports 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13
Source: own calculations based on IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.
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show the share of imports and exports from and to the EA to and from the NMS, as a
share of total EA imports and exports. While in 1999 imports (exports) to the NMS
amounted to 9% (10%) of total EA imports (exports), by 2010 they reached values
of 12% (13%).
The transition period was also accompanied by a dramatic increase in open-
ness of the capital account. Capital account liberalization proceeded at different
paces in the transition countries: while the Czech Republic and the Baltic coun-
tries can be considered fast liberalizers, as restrictions to most transactions were re-
moved by 1995, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia achieved full
capital account liberalization only in the first years of the new millennium.5 The in-
creased macroeconomic stability, an economic outlook characterized by stable eco-
nomic growth and prospects of EU membership prompted foreign investors to direct
large amounts of capital to the region, attracted by new investment opportunities and
higher returns.
5 The reader is referred to Arvai (2005) for a review of the process of capital account liberalization
in the transition economies, and for a description of the difficulties posed by increased foreign capital
flows on economic policy. Other studies that focus on the experience of the new EU member states
concerning capital flows are: Lipschitz, Lane and Mourmouras (2002), Bakker and Chapple (2003),
Buiter and Taci (2003) focusing on the interactions between capital flows and the financial sector, and
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Figure 1.5: Gross capital inflows to the NMS
Source: Eurostat .
The CEE countries have been recipients of large capital inflows since the be-
ginning of the transition process. Figure 1.5 provides an outlook of the evolution
of gross capital inflows to the NMS as a whole. Specifically, three categories of in-
flows are depicted: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (PI) and
other investment (OI, a residual category comprising bank loans, trade credits and
transactions in currency and deposits). The figure shows a clear increasing trend of
capital inflows since the mid-1990s. Moreover, while during the 1990s foreign di-
rect investment was the predominant form of foreign investment, since the mid 2000s
short-term capital inflows in the form of cross-border loans became predominant.6
One of the reasons for the massive injections of foreign capital since the be-
ginning of transition was the limited development of NMS’ financial sectors, that
weren’t able to match the demand for financing driven by increased domestic de-
mand for investments and consumption. In fact, the banking sector in the NMS is
still small relative to the size of their economy.
6 See Pirovano, Vanneste and Van Poeck (2009) for a country breakdown of the composition of
capital inflows to the NMS.
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Figure 1.6: Banks’ assets as a percentage of GDP, 2008
Source: own calculations based on ECB data. Data for Estonia not available. .
Figure 1.6 depicts total assets of monetary and financial institutions as a per-
centage of GDP in the NMS and in the EA in 2008. The discrepancy between old and
new member states is striking. While the average of the EA reaches 339% of GDP,
the figures for the NMS range between 50% and 137% of GDP. The rapid increase
in foreign lending to the NMS is a direct consequence of the extensive presence of
foreign banks in the region. Equipped with consolidated management strategies, at-
tracted by the possibility to capture market shares and helped by loose licensing in the
destination countries, Euro Area banks invested massively in the region, establishing
a large number of branches and subsidiaries.
14
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Figure 1.7: Assets of EU credit institutions as a percentage of total assets of credit
institutions
Source: Own calculations based on ECB data
Figure 1.7 depicts the share of assets owned by EU credit institutions as a per-
centage to total assets in the NMS. As it is evident, in all countries except Slove-
nia, foreign credit institutions hold more than half of total assets and this percentage
is particularly elevated in the Czech Republic (more than 80% in 2008), Estonia
(slightly less than 90%) and the Slovak republic (circa 72%). Being better capital-
ized and enjoying easier access to foreign financing through their parents in Western
Europe, foreign banks intermediated a large amount of cross-border loans, result-
ing from increased demand for credit which could not be satisfied by domestic sav-
ings only. Increased demand for foreign financing resulted in heavy reliance of the
CEECs on loans originating mainly in European economies, and large exposures of
European parent banks in the host countries. As we will see later, heavy reliance on
foreign loans and tight lending relationships with Western Europe exposed the NMS
to financial imbalances and were crucial in transmitting the crisis to this part of the
European continent.
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Figure 1.8: Lending from Euro Area banks to NMS’ financial (MFI) and non-finan-
cial (Non-MFI) institutions
Source: ECB
Figure 1.8 depicts the evolution of bank loans originating in the Euro Area
directed to NMS’ financial (MFI) and non-financial (Non-MFI) institutions. The
increase in foreign loans to the CEECs was particularly evident in the run-up to EU
membership and was in vast majority directed to monetary and financial institutions
that channeled funds to households and firms in the form of loans.
1.4 Macro-financial imbalances in the run-up to the financial crisis
As illustrated in the previous sections, the CEE countries underwent a period of re-
markable economic performance, characterized by increased economic growth and
development. The period of economic stability and enhanced prosperity was ac-
companied by a surge in domestic demand (both for consumption and investment
purposes), fuelled by the availability of credit and fostered, to a large extent, by the
massive wave of foreign capital flowing in the region.
16
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Figure 1.9: Credit growth (yearly)
Source: ECB
Figure 1.9 portrays total credit growth in the NMS in the years preceding the
financial crisis. Cross-country heterogeneities are immediately noticeable: while in
countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary credit growth was contained below
30%, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania exhibit striking figures. In 2005,
annual credit growth in the Baltic countries exceeded 60%, while Romania attained
a record credit growth of almost 70% in 2006.
17
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Figure 1.10: Credit growth, sectoral decomposition
Source: Bakker and Gulde (2010)
Credit growth involved both the household and the corporate sector. Figure
1.10 depicts the decomposition of total credit growth according to the sectoral des-
tination, distinguishing between loans to firms, loans for housing purchase and non-
housing loans. In some countries, such as the Baltics and Hungary, credit for mort-
gage purposes constituted a conspicuous share of total credit. On the other hand, in
countries like Bulgaria credit to households in the boom years was small relative to
corporate credit, while credit for consumption purposes was proportionally larger in
the Slovak Republic and Romania.
Although empirical evidence (Kiss et al. (2006)) reveals that credit growth in
the NMS was largely justified by economic fundamentals and was a natural result of
the increase in domestic demand, credit dynamics in Emerging Europe posed a chal-
lenge to macro-financial stability on three grounds. First, rapid growth in bank credit
and asset prices significantly contributed to financial fragility, by increasing lever-
18
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age and hampering the resilience of the economy during downturns. The availability
of cheaper credit and the consequent increased demand for real estate investment in-
flated real estate prices, with a positive effect on consumption through wealth effects.
At the same time, investment in the corporate sector increased to several times its
level at the beginning of the decade, fueling asset prices growth. As a result, in the
years preceding the global financial turmoil, both house and asset prices exhibit an
increasing trend in the countries in the region, as Figure 1.11 shows.
Figure 1.11: Evolution of asset prices in the NMS
House Price Indexa Stock Price Indexb
Source: a: BIS; b: Eurostat
The surge in borrowing resulted in an increase in household leverage across
countries in the region (Figure 1.12). While in the three-year period from 2000 to
2003, the debt to income ratio of households ranged between less than 5% (Lithuania)
and 24% (Slovenia), in the time interval from 2004 to 2007 all countries registered
debt to income ratios higher than 25%, with Estonia and Latvia settling on values of
68% and 57% respectively.
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Figure 1.12: Households’ gross debt-to-income ratio, period averages
Source: Eurostat
A further source of concern involves the large share of liability dollarization
and resulting currency mismatches in borrowers’ balance sheets. In fact, in East-
ern European countries, a considerable fraction of credit to the private sector was
denominated in foreign currency. As Figure 1.13 shows, a considerable share of
loans to both household (i.e. mortgage loans) and firms were granted in foreign cur-
rency. This is particularly evident in the Baltic countries (registering shares higher
than 60%), Bulgaria and Romania, although in the other countries of the region the
phenomenon is not negligible.
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Figure 1.13: Share of foreign currency loans in total loans, average 2000-2006
Source: Basso et al. (2007)
This resulted in an increased exposure of borrowers to currency mismatches,
with assets valued in domestic currency (i.e. houses, ownership of firms, capital
goods etc.) and liabilities in foreign currency, posing a serious threat to macroeco-
nomic and financial stability in case of a currency devaluation. In fact, a devaluation
implies an increase in the domestic currency value of liabilities, not matched by a
proportional increase in the value of assets, which pushes up leverage and deterio-
rates borrowers’ balance sheets.
Finally, the increased dependence on foreign financing exposed countries to
risks of contagion from external developments, which became evident during the
financial crisis.
1.5 The financial crisis
Trade and financial openness, and the macro-financial imbalances characterizing the
NMS in the run-up to the financial crisis were crucial in determining the crisis’
spread and intensity.While not being directly exposed to toxic assets, the small open
21
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economies of Central and Eastern Europe were dragged into the spiral through their
trade and financial ties with Western Europe.
As it is evident from Figure 1.5, all three categories of capital inflows declined
sharply when the crisis hit. While portfolio investment, composed of investment in
equity and debt securities turned to negative as soon as the crisis hit, foreign direct
investment and other investment decreased by more than 50% between 2007 and
2009. When the financial crisis spread to Western Europe, banks interrupted the flow
of lending to the NMS, depriving them of their main form of financing. As Figure
1.8 reveals, lending from EA banks to NMS’ monetary and financial institutions
declined by 30% from 2007 to 2009, after a period of steady increase. The spread
of uncertainty and scarcity of liquidity led to a repricing of credit and a tightening
of credit conditions, which discouraged new borrowers and put the existing ones
under strain. Furthermore, as capital outflows put downward pressure on domestic
currencies, borrowers with liabilities denominated in foreign currencies saw the value
of their debt increase, implying a further deterioration in borrowing conditions.
Table 1.3: Import and export volumes, percentage change from previous year
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp
2006 45.2 95.7 10.7 14.0 15.2 7.8 20.9 3.2 13.3 13.4
2007 10.1 6.2 13.7 11.4 5.7 2.1 16.6 8.3 9.5 5.2
2008 3.5 4.1 2.1 3.0 -7.2 -0.5 -12.3 1.0 10.4 13.5
2009 -22.7 -11.4 -12.8 -11.8 -33.0 -25.5 -33.2 -10.7 -29.3 -11.9
2010 6.4 19.8 16.0 16.4 23.7 33.6 14.8 19.8 20.8 18.0
2011 11.4 16.6 7.0 10.6 29.9 30.0 25.1 11.8 13.2 13.5
2012 4.5 -0.9 1.6 4.2 8.4 7.2 4.7 11.0
Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia
Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp
2006 14.8 17.5 16.8 13.8 23.7 7.1 12.7 13.4 19.0 22.1
2007 12.0 15.7 15.1 7.0 30.9 7.3 16.2 13.9 8.6 15.1
2008 5.1 5.6 8.5 7.8 4.7 3.8 3.0 1.8 1.5 3.6
2009 -17.2 -13.1 -14.3 -8.5 -23.1 -3.6 -20.2 -16.6 -19.1 -15.2
2010 13.1 12.8 13.7 13.1 17.0 19.1 8.3 12.0 17.5 17.7
2011 6.7 9.1 6.2 7.7 10.7 12.2 6.6 8.2 11.1 12.9
2012 0.3 2.1 -1.7 3.3 -1.2 -4.3 -5.1 -0.1 3.8 9.7
Source: Eurostat.
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Trade ties also contributed in reinforceing the impact of the crisis in the CEE
countries. As demand in Western Europe decreased as a consequence of the crisis and
prices of imported goods increased thanks to the currency depreciation, the NMS saw
a reduction in commercial exchanges. Table 1.3 reports the year-on-year percentage
changes in the volume of imports and exports in the CEECs. Between 2008 and
2009, both imports and exports reduced dramatically, with the most acute decrease
happening in the Baltic countries.
Figure 1.14: Nominal GDP growth in the CEECs (yearly percentage change)
Source: Basso et al. (2007)
As a result of the global crisis, the NMS suffered large losses in terms of GDP
growth, as Figure 1.14 shows. However, heterogeneities in economic performance
are noticeable. Specifically, countries which experienced the strongest credit boom
before the crisis and large macroeconomic and financial imbalances (notably, the
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Baltic countries) faced the largest contraction in GDP growth (Bakker and Gulde
(2010))7.
1.6 Monetary and exchange rate policy
As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, the countries of Central and East-
ern Europe engaged in a remarkable process of convergence. By the beginning of
the new millennium, countries exhibited robust growth and inflation declining below
double-digit figures. This common tendency was, however, associated with differ-
ent exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy strategies. Table 1.4 provides
an overview of the time evolution of monetary policy and exchange rate strategies in
the NMS.
In the first years of transition, all countries in the region were characterized
with high macroeconomic volatility and inflation instability and set economic stabil-
ity as the top priority. For some countries, setting a nominal anchor to the currency
seemed the more viable strategy to achieve this objective, and opted for pegged ex-
change rate regimes. Other countries, like Bulgaria and Romania and Slovenia set-
tled for flexible currencies, probably in light of the scarcity of international reserves
to back the currency. As inflationary pressures weakened in subsequent years, an
increasing number of countries opted for more flexibility and adopted inflation tar-
geting as their monetary policy strategy at the end of the ’90s. From 1994 to 2000,
7 In a recent study, Mitra (2011) argues that sectoral destination of capital flows is an important
determinant of the impact of the crisis. She observes that countries that suffered the largest swings in
GDP growth coincide with those where capital inflows were heavily channeled to real estate and to the
household sector. The heaviest impact of the crisis on these countries might be related to two aspects.
On one side, to the credit crunch that severely limited the credit supply that fostered consumption and
hence GDP growth. In comparison, countries where credit was channeled to the production sector
could rely on higher productivity brought about by newly installed capital, better competitivity and
thus a better export performance, which limited the extent of the downturn. On the other hand, the
three Baltic Republics committed to a fixed exchange rate regime, thereby constraining the room for
manoevre of monetary policy authorities and renouncing to the benefits of a currency depreciation that
would have followed the sudden stop in capital flows.
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Table 1.4: Official monetary policy strategies and exchange arrangements in the NMS
Monetary policy strategy Exchange rate arrangement
[0.5ex] Bulgaria Until 1997: Money growth targeting Until 1997: Managed float
Since 1997: Nominal ER anchor Since 1997: Currency board
Czech Rep. 1994-97: ER and monetary targeting 1994-96: Basket peg ( 0.5% band)
1998-2001: Net inflation targeting 1996-97: Widening band to 7.5%
Since 2002: headline inflation targeting Since 1997: Managed float
Estonia Until 2011: Nominal ER anchor 1992-2004: Currency board
Since 2011: Euro Area member 2004-2011: ERM II
Since 2011: Euro
Hungary 1994-2002: ER targeting 1994-99: Crawling peg (basket), 2.25% band
Since 2002: inflation targeting 2000-2001: Crawling peg100% Euro
2001: widening band to 15%
2001-08: Peg to Euro, 15% band
Since 2008: Managed float
Latvia Since 1994: ER targeting Since 1994: fixed peg
2005: ERM II
Since 2014: Euro
Lithuania Nominal ER anchor 1992-94: Managed float
1994-2004: Currency board
Since 2004: ERM II
Poland 1994-98: ER targeting 1994-95: Crawling peg, 1% band
Since 98: inflation targeting 1995-98: Widening band to 7%
1998-2000: Widening band to 10%
Since 2000: Free float
Romania 1994-2005: No specific commitment to strategy Since 1994: Managed float
since 2005: inflation targeting
Slovakia 1994-98: ER targeting 1994-96: Basket peg 1.5% band
1998-2008: informal inflation targeting 1997-98: Widening band to 7%
since 2009: Euro Area member 1998:2005: Managed float
2005-08: ERM II
Since 2009: Euro
Slovenia 1994-2000: Monetary targeting 1994-2004: Managed float
2001-06: Two pilliar strategy 2004-06: ERM II
Since 2007: Euro Area member Since 2007: Euro
[0.5ex]
Source: Barisitz (2004, 2007), Frömmel et al. (2011)
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most countries opted for managed or full exchange rate flexibility, while Estonia and
Lithuania maintained their currency board arrangement and Latvia followed a strict
peg. Against this tendency, Bulgaria switched from full flexibility to a currency board
arrangement in 1996. The years after 2000 and the more concrete prospects of EU
members led many countries to reconsider their exchange rate strategies in order to
align them with the prescriptions of the Maastricht Treaty. In particular, a prereq-
uisite for euro adoption is participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM
II), which entails pegging the currency to the euro with limited fluctuations around
the agreed parity (not exceeding 15%). Therefore, Lithuania and Latvia, switched
their reference currency from the U.S. dollar and the SDR respectively, to the euro
in 2002. ERM II was officially adopted in 2004 by Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia,
whereas Latvia and Slovakia followed a year later. Formal euro adoption has been
so far achieved by four countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), while the
other countries are committed to do so as soon as they comply with the necessary
criteria in terms of inflation stability, government finance and exchange rate stability.
Currently, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are operating under a floating
exchane rate regime (Hungary introduced it in 2008).
In general, the choice of the exchange rate strategy crucially hinges on balanc-
ing the trade-off between flexibility and stability. On one side, allowing the currency
to fluctuate freely grants the monetary authority more room for manoevre, which can
be helpful in supporting domestic policy objectives. On the other hand, adopting a
less flexible regime, while constraining domestic policy instruments, acts as a pow-
erful anchor for expectations (especially of foreign investors), contributing to lower
and more stable inflation. In fact, while in large and relatively closed economies ex-
change rate fluctuations have a negligible impact on inflation, given the small weights
of imports in the price level, changes in the (domestic currency) price of imports can
considerably destabilize inflation in small open economies where imports constitute
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a large fraction of the consumption basket. Furthermore, in countries characterized
by a large degree of liability dollarization, anchoring the nominal value of the cur-
rency might look desirable in order to avoid unfavorable increases in the value of
debt following shocks with devaluation pressures.
While the choice of exchange rate arrangement and monetary policy strategy
did not seem to be discriminant in determining differences in the catching up and
convergence process of the NMS in the transition period and in the run-up to EU
membership, it had an impact on the accumulation of macro-financial imbalances and
on the impact of the global financial crisis. As it can be seen comparing figures 1.9,
1.13 and 1.14, countries operating under a strict peg or a currency board arrangement
(i.e. the Baltic countries and Bulgaria), experienced both the fastest credit growth
and the largest degree of liability dollarization prior to the crisis, and suffered the
greatest losses in terms of GDP growth when the financial crisis hit. As we will see
in the following chapters, the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy strategy
of a central bank in economies characterized by a high degree of trade and financial
openness are crucial in determining the build-up of vulnerabilities and the reaction
to foreign shocks. Finally, the extent of trade and financial integration with the EA
makes the small open economies of Central and Eastern Europe not immune to the
stance of EA monetary policy. On one side, shocks to the foreign monetary policy
can have important consequences for the exchange rate and asset prices in small open
economies; on the other side, the reaction of the EA central bank to EA shocks is
very important for the transmission of such shocks to small open economies, and the
intensity of transmission is strictly linked to the exchange rate arrangement adopted
by the latter.
1.7 Overview of the dissertation
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The present dissertation analyzes issues related to monetary and exchange rate pol-
icy in small open economies presenting the characteristics of the Central and Eastern
European economies illustrated in the previous sections. In the following chapters,
one empirical and two theoretical essays are presented, all of which featuring a small
open economy affected by both domestic and foreign shocks. The concepts of fi-
nancial openness and integration together with their interplay with monetary and
exchange rate policy are the leitmotif of this dissertation, recurring in every chap-
ter albeit under different points of view. While the focus of the essays is not on the
global financial crisis, the recent turmoil is of crucial importance in that it led to the
reconsideration of many aspects of macroeconomic modeling and monetary policy
making which are at the core of the subsequent chapters.
First, the crisis led to a renewed interest in the interplay between monetary
policy and asset prices. A large body of studies tackled this issue even in years pre-
ceding the crisis, nevertheless their focus was on advanced economies. While these
studies concluded for a significantly negative effect of a (domestic) monetary policy
contraction on the stock price index, it is natural to ask whether this finding holds
also for small economies characterized by tight trade and financial linkages with
larger countries. Section 1.3 highlighted the extent of trade integration between the
NMS and the EA, establishing the key role of Western Europe as a destination mar-
ket for CEE goods and a provider of imports, of which intermediate goods constitute
a significant share.8 Furthermore, the NMS have been heavily dependent on loans
originating from the Euro Area. As a result of these developments, it is reasonable
8 A study performed by the CEPII (2009) reports that several new member states (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), have high shares of intermediates in total imports, par-
ticularly originating from the "old" members of the EU. Furthermore, all NMS exhibit significant
increases in their intermediate goods imports, reaching levels higher than the EU average of 70%.
While in some countries (e.g. the Baltic States) such imports origin mainly from other NMS, oth-
ers significantly imported from the rest of the world (Hungary, Poland), and the "old" member states
(Czech Republic and Slovakia).
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to assume that cash flows of NMS’s firms, and hence stock prices, might be increas-
ingly influenced by Euro Area monetary policy. In particular, the increased trade and
financial openness of Central and Eastern European Countries can affect their firms’
performance through movements in borrowing and exchange rates, and demand ef-
fects. For instance, an increase in EA interest rate resulting in an appreciation of
the euro increases the cost of imported intermediate goods and decreases output of
firms in CEECs, exerting a negative effect on stock prices. Furthermore, for firms
relying on foreign funding, an increase in foreign interest rates translates in an in-
crease in borrowing costs, making it more difficult to service existing loans and more
expensive to contract new ones. In addition, demand effects of contractionary mone-
tary policy in the EA reduce demand for NMS’ exports if quantity effects dominate
the consumption switching effect of CEECs’ exchange rate depreciation. Finally, as
EA interest rates increase, foreign investors might sell stocks held in NMS to invest
in interest bearing securities in EA. For all the aformentioned reasons, the first es-
say of this dissertation (Chapter 3) examines empirically the response of stock prices
in four NMS to shocks to both domestic and foreign (Euro Area) monetary policy.
The results reveal that, while domestic monetary policy shocks do not exert a sig-
nificant impact on stock prices, unexpected changes in Euro Area monetary policy
do. Specifically, a contraction in foreign monetary policy reduces stock prices in the
NMS. Furthermore, variables associated with international finance and trade (namely
the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate, are the main determinants of the vari-
ability of stock prices in the considered countries. This seems to suggest that in small
economies characterized by a high degree of openness, stock markets are more sen-
sitive to shocks related to international trade and finance.
A second issue the financial crisis led to reconsider, strictly linked to the first, is
the role of the financial sector as a source and propagation channel for shocks. While
imbalances in the United States’ financial sector were at the roots of the turmoil, dis-
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tress was quickly transmitted to international financial markets and real economies
worldwide. Heavy losses on the asset side of the balance sheet led banks to reduce
lending both domestically and internationally. As shown in section 1.5, the interna-
tional credit crunch resulted in a sudden stop of capital flows to emerging economies
and to the NMS, which were particularly dependent on foreign bank loans before the
crisis. As illustrated earlier, however, countries which experienced the largest amount
of capital inflows, the strongest credit and real estate booms, and largest macroeco-
nomic and financial imbalances before the crisis faced the largest contraction in GDP
growth. Furthermore, these countries share the common feature of having adopted
a fixed exchange rate during most of the pre-crisis period. Chapters 4 and 5 of this
dissertation present two modeling frameworks to study monetary policy conduct in
small open economies explicitly accounting for the role of the financial sector as a
source and propagation channel for shocks. However, the two chapters tackle the
issue from two very different standpoints while adopting the same modeling frame-
work of Dynamic Stochastic Genreal Equilibrium (DSGE).
Chapter 4 takes the perspective of the pre-crisis period, when countries were
exposed to large capital inflows directed to the financing of loans to both house-
holds and firms, and were characterized by high degrees of liability dollarization. As
the stylized facts presented earlier show, the build-up of imbalances and vulnerabili-
ties in good times can significantly amplify the effect of downturns. Furthermore, it
emerged that such imbalances were more pronounced in countries adopting a fixed
exchange regime. In this essay, I look at the optimal monetary policy of a small open
economy featuring the aforementioned characteristics and exposed to domestic tech-
nology and foreign capital inflow shocks. More specifically, the chapter is set in a
small open economy DSGE framework, in which capital inflows are directed to the
financing of both mortgage and investment loans. Credit frictions are present at both
the entrepreneurial and household level, allowing to explore the interaction between
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leverage dynamics in the two sectors. In addition, liabilities in the two sectors are de-
nominated in foreign currency, further increasing the dynamic interaction of leverage
upon occurrence of the considered shocks. The objective of this essay is threefold.
First, I compare the dynamics of the economy in response to productivity and capital
inflow shocks under different monetary policy rules that have been widely consid-
ered in the literature for emerging economies (i.e. standard Taylor rule, Taylor rule
with exchange rate smoothing and fixed exchange rate) and a Taylor rule reacting to
credit growth. Secondly, the dynamic interaction between leverage at the household
and entrepreneurial level is analysed and compared. Third, I compute the optimal
unrestricted monetary policy rule for a small open economy subject to productivity
and capital inflow shocks, under two central bank objectives, namely macroeconomic
stability and macroeconomic cum financial stability. The analysis largely confirms
the stilyzed facts. Small open economies pegging the exchange rate are characterized
by a more marked macro-financial overheating following capital inflow shocks, re-
flected in a greater credit growth and expansion of aggregate demand, and a stronger
increase in inflation. Furthermore, I find that in the case the monetary authority is not
concerned with financial stability, steering the interest rate responding only to infla-
tion and output deviations (i.e. following a standard Taylor rule) is optimal. Adding
financial stability to the central bank’s objectives does not result in an optimal reac-
tion to credit growth, while some degree of reaction to exchange rate depreciation is
optimal. In fact, reacting to credit growth implies a too sharp tightening of monetary
policy in response to capital inflow shocks, which results in further exchange rate
appreciation and further strengthens borrowers’ balance sheet encouraging more for-
eign borrowing. This seems to suggest that in a small open and dollarized economy, a
the central bank with financial stability objectives but equipped with one instrument,
namely the nominal interest rate, cannot simultaneously achieve macroeconomic and
financial stability.
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In Chapter 5, the interplay between exchange rate regimes and the strength
of cross-border financial linkages in the event of adverse foreign shocks is studied.
Here, instead of modeling a single small open economy, I consider a two country
DSGE model featuring two countries of different sizes which engage in trade and
cross-border lending relationships. In each country banks operate internationally and
are subject to balance sheet constraints. Specifically, banks in each country can bor-
row from both domestic and foreing lenders (depositors) and grant loans to domestic
and foreign entrepreneurs for the financing of investment in capital. This framework
allows to examine the transmission mechanism of real and financial shocks originat-
ing in a large and relatively closed economy to a small open economy, in addition to
the effect of the foreign country’s monetary policy responses on the small economy.
This analysis has multiple purposes. First, it examines the transmission mechanism
of foreign real and financial shocks to a small open economy under different ex-
change rate regimes and degrees of cross-border lending relationships. Second, it
addresses the issue of the ranking of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes and its
relation with the strength of cross-border lending relationships. In particular, the rel-
ative preformance of exchange rate regimes is evaluated from the point of view of
both the small open economy’s central bank and the welfare of its residents. Once
again, to represent the preferences of the central bank, I consider both the objectives
of macroeconomic and macro cum financial stability. The results of the model simu-
lation are consistent with the stylized facts. Specifically, the superiority of a flexible
exchange rate regime in stabilizing the economy facing adverse foreign shocks is
confirmed. Furthermore, a flexible exchange rate regime ranks higher from the per-
spective of both the small open economy’s central bank and households’ welfare.
From the point of view of the small open economy’s monetary authority, the relative
cost of pegging the currency increases the larger its concerns for financial stability,
since it involves a stronger monetary policy reaction to preserve the parity, which has
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repercussions on the volatility of financial variables. On the other hand, tighter cross-
border lending relationships decrease the relative cost of pursuing a fixed exchange
rate strategy.
Before turning to the details of the models and the presentation of results, the
following chapter offers an overview of the recent studies constituting the back-
ground and the scientific context of this dissertation, highlighting the contribution
each essays brings to the existing literature.
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RELEVANT LITERATURE
The economic literature following the global financial crisis is immense. Other than
constituting a worldwide economic and financial earthquake affecting the lives of
millions of people around the globe, the crisis severely shook the basis of the exist-
ing macroeconomic research and policy framework. Recent events led to a profound
reconsideration of well-established practices and methodologies used in academic
and institutional environments. All aspects of the crisis, from its causes to its con-
sequences and the possible policy responses, spurred a lively macroeconomic debate
putting into question the status quo of monetary policy research and practice. This
dissertation relates to four major themes which gained momentum during and in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. First, the renewed interest in the role of asset prices,
and the scope of monetary policy in influencing them. Second, the attention to a
particular category of asset prices, namely real estate prices, and to the role of the
real estate sector in transmitting macroeconomic fluctuations. Third, the recogni-
tion of the role of leverage and of international lending relationships as a source and
propagation channel for shocks. Finally, the reconsideration of the objectives and
implementation of monetary policy.
This chapter presents the major findings of these strands of literature, provid-
ing the scientific underpinning to the subsequent chapters. Section 2.1 presents the
empirical evidence on the interplay between monetary policy and stock prices, con-
stituting the background for Chapter 3. Section 2.2 present a general overview of
the main challenges to the prevailing practices in modeling for macroeconomic and
monetary policy analysis in the aftermath of the financial crisis, paving the way for
the methodology adopted in chapters 4 and 5. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 constitue the
scientific underpinning of Chapter 4, illustrating advances in modeling the housing34
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market, credit frictions and capital inflows in macroeconomic models. Section 2.5 is
related to the modeling of international financial linkages and studies focussing on
exchange rate regimes, which is particularly relevant to chapter 5. Finally, section
2.6 concludes presenting the debate on the reconsideration of the roles, objectives
and instruments of monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis.
2.1 Financial integration, monetary policy and stock prices
The interplay of monetary policy with stock prices was the subject of a large num-
ber of studies in the last two decades. If we think about the stock price as defined
by the discounted sum of future cash flows, it is immediately clear from this very
simple theoretical framework that an inverse relationship exsists between the inter-
est rate and stock prices. As interest rates increases, the future is discounted more
heavily and the current stock value decreases. In other words, as market interest
rates hike, the return required for investors to hold stocks (compared, for example,
to bonds or other savings instruments) increases, and the price of equity decreases.
However, there is a second, indirect effect of monetary policy on stock prices, oper-
ating through its effects on cash flows. A contractionary monetary policy increases
the cost of credit, limiting firms’ investment opportunities, and discourages demand
for firms’ products from domestic consumers, reinforceing the discount factor effect
in depressing stock prices. Empirical studies conducted so far broadly support the
notion that monetary policy is able to significantly affect stock prices, and that the
relationship between interest rates and stock prices is negative. A number of empir-
ical studies have been produced, relying on different statistical methods. The great
majority of studies relies on the methodology of structural VAR (SVAR), and fo-
cused, at least in the beginning, on the United States’ stock market and the monetary
policy of the FED. Thorbecke (1997) estimates a VAR model identified by means
of a Choleski scheme, including monthly equity returns, output growth, inflation,
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and the federal funds rate. His results highlight that expansionary monetary policy
has a large and positive effect on monthly stock returns. Thorbeke’s results are con-
firmed by Rapach (2001) who identifies the shocks in his VAR model by means of
long-run restrictions. Again, a negative relationship between changes in the Federal
Funds rate and stock prices emerges. The same conclusions for the US are reached
by Rigobon and Sack (2004), who identify their VAR by means of changes in the
covariance between stock prices and interest rates after a (known) change in the vari-
ance of monetary policy shocks. International evidence on the effect of monetary
policy on stock prices focuses mainly on developed countries. The earliest contri-
bution is by Lastrapes (1998), who imposes long-run restrictions to identify a VAR
model for the G7 countries and the Netherlands, which includes as endogenous vari-
ables an index of real equity prices, the interest rate, output, the price level and the
nominal money stock. He finds that in many countries real equity price indices re-
spond positively, persistently and significantly to an expansionary monetary policy
shock: in particular, the effect is stronger in the Netherlands, Italy and Japan (with
peaks between 2 and 3 percent). A later paper by Neri (2004) updates the results
of Lastrapes considering a longer sample period for the same countries. While rely-
ing on the same methodology of structural VAR, he adopts an identification scheme
based on short-run restrictions. Moreover, he models the G7 countries as small open
economies, where the exchange rate plays an important role in the monetary trans-
mission mechanism and its inclusion allows a better identification of money supply
shocks. The monetary policy rule is specified such that the supply of money is a func-
tion of the monetary aggregate, the nominal exchange rate, industrial production, the
consumer price index and the world commodity price index. It is therefore assumed
that the Central Bank reacts to contemporaneous domestic and external economic
developments. His results are in line with the notion that a contractionary monetary
shock produces a decrease in stock market index, in all countries considered.
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To my knowledge, the only existing study exploring the relationship between
foreign monetary policy and domestic stock prices is that by Li, Iscan and Xu (2010),
who study the differences in the response of the stock market to changes in mone-
tary policy in Canada (a small open economy) and the United States (a relatively
closed economy), modeling them differently according to their structural character-
istics. Their analysis relies on a VAR model following Lastrapes (1998), imposing
short-run identification restrictions. They find that while in the United States the
response of stock prices to a contractionary monetary policy shock is large and per-
sistent, in a small open economy such as Canada the response is smaller and less
persistent. Moreover, unexpected changes in the U.S. Federal Funds rate have a sig-
nificant impact on Canadian stock prices. They explain their findings in light of the
high degree of openness to international finance and trade of the Canadian economy.
2.2 Macroeconomic modeling after the crisis
The recent financial crisis seriously challenged the prevailing practices in modeling
for macroeconomic and monetary policy analysis, as much as to lead many econo-
mists and observers to consider it the crisis of modern macoreconomics. Most of the
criticisms raised to the mainstream macoreconomic models, i.e. the Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, rest on the inability of such framework
to foresee the financial crisis and, more in general, on the assumptions underlying the
prevailing modeling setup, which are deemed inadequate to represent the complexity
of economic behavior.
Criticisms to DSGE models can be grouped in two main categories. First, those
challenging the very essence of this research paradigm, i.e. the type of microfoun-
dations that form the basis of even the most stylized DSGE model. The use of the
"representative individual", the rationality of expectations, the existence of market
clearing conditions, the assumptions related to the completeness and efficiency of
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markets are considered to be major flaws in the microfoundations, unfit to represent
the economic reality and the behavior of economic agents.9 The second category of
criticisms, while accepting the DSGE modeling framework, focusses on its short-
comings in explaining relevant transmission mechanisms, deriving from quantities
(i. leverage) and/or sectors of the economy (i.e. the financial sector) not considered
in the models prevailing before the financial crisis. This view, advocated for exam-
ple by Tovar (2008), Blanchard (2009) and Wickens (2009) affirms the usefulness of
current macroeconomic models in providing intuitions necessary to understand the
behavior of the macroeconomy, however advocating the adoption of more realistic
assumptions involving, for instance, financial markets, and the presence of a wider
spectrum of economic agents.
The core structure of the mainstream new Keynesian DSGE model nests a fully
micro-founded approach based on utility maximisation of agents typical of the Real
Business Cycle framework with Keynesian elements such as price stickiness, ineffi-
ciency of aggregate fluctuations, and non-neutrality of money in the short run. The
typical DSGE environment is populated by households, firms and a government au-
thority in charge of conducting monetary and fiscal policy. Households face two main
choices, involving the allocation of expenditure between consumption and savings,
and that of their time between work and leisure. In the case of an open economy,
households also choose the composition of their consumption basket between do-
mestically and foreign produced goods. Households are monopolistic suppliers of
differentiated types of labor, which allows them some bargaining power when nego-
tiating the wage. Firms employ labor and rent capital in order to produce differen-
9 I refer to Meeusen (2010) and for a detailed discussion of these issues. Kirman (1992) focusses on
the meaningfulness of the representative agent assumption, while De Grauwe (2009) opposes the ra-
tional expectations hypothesis proposing an alternative modeling of expectations based on heuristics
and bounded rationality. A similar advocation for the recognition of the inappropriateness of the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis is presented by Akerlof and Schiller (2009). Other noteworthy criticisms
of the DSGE paradigm can be found in Solow (2008), Mankiw (2006), Caballero (2010).
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tiated domestic goods, which are then sold in the domestic economy and exported
to the rest of the world. As firms operate in a monopolistically competitive setting,
they set the price of their goods optimally. However, as it is the case for workers
in their wage bargaining process, a degree of stickiness in the setting of prices and
wages is introduced. In particular, it is assumed that in every period, only a frac-
tion of firms and labor unions are allowed to reset their prices and wages, leading to
a sluggish adjustment to shocks hitting the economy that increases their persistence.
Capital is accumulated through investment performed by households or capital pro-
ducers employing domestic and foreign goods, and it is subject to frictions such as
capital adjustment costs. Fiscal policy is modeled in a stylized Ricardian setting,
where the government collects taxes from households and uses them to finance gov-
ernment expenditure10. The central bank conducts moentary policy through a Taylor
rule, setting the nominal short-term interest rate in response to deviations of inflation
from a target and a measure of economic activity.
By far, the most important shortcoming of the "typical" DSGE model under-
lined by the financial crisis is the assumption of perfect and complete financial mar-
kets. In particular, in the standard model described above, relationships between real
and financial variables are modeled in a very stylized manner. In the standard small
open economy model, the domestic short-term interest rate and the exchange rate
are the only two financial variables linking domestic and foreign policies with real
activity. These models assume that financial markets are complete and efficient, char-
acterized by risk-free financial contracts and symmetry of information. They abstract
from the role of financial intermediaries, such as banks, in channeling resources from
savers to borrowers. However, issues as the interaction between asset prices and bal-
ance sheets, the relevance of housing prices and the role of real estate as collateral, the
10 As the focus of chapters 4 and 5, is not on fiscal policy, there is no explicit role for taxes and
government expenditure. A simple balanced budget equilibrium is assumed.
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pro-cyclicality of the financial system and the composition of balance sheets played a
crucial role in the financial turmoil, and, in order to be modeled, require abandoning
such strong assumptions on financial markets. Introducing financial frictions in the
standard New Keynesian DSGE model requires abandoning two assumptions. First,
it is necessary to introduce heterogeneity among economic agents, thereby abandon-
ing the representative agent framework. In a world populated by identical agents,
there is no scope for borrowing and lending; on the contrary, agents heterogeneities
with respect to their consumption preferences, financing constraints and productiv-
ity allows for some of them to be willing to lend wile others to be eager to borrow.
Secondly, information asymmetries between agents need to be introduced, in order
to generate a difference between the borrowing rate and the risk-free rate.
The approaches to introduce financial frictions in the DSGE framework are es-
sentially of three types: the collateral constraint framework, the costly state verifica-
tion approach and the introduction of explicit financial intermediaries. Both collateral
constraint and costly state verification approaches introduce procyclical interactions
between asset prices, the balance sheet position of borrowers and real economic ac-
tivity through changes in the borrowing possibilities. However, the channel through
which imperfections in financial markets impact on credit supply differ. While in the
collateral constraint framework, quantity limits on credit are imposed on borrowers
depending on the value of their collateral, in the costly state verification framework
it is the price of credit that varies according to borrowers’balance sheet conditions.11
The collateral constraint framework was pioneered by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), combining limited contract enforceability with heterogeneity of agents in
their intertemporal discount factor. Kiyotaki and Moore (henceforth, KM) divide the
population of agents into savers (patient) and borrowers (impatient), depending on
11 Brzoza-Brezina et al. (2011b) compare the properties of the two approaches in a consistent way,
and find that the business cycle properties of the external finance premium framework are more in line
with empirical evidence.
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their consumption propensity: impatient (patient) agents have a lower (higher) in-
tertemporal discount factor, and hence they prefer current (future) to future (current)
consumption, thereby preferring to borrow (lend). Furthermore, borrowers are credit
constrained, as they can only borrow against collateral. When asset prices rise, the
value of collateral increases and borrowers have access to more credit. As asset prices
increase in periods of economic expansion, the evolution of debt mirrors that of the
business cycle, amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations.
The costly state verification approach, extensively used in the following chap-
ters, traces its origin to the analysis by Townsend (1979) and was later incorporated
in a New Keynesian DSGE framework by Bernanke, Getler and Gilchrist (1999).
Townsend (1979) introduces heterogeneity among borrowers, as well as imperfect
information between borrowers and lenders. In his framework, borrowers are char-
acterized by idiosyncratic productivity, which determines the profitability of invest-
ment projects and hence the distribution of investment returns. While all agents know
the ex-ante probability distribution of firm returns, only firms privately and costlessly
observes the actual realized project outcome. Hence, information asymmetry applies
ex-post. In this setting, borrowers have an incentive to misreport the outcome of
their investment project in order not to repay the debt they contracted with lenders.
Lenders can observe the project’s outcome only upon payment of a monitoring cost,
and they will do so whenever the borrower declares default, which creates an incen-
tive for borrowers to report the true outcome. The debt contract between borrowers
and lenders is then optimal in the sense that the verification cost is minimized. In
fact, when the firm makes the contracted debt repayment, no cost is incurred. Only
when the firm declares bankruptcy, and hence cannot repay its debt, verification oc-
curs. In this instance, the firm is liquidated and its remaining assets are seized by the
lender. In such a setting, optimal incentive compatible constracts are chatacterized
by a positive premium induced by uncertainty on project returns and the presence
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of monitoring costs. hence, the asymmetric information problem leads to a higher
price of credit relative to the case where credit markets are perfect. As lenders are
imperfectly informed on the outcome of borrowers’ investment projects, they charge
a countercyclical lending premium, which positively depends on borrowers’ lever-
age. In periods of economic upturns, asset prices increase and with them the value of
firms’ assets and firms’ equity, thereby lowering the borrowing premium, encourag-
ing further investment and economic expansion.12
The third approach introduces financial intermediaries in DSGE models ex-
plicitly, which allows to incorporate intermediation costs and issues related to banks’
balance sheets. The aim of this strand of literature is to focus on the supply side of
credit, providing an endogenous determination of deposit and lending spreads, ac-
counting for the imperfect pass-through of monetary policy changes to retail banking
rates, and introducing an explicit role for bank capital to influence the transmission
of shocks.
A final criticism of DSGE models is of a more technical nature and relates
to the most common solution method, namely linearization around the steady state.
Linearization of the model equations around the seady state involves the computation
of a first order approximation, which implies certainty equivalence. This means that
expectations of future shocks are zero, therefore they do not influence decision rules.
Furthermore, the expected value of endogenous variables is equal to their steady state
value, ruling out the role of uncertainty. In genreal, linearization eliminates asymme-
tries, threshold effects, precautionary behavior and the consideration of large shocks.
Higher order approximations of the model equations are necessarey to analyze issues
12 Since these seminal contributions, a vast literature has flourished analyzing the role of financial
frictions in originating and propagating macroeconomic fluctuations. Estimated DSGE models pro-
vide quantitative evidence in favor of the financial accelerator, and find that its presence improves the
ability of models to capture the dynamics observed in the data (Elekdag et al.(2005), Christensen and
Dib (2008) and Saxegaard et al. (2010)). Furthermore, Christiano et al. (2010) affirm the importance
of financial shocks in accounting for a subtantial portion of economic fluctuations.
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among which welfare, asset pricing and portfolio choice models, volatility shocks.
The models presented in chapters 4 and 5 do not deal with this shortcoming, and still
rely on a first order approximation of the models equations13. This choice is mainly
dictated from the fact that issues such as portfolio allocations, volatility shocks and
precautionary behavior are not considered in these chapters. For the purpose of the
presented analysis, simulating the models relying on linearization of the model equa-
tions is adequate to answer the research questions at hand.
2.3 Incorporating the housing sector in DSGE models
In the same years, the recognition of the importance of housing as a source of col-
lateral, and of the negative implications of housing price bubbles for economic and
financial stability has spurred the attention of many macroeconomic researchers.14
Therefore, a growing number of studies have begun to appear, modeling collateral
constraints in housing investment, following the financial accelerator framework of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).15 The study that paved the way for research in the field
is by Iacoviello (2005), who reproduces the positive correlation between spending
and house price shocks introducing collateral constraints in real estate and capital in-
vestment.16 Furthermore, he finds that, allowing the central bank to respond to asset
prices does not improve its performance in stabilizing output and inflation. Chris-
tensen et al. (2007) extend the Iacoviello framework to an open economy setting
13 However, in chapter 5, the analysis of households’ welfare is based on a second order apporxima-
tion of the model.
14 I refer to Iacoviello (2010) for a review of the stilyzed facts on the housing sector, and its relevance
for macroeconomic fluctuations.
15 A notable seminal contribution on housing in macoreconomic models is by Davis and Heathcote
(2003). The authors construct a growth model with a production and a construction sector and succeed
at reproducing important features of U.S. data (namely the positive correlation between consumption,
GDP and investment in the two sectors, and the larger volatility of investment in the real estate,
compared to capital, sector).
16 However, note that, in his model, firms are constrained by the value of their real estate holdings,
not by that of their assets (capital stock).
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where collateral constraints apply to both real estate and capital investment financ-
ing and estimate the model with Canadian data. Their analysis provides an empirical
validation to the model’s ability to reproduce the positive response of consumption to
increases in house prices. However, comparing the model with one without collateral
constraints, they do not find large differences. The empirical relevance of housing is
further confirmed by Pariès and Notarpietro (2008) in a two country model with col-
lateral constraints on housing investment estimated with U.S. and Euro Area data.
Furthermore, their analysis of optimal monetary policy in this setting reveals a wel-
fare gain in allowing the central bank to respond to house price movements. The role
of developments in the housing market as a driving force of business cycle fluctu-
ations is explored by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in a model estimated for the U.S.
economy, asserting the fit of the model in explaining trends in U.S. housing prices
and investment. Furthermore, they find that collateral constraints on household bor-
rowing amplify the response of non-housing consumption. Kannan et al. (2009)
reexamine the interplay between house price booms and monetary policy. In partic-
ular, they find that a stronger monetary policy reaction to signs of overheating in the
economy (i.e. credit growth and house price booms) is successful in dampening the
acceleration effect of collateral constraints. Furthermore, they examine the appropri-
ateness of a specific macroprudential policy designed to offset credit developments,
and conclude for its usefulness. While these studies largely focused on developed
economies, particularly the United States, fewer studies looked at housing develop-
ments in emerging economies. Two exceptions are constituted by Brzoza-Brezina
and Makarski (2011a) and Ajevskis and Vitola (2011). In the former, a small open
economy DSGE model with collateral constraints on housing and capital financing
and a banking sector is estimated for Poland, in order to gauge the role played by
the banking sector in generating the slowdown during the financial crisis. The sec-
ond study estimates a small open economy with Latvian data to examine the role of
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financial intermediation in the business cycle, and the implications for monetary and
macroprudential policies.
Only few studies in the literature adopt the asymmetric information framework
in introducing financial frictions to mortgage credit (Aoki et al. (2004), Solomon
(2010) and Forlati and Lambertini (2011)). Aoki et al. (2004) focus on the im-
plications of credit frictions at the household level for the transmission of monetary
shocks. They conclude that the presence of asymmetric information in the credit con-
tract between financial intermediaries and households financing housing purchases
amplifies the transmission of changes in the interest rate to housing investment, house
prices and consumption. The objective of Forlati and Lambertini’s (2011) study is to
examine the impact of shocks to mortgage default rates on the macroeconomy, and to
evaluate different parametrizations of the central bank’s policy rule. They conclude
for the superiority of low-inertial rules in stabilizing the economy after an exoge-
nous increase in mortgage defaults. In particular, as inertial rules imply smoother
reductions in the nominal interest rate, they imply larger output contractions. Finally,
Solomon (2010) examines the interaction between consumer debt and firm debt over
the business cycle, focussing on the quantitative importance of feedback effects be-
tween the debt levels in the two sectors. His model abstracts from rigidities in price
and wage setting, and from monetary policy considerations. His estimation of the
model with U.S. data reveals that, while credit frictions at the firm level significantly
amplify the response of investment to shocks, they do not amplify output responses.
Furthermore, tighter borrowing conditions for households contribute to ease those
for firms, leading to a negative co-movement of financial variables across sectors.
However, all three studies are set in a closed economy context, and their conclu-
sions are of limited relevance to small, open, dollarized economies. In particular,
exchange rate fluctuations have nontrivial consequences for domestic production and
prices, thereby influencing consumption and housing demand. Furthermore, balance
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sheet effects of currency movements at both the household and firm level consider-
ably enrich the dynamics, possibly reverting the monetary policy implications drawn
for developed countries. Specifically, Forlati and Lambertini’s (2011) prescription
for non-inertial rules might be reverted in an open economy context, as large inter-
est rate responses imply exchange rate fluctuations that have large repercussions on
trade and balance sheets.
2.4 Credit frictions and capital flows in open economy DSGE
models
While the collateral constraint approach of Kiyotaki and Moore has been mainly ap-
plied to characterize credit market imperfections in real estate mortgages, the asym-
metric information framework by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) was mainly
used in the context of firms’ capital financing.
In the context of small, open, emerging market economies, issues as vulner-
ability to external shocks, limited access to credit and foreign currency borrowing
are particularly relevant, and have been incorporated in New Keynesian open econ-
omy models framework in order to study their monetary policy implications, with
a particular focus on the choice of exchange rate regime. Although the insulating
properties of flexible exchange rate regimes have been advocated since the times
of Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1960), researchers started to question the valid-
ity of this claim in the presence of credit frictions and liability dollarization. While
in a non-dollarized economy exchange rate movements affect primarily aggregate
demand through a change in relative prices, when debt is denominated in foreign
currency an additional balance sheet effect arises17, which increases the domestic
currency value of debt in case of a depreciation, increasing leverage and reducing
investment. Therefore, the negative balance sheet effect offsets the expansion of ag-
17 Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001).
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gregate demand brought about by the currency depreciation and, if it prevails, it offers
an incentive for the central bank to limit exchange rate fluctuations adopting a pegged
exchange rate.
Studies in this field largely focus on the impact of negative foreign shocks on
the small open dollarized economy. Cespedes, Chiang and Velasco (2004) explore
the stabilization properties of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a dynamic
general equilibrium model of a small open economy characterized by a financial ac-
celerator and liability dollarization, concluding that, although balance sheet effects
magnify the effect of external disturbances, a flexible exchange rate is still successful
in insulating the economy from external shocks. The superior stabilization proper-
ties of flexible exchange rates are confirmed by Devereux et al. (2006), which subject
their small open economy to foreign interest rate and terms of trade shocks. However,
their conclusion crucially hinges on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. With
high pass-through, stabilizing the exchange rate implies a high trade-off between out-
put and inflation volatility, since it requires a stronger interest rate response; when
pass-through is low, exchange rate movements do not have a strong destabilizing ef-
fect on the price level and it is better for the central bank to focus on stabilizing
inflation, while allowing for the currency to float. In a similar framework, Gertler et
al. (2007) explore the issue of whether the exchange rate regime influences a coun-
try’s response to a financial crisis, defined as an exogenous increase in the country’s
risk premium. They find that while the financial accelerator amplifies the effect of the
shock, it does not alter the ranking between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes:
in particular, they find that the effect of the financial accelerator is more muted with
a floating currency. Concerning liability dollarization, they conclude that, although it
lowers the attractiveness of a flexible exchange rate, this still leads to a smaller out-
put drop. While these papers treat the foreign economy as exogenous, Batini et al.
(2007) study the monetary policy implications of increased degrees of financial fric-
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tions and dollarization in a small open economy obtained as the limit case of a two-
country DSGE model and characterize the optimal monetary policy in this setting.
They conclude that the financial accelerator has a larger impact on the performance
of monetary policy rules than the presence of liability dollarization: in particular, tar-
geting the exchange rate is not optimal, as exchange rate movements attenuate the
effect of financial frictions.
These studies, however, abstract from three important issues, which I address
in Chapter 4. First, they do not consider the housing market and the interplay with fi-
nancial frictions at the household and firm level. Second, they discard potential finan-
cial stability objectives of the small open economy’s central bank. Their conclusions
concerning the superiority of flexible exchange rate regimes relies on the volatility
of output and inflation, without consideration of the volatility of financial variables.
Third, they model capital inflow shocks as an exogenous increase in the foreign inter-
est rate or in the country’s risk premium. However, the experience of many emerging
economies revealed that capital flows are largely influenced by waves of optimism
and pessimism of international investors, without any relation to country risk premia
or interest rate differentials. Curdia (2006 and 2007) models capital inflows as ex-
ogenous shifts in foreign investors’ perceptions of domestic borrowers’ productivity,
in a DSGE setting where financial frictions in the spirit of Bernanke at al. (1999) are
introduced on the financing of intermediate goods used for production. In particular,
foreign lenders have a distorted perception of borrowers’ idiosyncratic productivity
and, when they perceive it to be higher, they loosen credit conditions, leading to a de-
crease in lending rates. As the financial accelerator kicks in, the country experiences
a reinforcing spiral of improved lending conditions, rising asset prices and increased
net worth, that further lower borrowing costs through a positive effect on leverage. A
similar modeling choice is adopted in a series of papers by Ozkan and Unsal (2010,
2011), in order to analyze the transmission of a financial crisis to a small open econ-
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omy and evaluate monetary policy responses. However, their studies abstract from
credit frictions at the household level and financial stability objectives of the mone-
tary authority.
2.5 International financial linkages in DSGE modeling
Models with frictions in credit markets have also been used to explore the role of fi-
nancial markets in the international transmission of shocks and international business
cycle correlations. While increased business cycle co-movement has been observed
even when countries are hit by asymmetric shocks, this result does not emerge from
traditional open economy models (see for example Gali’ and Monacelli (2002)). In
fact, in these models the international transmission of shocks happens through in-
ternational trade and demand switching effects. In a series of papers, Faia (2001,
2002, 2007, 2010) extends the financial accelerator model to a two country frame-
work, and finds that credit frictions enrich the international transmission mechanism
with an "indirect financial spillover effect" which can be strong enough to offset the
expenditure-switching effect and yield a wide range of business cycle correlations.
In particular, Faia (2002) finds that the magnitude of the financial spillover effect in-
creases with the degree of financial similarity between countries, leading to positive
business cycle correlation18. In a similar framework, Gilchrist (2003) explores the
role of financial leverage in the international transmission of shocks. Specifically,
he focuses on the transmission of shocks from developed countries (characterized by
lower levels of leverage) and developing countries (highly leveraged). His results
suggest that, not only slowdowns in economic activity are severely amplified by fi-
18 In a later paper, Faia (2007) explores the effect of different monetary policy rules (currency union,
unilateral peg and inflation targeting) in a similar model with financial differences. She finds that
international business cycle synchronization is enhanced in a currency area compared to an indepen-
dent policy regime. Furthermore, under the unilateral peg, the business cycle co-movements are very
close to the ones arising under the currency area.
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nancial frictions, but high-leverage economies are particularly vulnerable to external
shocks, and that asymmetries between lending conditions across economies provide
a strong source of transmission for shocks from developed to developing economies.
While this modeling approach offers interesting theoretical insights on the role of fi-
nancial frictions in altering the international transmission of shocks, it still fails on
empirical grounds, to replicate observed business cycle correlations. Alpanda and
Aysun (2012) estimate a model in the spirit of Gilchrist (2003) and Faia (2010) with
Bayesian methods in order to test its ability to reproduce Euro Area responses to
US shocks. They find that the model is able to generate meaningful business cycle
correlations only when allowing for correlated shocks across countries.
Extending the framework of an increasing number of studies incorporating a
banking sector is standard DSGE models19 to an open economy setting, a recent
strand of literature proved successful in producing models capable of accounting for
the observed business cycle correlations and international transmission of country-
specific financial shocks. Motivated by the large observed cross-country spillovers
of financial shocks during the financial crisis, many studies have appeared embed-
ding international financial linkages in two country models of the New Keynesian
paradigm (Mendoza and Quadrini (2009), Davis (2011), Kollmann et al. (2011),
Yao (2012), Ueda (2012), Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2012)). The key feature of
these models is the simultaneous presence of frictions in credit markets, and financial
institutions engaged in cross-border lending. In this setting, international credit con-
19 The recognition of the key importance of the banking sector in originating and propagating shocks
led many researchers to model financial intermediation in closed economy DSGE models. A non-
exhaustive list of such studies includes Hirakata et al. (2009), Davis (2010), Meh and Moran (2010),
Dib (2010), Gerali et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Rannenberg
(2011). Estimated versions of these models reveal their ability to fit the data (especially financial
variables) quite well and that banking sector shocks are important in explaining macroeconomic fluc-
tuations (Hirakata et al (2010), Villa and Yang (2011)).
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tracts generate cross-country financial interdependence, as balance sheet conditions
of borrowers in one country will affect financial institutions in any country finan-
cially linked to it. On one side, international lending consitutes an additional channel
through which foreign shocks are transmitted. While in case of financial autarky, say,
a foreign monetary policy shock is transmitted internationally to the extent that it al-
ters bilateral exchange rates, relative prices and international demand patterns, in a
financially integrated world it has an additional direct effect through its impact on
the banking sector and on lending rates in any country borrowing from on the one
where the shock originates. On the other hand, modeling financial linkages explic-
itly allows to study the inter-country transmission of financial shocks, which directly
impact other countries through cross-border financial exposures. Adopting different
modeling approaches, these studies broadly affirm the importance of cross-country
banking exposures in the propagation of country-specific real and financial shocks.
Compared to the case of financial autarky, the interdependence of balance sheet con-
ditions resulting from cross-border banking activities yields larger co-movement of
business cycles and a stronger spillover of disturbances.
The interplay between financial frictions and exchange rate regimes has so far
been studies only in models where cross-border lending relationships are not present.
Faia (2010), using a two country DSGE model with financial frictions but no inter-
national borrowing, argues for the superiority of a floating exchange rate in isolating
a country from foreign shocks. Furthermore, the desirability of a floating currency is
enhanced by the presence of financial frictions: not only the output-inflation trade-off
is steeper when the currency is pegged, but its intensity increases with the degree of
credit frictions.
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 differs from previous studies mainly be-
cause it examines exchange rate policy in a world where even country-specific shocks
generate positive international business cycle co-movement, obtained by modeling
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cross-country balance sheet interdependence explicitly. While in the literature an-
alyzing exchange rate regimes in financially dollarized economies the degree of fi-
nancial dollarization is taken as a proxy of financial interdependence, issues related
to international spillovers through direct bank exposure to foreign borrowers are dis-
carded. In a small open economy context, this rules out the analysis of foreign finan-
cial shocks, while, in two country models, it limits the transmission of these shocks
to real channels. In fact, in this context, the foreign financial shock feeds to the do-
mestic economy only to the extent that changes in foreign investment and output
alter international relative prices and demand, and trigger a reaction of the domes-
tic central bank. In a model with explicit financial linkages, a second direct effect
is present. A foreign financial shock is directly transmitted to the domestic econ-
omy, as domestic banks and lenders are involved in lending contracts with foreign
agents. Furthermore, in this setup the exchange rate plays a role in the balance sheets
of banks in both countries, giving rise to additional inter-country dynamics.
2.6 Reconsidering the role of monetary policy
Contrary to previous episodes, the undisputed protagonist of the recent global cri-
sis were the financial sector and its underlying instability. One of the most important
lessons recent events have taught academics and policymakers is that financial imbal-
ances can arise even in an environment of low inflation and overall macroeconomic
stability. In particular, it has been argued that asset price bubbles and excessive credit
growth might occur as a consequence of stable inflation expectations and optimistic
prospects about the future economic outlook, which encourage risk taking and finan-
cial fragility. The crisis led, on one side, to reexamine the appropriateness of the
traditional objectives of monetary policy, i.e. inflation and output stability, on the
grounds that they might not be necessarily conducive of financial stability. On the
other hand, it spurred a debate on the implementation of monetary policy, reconsid-
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ering the effectiveness of inflation targeting regimes whereby central banks set the
policy rate reacting to inflation and a measure of economic activity. Hence, the dis-
pute on monetary policy conduct in the aftermath of the crisis evolves around two
main questions. Should central banks be concerned about financial, in addition to
macroeconomic, stability? And, if so, should central banks react to financial vari-
ables when setting the monetary policy rate?
On one hand, proponents of the inflation targeting regime argue that, to the
extent that asset price inflation and credit growth lead to an expansion of aggregate
demand through their effect on wealth and spending, a monetary policy reacting to
inflation and output will automatically counteract financial imbalances. The main
analytical contribution to this view is offered by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) who
use a small scale macroeconomic model to show both theoretically and empirically
that, to the extent that central banks react to inflation in the pursuit of price stability,
a reaction to changes in asset prices is warranted only as far as they contain useful
information about inflationary or deflationary pressures.20 Of a similar opinion are
Bullard and Schaling (2002), who consider a macroeconomic model where the cen-
tral bank adds asset prices as a target in an otherwise traditional Taylor rule. Their
analysis suggests that asset price targeting can interfere with the minimization of in-
flation and output volatility, leading to suboptimal levels of inflation and the output
gap. Faia and Monacelli (2003) focus on the welfare implications of asset prices
targeting and dismiss such a monetary policy strategy on the grounds that it is not
conducive to higher welfare. The view against asset prices targeting has been widely
embraced by central bankers in the United States21: in a recent speech, the Philadel-
phia Fed President Charles Plosser asserted that "Financial stability should not be an
20 A similar conclusion is reached, a few years later, by Distayat (2005). In his model, the nonfunda-
mental component of real asset returns appears in the central bank’s optimal monetary policy because
it helps to predict future output and inflation dynamics.
21 See for example Bernanke (2002), Ferguson (2003).
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explicit objective of monetary policy per se" and that, in his opinion, "we need to re-
sist the temptation of adding the financial stability goal to the burdens of monetary
policy".22
On the other hand, proponents of a "leaning against the wind" approach of cen-
tral banks to inflating asset prices and credit growth argue that output and inflation
stability might not be sufficient to induce stable growth in asset prices and credit,
with destabilizing consequences on the financial sector and, ultimately, on the real
economy. Among the early advocates of this view are Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio
and Lowe (2002 and 2004), Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and White (2006). Their argu-
ment rests on the claim that setting monetary policy only considering developments
in inflation and the output gap might be a too narrow approach, and that better results
in terms of stabilization could be achieved by explicitly targeting unsustainable in-
creases in asset prices and excessive credit growth, even at the cost of increased vari-
ability in inflation and output. In particular, it is argued that ensuring a stable path
of credit growth is conducive of both financial stability (through reduced swings in
asset prices and sustainable leverage dynamics) and macroeconomic stability (ham-
pering excessive fluctuations in consumption and investment). More recently, Curdia
and Woodford (2010), use a new Keynesian DSGE model with credit frictions and
financial intermediaries to conclude that it is optimal to include a spread adjustment
term in the Taylor rule. Woodford (2012) strongly encourages central banks to ac-
knowledge the influence of monetary policy on financial stability, and he argues that
the monetary policy trade-off between inflation and financial stability is very similar
to that between inflation and output stabilization. In the same way as central banks
strike a balance between price stability and output gap stabilization engaging in a
so-called "flexible inflation targeting regime", they may very well be able to find a
22 Speech held in occasion of the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, on January 4th
2013.
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short-run path for the economy balancing inflation stability against output gap and
financial stabilization. The optimal target criterion resulting from his model reveals
that it is appropriate to set the monetary policy instrument to “lean against” a credit
boom, even if this requires a temporary sacrifice in terms of inflation and output gap.23
The validity of a central bank’s financial stability objective from a welfare standpoint
has been emphasized by Angeloni and Faia (2013). By making a quantitative com-
parison of welfare under different central bank’s objectives, they conclude for the
appropriateness of financial stability being included as one of such objectives. Fi-
nally, contrary to their American counterparts, European central bankers seem more
keen to consider financial stability concerns in their monetary policy conduct and to
amend the implementation of monetary policy to include financial variables. In a
recent speech at the Czech National Bank, Yves Mersch, a member of the ECB’s Ex-
ecutive Board, stated that, although the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain
price stability, "it may be desirable to incorporate in the decision-making process of
monetary policy certain financial variables, which, over the medium to longer term,
may influence inflationary developments (e.g. excessive credit growth, asset bubbles
etc.)".24
How is this debate relevant to emerging economies? Middle income coun-
tries can be ascribed characteristics that distinguish them from mature, high income
countries. First of all, financial markets are less developed, in particular capital mar-
kets. As equity issuance remains limited, firms rely more heavily on bank credit
in order to finance their investment projects.25 Second, emerging economies, and
23 However, Woodford underlines how his analysis does not imply that financial stability should
be the primary responsibility of monetary policy. As his analysis reveals the presence of trade-offs
between financial stability and traditional monetary policy objectives, the development of additional
tools (i.e. macroprudential policy) is of utmost importance.
24 Speech by Yves Mersch, member of the Executive Board of the ECB in occasion of the seminar:
“Financial Stability Policies in a Post-Crisis World” hel at the Czech National Bank, 4 March 2013.
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130304.en.html
25 Data on stock market capitalization reveal that, in 2007, the size of Eastern European stock markets
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among them particularly Eastern European countries, are heavily financially inte-
grated, which makes them vulnerable to external developments and to international
financial cycles.26 Finally, middle income countries have endured several crises in the
past decades, mainly associated with swings in capital inflows, and preceded by the
accumulation of large imbalances (currency mismatches, excessive credit growth, as-
set price inflation). Hence, in this context, it might be worth for monetary authorities
to adapt their monetary policy strategy in order to prevent the build up of imbal-
ances, with potentially large effects on welfare. In addition to the pros and cons to
financial stability concerns in monetary policy making put forward by the literature27,
some considerations are particularly relevant for emerging economies (Agénor and
Pereira da Silva (2011)). On one side, monetary policy might have undesirable side
effects in the event of capital inflows which are accompanied by exchange rate ap-
preciations, credit growth and inflationary pressures. In particular, a tightening of
monetary policy which increases the interest rate differential of the small open econ-
was much inferior to the average in Euro Area countries. While Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and the
Slovak Republic settled on values below 30% of GDP, the average of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic
and Poland amounted to 50% of GDP. Only in Slovenia, stock market capitalization reached a value
as high as 60% of GDP. In comparison, the average of Euro Aerea countries exceeded 80% of GDP
(Pirovano et al. (2011)).
26 As reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the degree of international financial integration
measured through the capital account of the Central and Eastern European economies has doubled
since the beginning of the transition process. The sum of external assets and liabilities as a percentage
of GDP was on average 80% in 1994 and rose to 160% by 2004.
27 The arguments opposing the inclusion of financial stability considerations in monetary policy’s
objectives and implementation relate mainly to the adequacy of the short-term interest rate in dealing
with financial imbalances. It is argued, first, that multiple objectives call for multiple instruments
(the Tinbergen principle) and, second, that macroeconomic and financial stability necessarily imply a
trade-off for the central bank. Third, reacting to financial variables might induce too large swings in the
monetary policy rate exerting a destabilizing effect on the real economy. The case for a more proactive
role of monetary policy in pursuit of financial stability objectives rests on the following arguments.
First, if monetary policy had not been so accommodative before the crisis and took leverage and
credit developments into account, it could have mitigated the impact of the crisis. Second, monetary
policy might be very effective in deflating credit-financed bubbles. Third, macroprudential policy
as implemented before the crisis did not prove to be very successful. For a thorough review of the
arguments in favor and against financial consideration in monetary policy conduct, see Kohn (2006)
and Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2011).
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omy might reinforce the capital inflow. In this circumstance, countercyclical policies
such as capital controls might be a more suitable alternative. On the other hand, re-
lying too heavily on macroprudential regulation by limiting credit availability and
increasing borrowing costs might encourage the shadow banking sector, making it
even more difficult to maintain financial stability. Furthermore, as confirmed by the
recent experience, in the run-up to a financial crisis both macroeconomic and finan-
cial instability increase, justifying a preemptive intervention of the central bank in
normal times to offset the growing financial vulnerability.
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CHAPTER 3
MONETARY POLICY AND STOCK PRICES IN SMALL OPEN
ECONOMIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE NEW EU MEMBER
STATES
This chapter focuses on the interplay between financial integration, monetary pol-
icy and stock prices in four NMS, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia.28 Given the significant body of studies pointing towards a signifi-
cantly inverse relationship between short-term interest rates and stock prices in ad-
vanced economies, in this chapter I assess whether this finding holds also for small
economies characterized by tight trade and financial linkages with larger countries.
The tight trade relationships and heavy dependence of the NMS on loans originating
in Euro Area countries leads to assume that cash flows of NMS’s firms, and hence
stock prices, might be increasingly influenced by Euro Area monetary policy.
According to the well-known present value model, the current price of a stock
is defined as the discounted value of the stream of future expected cash flow. From
this simple model it emerges that monetary policy can influence stock prices in two
ways. A first, direct effect is on the discount rate, if discount rates are tied to market
rates, which the Central Bank is able to influence. Secondly, monetary policy affects
expectations of future cash flow. A rise in the interest rate implies a higher cost of in-
vestment, which in turn decreases expected future cash flow, leading to lower stock
prices. In turn, stock prices affect the real economy by influencing financial wealth,
and with it consumption and investment decisions. The two effects operate in the
same direction: a contractionary monetary policy action, i.e. an increase in the policy
rate, increases the discount rate and reduces expected future cash flow, implying a de-
28 A version of this chapter was published as Pirovano, M., 2012, "Monetary policy and stock prices
in small open economies: empirical evidence ofr the new EU member states", Economic Systems, 36,
pp. 372–390.58
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crease in stock prices. However, in economies characterized by high degrees of trade
and financial openness, foreign interest rates (especially the one of the country they
are mostly tied to) might have important effects on stock prices. First, movements
in borrowing and exchange rates, and demand effects can affect firms’ performance.
As an example, anappreciation of the foreign currency due to a tightening of the for-
eign monetary policy stance increases the cost of imported intermediate goods and
decreases output of firms in CEECs, exerting a negative effect on stock prices. Fur-
thermore, for firms relying on foreign funding, an increase in foreign interest rates
translates in a raise in borrowing costs, making it more difficult to service existing
loans and more expensive to contract new ones. In addition, demand effects of con-
tractionary monetary policy in the EA reduce demand for NMS’ exports if quantity
effects dominate the consumption switching effect of CEECs’ exchange rate depre-
ciation. Finally, as interest rate differentials increase, investors might rebalance their
investment portfolios.
This chapter deals with three main issues. First, I examine the effect of do-
mestic monetary policy on stock prices in the NMS, an issue not investigated so far.
While monetary policy shocks are passed through the real economy with consid-
erable delay, financial markets are much more reactive, in that asset prices tend to
quickly incorporate new information. Secondly, in light of the heavy financial link-
ages between the NMS and the Eurozone, I examine the response of the domestic
stock market to Euro Area monetary policy shocks. Thirdly, I determine which do-
mestic and foreign variables are the main drivers of stock price movements in the
countries under analysis.
The methodology is rather standard. I estimate a macro-econometric model of
a small open economy using monthly observations on seven macroeconomic vari-
ables for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. I identify the structural
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VARs by means of short-run restrictions following Neri (2004), Jarocinsky (2008)
and Li, Iscan and Xu (2010) and examine impulse-response functions and forecast er-
ror variance decompositions. The study is structured as follows. Section 3.1 presents
the baseline SVAR model, the identification scheme and the resulting equations. In
section 3.2 reports the results, after describing the dataset and testing for model ad-
equacy. I assess the robustness of our results to alternative identification schemes in
section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes and proposes directions for further research.
3.1 The baseline model
The analysis is based on the identification and estimation of a Structural Vector Au-
toregressive (SVAR) model. SVARs are extensively used in macroeconomic analysis
and particularly in monetary economics, in order to analyze the effect of exogenous
shocks in monetary policy on macroeconomic variables. One of the toughest chal-
lenges of modeling monetary policy is to distinguish between monetary policy ac-
tions that the market has already anticipated and those it has not. If we accept the
rational expectations hypothesis, anticipated monetary policy changes will already be
embedded in the current stock prices, while only unanticipated actions will have an
effect on current returns. In this context, the VAR framework is the most adequate.
The starting point of the analysis is a VAR model without exogenous vari-
ables29, whose reduced form is:
xt =  0 +  1xt 1 +  2xt 2 + :::+  pxt p + ut (3.1)
Where xt is a (n  1) vector of the n endogenous variables included in the
VAR (in our case n = 7), xt 1; :::; xt p are (n  1) vectors of the lagged values of
29 In the present context, it might have been useful including exogenous foreign variables in order to
control for external developments in the Euro Area economy and stock market. Nevertheless, these
variables are correlated with the Euro Area short-term interest rate, thereby violating the exogeneity
requirement.
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the endogenous variables,  1; :::; p are (n n) coefficient matrices,  0 is a (n 1)
vector of constant terms and ut is a (n  1)vector of white noise disturbances, with
E(ut) = 0 and variance-covariance matrix E(utu0t) = u.
As the components of ut may be instantaneously correlated (i.e. the matrix u
may be not diagonal), the impulse responses obtained from the reduced form model
might not properly reflect the relations between the variables.
In order to consider a model with uncorrelated residuals, we can model the
instantaneous relationships between variables directly. In particular, if the reduced
form disturbances are linear combinations of the structural shocks ("t) in the form
But = "t, we can define the following structural model:
Bxt = A0 + A1xt 1 + A2xt 2 + :::+ Apxt p + "t (3.2)
Where xt is again our (n  1) vector of the n endogenous variables at time
t; A0 = B 0 is a vector of constants, A1 = B 1; :::; Ap = B p are matrices of
coefficients of the p lagged values of all endogenous variables and "t = But, where
E("t) = 0 and E("t"0t) = BuB0. Hence, for a proper choice of B, the variance-
covariance matrix of the structural innovations will be diagonal.
The reduced form model in equation (3.1) has N2p + N + (N(N + 1))=2
parameters to be estimated: N2p + N in the equation for xt and (N(N + 1))=2
unique elements in the covariance matrix. The structural form of equation (3.2) has
2N + N2p unknown parameters, which is smaller than N2p + N + (N(N + 1))=2.
It is therefore necessary to impose restrictions on the reduced form model in order to
identify the primitive system. In particular, given estimates of the uts, I will identify
the structural shocks imposing suitable, economically meaningful restrictions on the
B matrix of contemporaneous coefficients.30 The seven variables in our model are,
30 Alternatively, we could restrict the reduced form model by means of the so-called Choleski de-
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in order: the Euro Area interest rate (EAint), the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the
euro (er),31 the industrial production index (ip), the domestic price level (cpi), the
domestic short-term interest rate (i), the monetary aggregate M2 (m) and the stock
market index (smi).32
In order to identify the structural shocks I impose short-run restrictions on the
B matrix following Neri (2004) and Li, Iscan and Xu (2010). As a result, the long-run
behavior of the model is left completely unconstrained.
The following relation between the reduced and the structural error terms is
proposed:
0BBBBBBB@
"EAint
"er
"ip
"cpi
"i
"m
"gmi
1CCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 b21 1 0 0 0 0 0
 b31  b32 1 0 0 0 0
 b41  b42  b43 1 0 0 0
0  b52 0 0 1  b56 0
0 0  b63  b64  b65 1 0
 b71  b72  b73  b74  b75  b76 1
1CCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBB@
uEAint
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uip
ucpi
ui
um
ugmi
1CCCCCCCA
(3.3)
In particular, I set the diagonal elements of the B matrix to unity as this allows
writing the k   th equation of the model with xk;t on the left-hand side.
composition, which consists in restricting the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals to be
a lower-triangular matrix and which leads to a just-identified model (i.e. a model with as many re-
strictions as there need to be). Although it is handy from a practical point of view, the Choleski
decomposition imposes restrictions without a theoretical foundation; moreover, it imposes an order-
ing to the variables in the VAR which might or might not be appropriate. Hence, if there is not a
theoretical basis to impose such restrictions, the impulse-responses might be poorly identified. We
will impose a Choleski type of identification as a sensitivity check (cfr. section 5).We refer to En-
ders (2004) for a detailed description of the different ways to impose restrictions on the reduced form
model and their criticism.
31 Defined as the price of foreign currency (euro) in terms of domestic currency.
32 Data on the consumer price index, industrial production index and the monetary aggregate (money
+ quasi-money) are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data on exchange rates, the
money market rate (except for Hungary, where the T-bill rate is used) and the stock market index are
from Eurostat. All variables except the short-term interest rate and the Euro Area interest rate are in
logarithms.
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The money supply equation is a feedback rule according to which the Central
Bank sets the short-term interest rate. I assume that, when setting the monetary pol-
icy instrument, the Central Bank does not observe the current values of real output
and the price level, which are observable only after a lag.33 Hence, the interest rate is
defined as dependent on contemporaneous values of the exchange rate and the mon-
etary aggregate, and on lagged values of the other variables in the model (embedded
in the term h (xt p)), as follows:
it = b50 + b52ert + b56mt + h(xt p) + "t;i (3.4)
In particular, I expect the coefficient b52 to be positive: a depreciation of the
exchange rate (increase in ert) causes imports from abroad to be more expensive,
hence resulting in inflationary pressures. The Central Bank is then supposed to react
by tightening monetary policy. The inclusion of the exchange rate in the Central
Bank’s reaction function is motivated by the choice of exchange rate regime in the
NMS. Although in the late 1990s many countries opted for flexible regimes, their
Central Banks tried to keep the domestic currency to fluctuate too much. In most
recent years, while Poland adopted a free floating regime, the other countries opted
for less flexible alternatives: while Hungary and Slovenia pegged their currencies to
the euro with large fluctuation bands, the Czech Republic adopted a managed floating
regime with the euro as a reference currency (Maria-Dolores, 2008). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that these countries have been following, although not as their
primary objective, some form of exchange rate targeting. The last term in equation
(3.4) represents an exogenous shift in monetary policy: a positive (negative) shock to
the short-term interest rate results in an unexpected tightening (relaxing) of monetary
policy.
33 A similar specification is adopted by Li, Iscan and Xu (2010). This assumption is reasonable in
light of the monthly frequency of our dataset, but will be relaxed as a robustness check.
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The equation representing equilibrium on the money market is a pretty standard
one, linking the monetary aggregate to output, the price level and the interest rate.
The resulting LM-type equation is the following:
mt = b60 + b63ipt + b64cpit + b65it + h(xt p) + "t;m (3.5)
Where a negative relationship in the (m; int) space is expected. "t;m is an
exogenous shock in the demand of money. The equation for the aggregate supply is
specified as follows:
ipt = b30 + b31EAintt + b32ert + h(xt p) + "t;ip (3.6)
Equation (3.6) states that industrial production in our model is influenced by
contemporaneous values of the Euro Area interest rate and the bilateral exchange rate
with the euro, as well as an exogenous aggregate supply shock ("t;ip)., which can be
interpreted as a productivity shock or a cost push shock. The proposed specification
of the equation for industrial production is motivated by two considerations. First,
the Euro Area interest rate enters the equation in reason of the heavy presence of
foreign investors in the NMS34, which leads us to assume that changes in the foreign
interest rate will have an impact on the capital stock of domestic firms. Furthermore,
as firms rely on foreign borrowing to finance their capital stock (see Rosenberg and
Tirpak (2008) on private sector foreign borrowing in the new EU member states), an
34 Since the beginning of the transition process, the Central and Eastern European countries caught
the interest of foreign investors. The last two decades saw a marked increase in the stock of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the region. While in 1990, the stock of FDI constituted a negligible share of
GDP (1.5% in Hungary and 0.2% in Poland), ten years later it accounted, on average, for 30% of GDP
(38.2% in the Czech Republic, 47.7% in Hungary, 20% in Poland and 14.8% in Slovenia and, by 2007,
it had increased by 50%, reaching 57.7% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 70.5% in Hungary, 33.8%
in Poland and 22.5% in Slovenia (UNCTAD, 2008). While the manufacturing sector attracted 65% of
total FDI in the region in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Resmini (2000)), in most
recent years foreign investors diverted their attention towards the services sector, which comprised
around 55% of total FDI in the period 1998-2003 (ECB, 2010). FDI is highly beneficial for capital
formation in Central and Eastern Europe: Krkoska (2001) estimates that a 1% increase in Foreign
direct investment leads to a 0.7% increase in capital formation.
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increase in the foreign interest rate represents an increase in their production costs.
Second, the bilateral exchange rate enters the equation in reason of the importance
of imported intermediate goods in production. Empirical estimates by Reininger
(2007) assess the prominent role of fixed investment in determining import demand
in the new EU member states. A depreciation of the domestic currency represents
an increase in marginal cost for firms relying on imported inputs, thereby negatively
affecting production.
Following Li, Iscan and Xu (2010), aggregate demand is divided in domestic
and external demand. Domestic demand is defined in terms of the factors affecting
the domestic price level, as follows:
cpit = b40 + b41EAintt + b42ert + b43ipt + h(xt p) + "t;cpi (3.7)
Where I assume a certain degree of price stickiness reflected in the coefficient
b43. The error term represents exogenous demand shocks, e.g. an exogenous change
in preferences. External demand is defined by the exchange rate equation. I define
the exchange rate as being conditional only on contemporaneous values of the for-
eign interest rate and lagged values of all other variables in the model. This approach
differs from Li, Iscan and Xu (2010) in that they consider the exchange rate market to
be strongly efficient, i.e. incorporating all publicly and privately available informa-
tion. In their model, the exchange rate is dependent on the contemporaneous values
of real output, the domestic price level, the monetary aggregate, the short-term inter-
est rate and the foreign interest rate.35 I adopt a different approach, by modeling the
exchange rate equation as:
ert = b20 + b21EAintt + h(xt p) + "t;er (3.8)
35 This alternative will be explored as a robustness check.
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We motivate this specification mainly because of the large, short-term and
interest-sensitive capital inflows which are typical of the region.36 I hypothesize that
a contemporaneous shift in the foreign interest rate and hence a change in the in-
terest rate differential produces capital flows that put pressures on the value of the
currency. The stock price equation is left completely unrestricted. This implies that
the stock price index at time t is influenced by contemporaneous and lagged values
of all the variables in the model, plus an exogenous shock, which we can interpret
as an exogenous shock in the demand for domestic equities. The rationale for this
model approach stems from two considerations. First, according to the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis, stock prices at a given time reflect all available information. Given
stock markets’ quick receptiveness of new information and the monthly frequency of
our dataset, I assume that the stock price at any point in time incorporates past and
present information on all real and financial variables available to the agents. Sec-
ond, as the stock price index is the variable of interest of our analysis, I do not want to
impose any a priori restriction on its responsiveness to other variables in the model.
Finally, the foreign interest rate is a contemporaneously exogenous variable.37
3.2 Data and estimation results
3.2.1 Dataset and preliminary analysis
The SVAR model is estimated using data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia. I exclude the Baltic States and Bulgaria because they adopted a strictly
36 The new and potential EU countries have experienced episodes of large capital inflows since the
beginning of the transition process (Cardarelli et al. (2010)). While during the 1990s foreign direct
investment was the pre-eminent form of foreign investment, since the mid 2000s short-term capital
inflows in the form of cross-border loans became predominant (Pirovano, Vanneste and Van Poeck,
2011). Furthermore, as noted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Western European countries are the
main financial trading partner of the NMS and most of the transactions are denominated in euro.
37 While in principle the foreign interest rate should be modeled as strictly exogenous, such an ap-
proach wouldn’t allow to examine the responses of the endogenous variables to shocks in Euro Area
monetary policy.
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fixed exchange rate regime for most of the sample period.38 While in the beginning
of the transition period also the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland operated un-
der fixed exchange rate regimes, from the late 1990s they opted for more flexible
systems. The Czech Republic operates under a managed float since 1997, with a
brief interruption in 2001 and 2002, when it adopted an independent floating regime.
Hungary adopted a crawling band system in 1995, increased flexibility adopting a
managed float in 2001 and switched to a pegged regime with large fluctuation bands
in 2003. Only recently, in 2008, it reverted to a flexible regime. Poland shifted from
a crawling band (from 1995 to 1999) to an independent float. Finally, Slovenia op-
erated under a managed float until 2004, when, in order to join ERM II, pegged its
currency to the Euro with large fluctuation bands. (Maria-Dolores (2009))
Furthermore, following Jarocinski (2008) I exclude Romania and Slovakia be-
cause for a large part of the sample they exhibit a discrepancy between the central
bank rate and the money market rate: in particular, the latter moves independently
from the former. One of our main assumptions (cfr. section 2) is that the Central
Bank is able to influence money market rates, and in these countries it is clearly vi-
olated. The sample period differs slightly for each country: from January 1998 to
August 2009 for the Czech Republic (140 observations), from April 1995 to August
2009 for Hungary (173 observations), from May 1995 to July 2009 for Poland (171
observations) and from May 1997 to October 200539 for Slovenia (106 observations).
Before estimating the model, I perform a battery of tests to check for the ad-
equacy of the baseline model. Although some variables exhibit evidence of non-
stationary behavior (cfr. Table 3.2 in the appendix) and the Trace and Maximum
38 Lithuania and Bulgaria are currently operating under a currency board on the euro (previously on
the Deutsche Mark or the US Dollar), as did Estonia before joining the Euro in 2011; Latvia settled
on a fixed peg on the DST and on the euro since 2005.
39 The sample for Slovenia is limited due to the lack of data on the monetary aggregate from October
2005 onwards.
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Eigenvalue tests find evidence of cointegration (cfr. Table 3.3 in the appendix), the
SVAR model is specified in levels of the variables without imposing cointegrating
relationships. This choice is dictated by three considerations. First, there is uncer-
tainty about the number of cointegrating relationships. Table 3.3 shows that the order
of integration changes when the tests are performed on a VAR including the inte-
grated variables only rather than the entire set of variables. Hence, I avoid possible
misspecification errors due to imposing long-run relationships not supported by theo-
retical underpinnings. Secondly, I avoid first differencing the nonstationary variables
as this would amount to ignoring error correction mechanisms and important corre-
lations in the data (Lutkepohl and Krätzig (2004)). Thirdly, our choice of estimating
the model in levels does not impair the quality of our results. In fact, the estimates of
the parameters that characterize the dynamics of the system are consistent when esti-
mating the VAR in levels implying that, asymptotically, the impulse-responses from
the model in levels will coincide with the ones resulting from a vector error correc-
tion specification (Hamilton (1994)). Furthermore, Sims et al. (1990) show that the
distributions of the statistics of interest to conduct standard inference in a multiple
time series context are not affected by nonstationarity in some series.40The choice of
specifying the model in terms of levels of the variables comes at the cost of a slight
loss in efficiency of the estimators, but allows us to avoid possible misspecification
errors and still yields consistent estimates.41
We determine the optimal lag length of our models by means of the AIC, FPE,
HQIC and SBIC information criteria. In particular, I look for the number of lags that
minimizes these criteria. It is important to note that while the AIC tends to overes-
timate the number of lags, under fairly general conditions the HQ and SC criteria
40 For a detailed discussion on how to make inference when series are likely characterized by unit
roots, we refer the interested reader to Sims and Uhlig (1991) and Phillips (1991).
41 Bagliano and Favero (1998), Neri (2004), Li, Iscan and Xu (2010) and Koivu (2011) similarly
estimate models in levels.
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estimate the correct number of lags (Lütkepohl (2006)). This procedure leads us to
obtain a different number of lags for the models of the different countries, as summa-
rized in Table 3.4. While for Hungary and Slovenia the 2 lags suggested by the test
statistics are sufficient to yield a correctly specified model, for the Czech Republic
and Poland I decide to include a number of lags equal to 4. Indeed, for these countries
the inclusion of fewer lags results in a large amount of residual autocorrelation. In
order to evaluate the adequacy of the variables included in the models, I estimate the
unrestricted model for each country excluding, in turn, the Euro Area interest rate,
the bilateral exchange rate and the stock market index. In all cases and for all coun-
tries, the specification including the whole set of seven variables performs better, as
measured by the AIC and SBC.42 Finally, I check for stability of our VAR models,
by computing the roots of the characteristic polynomial: despite some roots are close
to one, formal testing reveals that none of them lies outside the unit circle, and our
VARs are stable.43 Given that formal testing confirmed our model specification, I
proceed with the estimation of the baseline model. While the test for overidentifying
restrictions confirmed the validity of the imposed identification scheme in the mod-
els for Poland and Slovenia, the baseline specification was rejected for the Czech
Republic and Hungary. Hence, in these models, I had to drop one overidentifying
restriction: specifically, in these models, coefficient b54 is not restricted to be equal
to zero. This leads to a specification of the monetary policy rule (cfr. equation 3.4)
where the Central Bank is able to observe the current price level and incorporate this
information in the monetary policy reaction function. The overidentifying restriction
tests for this alternative specification do not reject the null that the overidentifying
restrictions are valid (cfr. Table 3.5).
42 Results are not reported for space reasons.
43 Cfr Figure 3.7 in the Appendix.
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3.2.2 Impulse-response functions
In this section, I examine the impulse-response functions and the variance decompo-
sitions obtained imposing the baseline structural identification scheme.
As our interest lies in the analysis of the impact of monetary policy on stock
prices, I first examine the responses of the stock price index to a one standard de-
viation structural innovation to domestic and Euro Area monetary policies. Figure
3.1 depicts the responses of the stock price indices of the four countries to a contrac-
tionary, one standard deviation shock to domestic monetary policy, i.e. an increase
in the domestic interest rate. The estimated responses are plotted for a forecast hori-
zon of 24 months. As expected, a contractionary monetary policy shock causes a
decrease in the stock price index in all countries, albeit with some differences. The
impact effect is negative in all countries, but heterogeneities arise in the dynamics
and in the statistical significance of the estimated responses. Except Slovenia, which
exhibits an impact effect very close to zero, impact effects lie in a close neighborhood
of -0.01 (albeit in the Czech Republic it is not significant). Moreover, the estimated
responses remain negative for the rest of the time horizon, showing a tendency to re-
vert towards the pre-shock equilibrium. Only in the Poland the estimated response
becomes positive between the second and the seventh month after the shock, but not
significantly in statistical terms.
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Figure 3.1: Responses of the stock price index to a +1 standard deviation innovation
to the domestic interest rate ( 2 standard errors).
In Hungary, the negative response is negative and statistically significant until
the thirteenth month after the shock, while in the in the Czech Republic the negative
response of the stock price index becomes statistically significant only 8 months af-
ter the shock, and it reaches a peak at the 10th month after the shock (-0.017). In
Hungary the negative peak is reached much sooner (5 months after the shock) and
it is slightly more pronounced (-0.025). Moreover, the dynamic adjustment towards
the pre-shock equilibrium is smooth, signaling a high degree of persistence. The re-
action of the stock price index in Poland and Slovenia is not statistically significant
during the entire forecast horizon.
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Figure 3.2 represents the responses of the stock price index to a one standard
deviation increase in the Euro Area interest rate. A first glance suffices to see an
overall negative effect and a high degree of similarity between countries.
Figure 3.2: Responses of the stock price index to a +1 standard deviation innovation
to the Euro Area interest rate ( 2 standard errors).
The largest and statistically significant impact effect is registered in Slovenia
(-0.01), followed by a further decline in the stock price index until a negative peak of
-0.026 is reached 7 months after the shock. Note how the persistence of this shock
is much higher than in the case of a domestic monetary policy shock: here, the stock
price index does not revert to its pre-shock level within 2 years after the shock. The
impact effect in Hungary and Poland is very small and not statistically significant,
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but it becomes larger and significant in later months, signaling that a shock in the
foreign interest rate is not immediately transmitted to the domestic economies. While
in Hungary a negative peak (-0.026) is reached a year after the shock, in Poland it
is reached after 16 months. The dynamic response of the Czech stock price index
stands out from the group in that the impact effect of a rise in the foreign interest rate
is positive and statistically significant. Nevertheless, from the 3rd month onwards it
starts decreasing and it becomes significantly negative from the 7th month onwards.
In figure 3.3, I report the dynamic responses of the stock price index to shocks
to other variables in the model.
Figure 3.3: Responses of the stock price index to a +1 standard deviation innovation
to the exchange rate, industrial production and M2 ( 2 standard errors)
The first row of figure 3.3 depicts the responses of the stock price index to an
unexpected increase in the exchange rate, i.e. a depreciation of the domestic cur-
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rency. The estimated response is significantly negative at a short time horizon in all
countries except Slovenia, where the response is very weak and not significant. Be-
ing small open economies, an unexpected change in the exchange rate could have two
roots. First, it could be given by a sudden stop in capital inflows, which puts down-
ward pressure on the exchange rate. The decrease in demand for domestic capital,
including domestic stocks, causes their prices to decrease to re-establish equilibrium
on the market. Second, an unexpected depreciation might be triggered by an unex-
pected decline in the foreign demand of domestic goods, which depresses production
and expectations of future cash flow.44 The second row of figure 3.3 depicts the re-
sponses of the stock price index to a positive shock in industrial production. Our
expectation of a significant increase in stock prices is not confirmed. In all countries,
the estimated response is not statistically significant, and very small in magnitude.
A similar conclusion holds for the responses to a money demand shock, presented
in the last row of figure 3.3. Only in the Czech Republic a positive shock to M2
significantly increases stock prices.
3.2.3 Innovation Accounting
In this section, I analyze the contribution of the seven variables in the model to fluctu-
ations in the variability of the stock price index by means of variance decomposition.
In Figure 3.4, the total variation in the stock price index is decomposed in shares as-
cribed to the single shocks in the model, for a time horizon of 24 months. As it is
to be expected, shocks to the stock price index itself account for the largest fraction
of the variation. Nevertheless, important considerations stem from the observation
of the contributions of the other six variables. First of all, it is immediately possible
to notice substantial differences across countries. Secondly, it is evident that it is im-
portant to make a distinction between the short and the long-run in that shocks that
44 See also Li, Iscan and Liu (2010).
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do not contribute much to the variation in stock prices on impact, gain importance in
the medium to long term. In the Czech Republic, shocks to the monetary base and
the exchange rate account for the largest fraction of variation in stock prices while
losing importance later on in the time horizon, and being outperformed by the Euro
Area and the domestic interest rates.
Figure 3.4: Variance decomposition of the stock price index.
In Hungary and Poland, the exchange rate accounts for the largest fraction of
variation of stock prices on impact and in the short to medium term: 23% and 19% re-
spectively. In Hungary, the domestic interest rate comes right after the exchange rate:
although on impact its contribution is around 4%, it increases in the medium-run and
it stabilizes around 10%. In Poland, both the domestic and the foreign interest rates
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contribute to the variation of stock prices quite insignificantly on impact: neverthe-
less, the Euro Area interest rate becomes increasingly important and in the medium-
run, it accounts for more than 20% of the total variation. The picture for Slovenia is
quite different from the previous ones. Here, the Euro Area interest rate dominates
the scene: although on impact it accounts for only 5% of the total variation, already
after 4 months it reaches 20% and keeps on increasing with time. All other variables
have a negligible impact. These figures reinforce our previous conclusion according
to which increasing financial openness has an impact on stock prices in the NMS.
Moreover, it emerges that domestic stock prices are more sensitive to external devel-
opments than domestic ones. This can be explained by the heavy presence of foreign
investors in the stock markets of the new EU members.
3.3 Robustness check
In what follows I check the robustness of our results to four alternative model speci-
fications. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the alternative specifications estimated in
this section.
The first alternative differs from the baseline in the specification of the mone-
tary policy rule. While in the baseline specification I assumed that the Central Bank
does not react to contemporaneous values of output and the price level, I now relax
this assumption and estimate coefficients b53 and b54. In the second specification, I
relax the hypothesis according to which the nominal exchange rate is contemporane-
ously influenced only by the Euro Area interest rate. I now assume that the exchange
rate market is efficient, in the sense that it incorporates all available information: the
contemporaneous coefficients of output, the price level, the domestic interest rate and
the money stock are now left unrestricted, as we can read in the second line of Table
3.1. As the exchange rate is contemporaneously affected by the contemporaneous
values of all other variables in the model except the stock price index, its position
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in the ordering of the variables in the model changes, and it now correspond to the
sixth row of the B matrix. As one of the main criticism to VAR models is their sus-
ceptibility to different variable ordering, it is useful to check whether our results are
robust to a change in the order of the variables. As this alternative formulation of the
exchange rate equation amounts to the elimination of four restrictions, I impose an
additional restriction in order to give more structure to the model. In particular, in
the money market equilibrium equation I constrain coefficient b53 to be equal to mi-
nus one. This simply implies that the demand of real money balances is a function of
the contemporaneous values of output and the short-term interest rate.
As a third alternative, I estimate the impulse-response functions by imposing
a Choleski identification scheme on the matrix B of contemporaneous coefficients.
The Choleski scheme is equivalent to imposing a recursive structure on the underly-
ing VAR model, and results a lower triangular B matrix. Compared to the baseline
model, the Choleski scheme differs in the specification of the monetary policy equa-
tion and the money market equilibrium equation. The baseline model assumes that
only the nominal exchange rate and the monetary aggregate (and the consumer price
index in the Czech Republic and Hungary) contemporaneously affect the interest
setting behavior of the Central Bank (cfr. equation 3.4). Here, the Central Banks’
monetary policy actions are contemporaneously influenced by the Euro Area interest
rate, the exchange rate, output and the price level. Furthermore, the money mar-
ket equilibrium equation, which I defined in the baseline specification as a standard
LM equation, is now poorly identified in that it includes the contemporaneous val-
ues of the Euro Area interest rate and the exchange rate. Finally, I estimate a second
Choleski decomposition changing the ordering of the variables of the VAR. Specifi-
cally, the ordering is now the same as in alternative 2, with the exchange rate in the
sixth row.
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Figures 3.5 and 3.6 report the estimated dynamic responses of a one standard
deviation shock to the domestic and Euro Area interest rates on stock prices for the
four alternatives respectively. As it is noticeable by comparing Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.5
and 3.6 the responses of the stock price index to an exogenous shock to the Euro
Area interest rate are robust through all specifications, both in terms of magnitude
and significance. The estimated response is negative in all countries: while the neg-
ative response is negative and significant in the short-run in Slovenia, the negative
effect of an unexpected foreign interest rate shock is significant in the medium or
long-run in the rest of the countries. Concerning the responses to an unexpected,
contractionary domestic monetary policy shock, some differences arise. While the
estimated impulse-responses for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia are quali-
tatively and quantitatively consistent throughout model specifications, it is not so in
the case of Hungary. In the first alternative specification, the estimated response is
similar to the baseline, only surrounded by somewhat wider confidence bands which
lead to a non statistically significant impact effect of the monetary policy shock on
the stock price index. Nevertheless, despite the broadening of the confidence inter-
vals, the negative response is still significant in the short and medium run. This does
not hold in specifications 2, 3 and 4: the estimated responses are much less pro-
nounced and are not statistically significant. Only in the last two specifications, the
impact effect is significantly negative.
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Figure 3.5: Responses of the stock price index to a +1 standard deviation innovation
in the domestic and Euro Area monetary policy (2 standard errors): Alternative 1
and 2
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Figure 3.6: Responses of the stock price index to a +1 standard deviation innovation
in the domestic and Euro Area monetary policy ( 2 standard errors): Alternative 3
and 4
The heterogeneity of impulse-responses across model specifications in the Hun-
garian case might stem from the failure of the proposed schemes to identify mone-
tary policy shocks. As reported by Vonnak (2005) and Vonnak (2008) identification
of the effects of monetary policy shocks in Hungary may be particularly challenging
for two reasons. First, because of the predominance, in the period 1995-2004, of sup-
ply side shocks, rather than demand shocks, in driving macroeconomic fluctuations.
Secondly, because of the potential importance of risk premia in driving interest rate
and exchange rate movements. In fact, given the high degree of openness of Hun-
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garian capital markets and the predominance of foreign investors (cfr. Arvai (2005)),
interest rates and exchange rates might be strongly influenced by risk perceptions of
international investors and behave less in accordance to the central bank’s attempt to
reach its targets.
Overall, alternative 2 seems the one generating the largest differences from the
baseline and from the rest of the alternative specifications. In particular, the estimated
impulse-responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock lose their significance,
while conserving the same qualitative features. Nevertheless, the key features of this
specification (i.e. the order of the variables and the specification of the exchange rate
equation) figure also in alternative 4, which provides results very consistent with the
baseline. Overall, the set of robustness checks lead us to consider our results stable
across different model specifications for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia.
Compared to the findings of previous studies on the effect of monetary policy
on stock prices in developed countries of Western Europe and North America, our
results for the small open economies of Central Europe offer a different picture. Es-
timated impulse responses to a contractionary, domestic monetary policy shock in
advanced economies reveal a significant inverse relationship between domestic inter-
est rate and stock price movements. Studies focusing on the United States, a large
and close economy, find that stock prices decrease significantly and persistently af-
ter an increase in the FED funds rate (see Thorbecke (1997), Rapach (2001), Neri
(2004)). Evidence on Western European countries and Canada is largely similar.
Neri (2004) finds a significant decrease in stock prices after a contractionary mone-
tary policy shock in Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Only in the case
of France the stock market does not seem to react to monetary policy shocks. Li,
Iscan and Xu (2010) compare impulse responses for the United States and Canada,
a small open economy heavily dependent on the United States, and find that the re-
sponse of Canadian stock prices to domestic monetary policy are much more muted
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and less persistent. In contrast, I do not find a significant effect of monetary policy
shocks on the stock markets of the formerly transition economies of Central Europe.
While the estimated impact effect is negative in all countries, it is not statistically
significant. This finding might be explained mainly by the large presence of Western
European investors on the stock market, for whom the ECB interest rate is the rele-
vant discount rate. However, I do find a statistically significant negative relationship
between the Euro Area interest rate and stock prices in the new EU member states.
This differs from the result by Li, Iscan and Xu (2011) according to which Canadian
stock prices increase after an increase in the FED interest rate. The decline in Cen-
tral European stock prices in response to a hike in the ECB interest rate may have
two explanations. The first relates to the large capital inflows received by the region
since the beginning of the transition process, both in form of FDI, portfolio flows
and bank loans. For firms relying heavily on foreign currency loans, an increase in
the Euro Area interest rate represents an increase in their production costs, which in
turn reduces expected future cash flow and hence the value of the firm on the stock
market. The second reason relates to the increased stock market co-movement be-
tween Western and Eastern European countries and spillovers between markets. As
noted above, Western European stock markets have been found sensitive to the ECB’s
monetary policy, and a contractionary monetary policy action is associated with a de-
crease in stock prices. Given the increasing degree of integration between European
stock markets (cfr. Christensen and Ranaldo (2009) and Savva and Aslanidis (2009)),
spillovers may occur and depress Eastern European stock markets45. The analysis of
the different channels of transmission of foreign monetary policy on stock prices will
be the subject of future research.
45 For example, Égert and Kocˇenda (2007) find that returns on stock markets in Western Europe,
particularly German and French stock returns, have a significantly positive impact on stock markets in
Central Europe. Furthermore, they find evidence of volatility spillovers between Western and Eastern
European stock markets
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate four structural VAR models with short-run restrictions for
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The models represent a small-
scale, small open economy model with stock prices in order to examine the interplay
between financial integration, domestic monetary policy and stock prices. Three
conclusions stem from our analysis.
First, I do not find robust evidence of a significant effect of domestic monetary
policy on stock prices. Second, Euro Area monetary policy significantly affects stock
prices in the NMS, and the effect is negative. Moreover, in all countries except
Slovenia (where also the impact effect is significantly negative), the response of the
stock price index seems to be transmitted to stock prices with a lag. These results
suggest that in small open economies characterized by a high degree of openness
to international financial markets, foreign monetary policy has a stronger effect on
stock markets than domestic monetary policy. In particular, in the NMS firms rely
heavily on foreign borrowing, originating mainly in Euro Area countries, to finance
new investments. Hence, increases in the foreign interest rate represent an increase
in their production costs, which in turn reduce expected future cash flow and stock
prices. In addition, in emerging economies capital inflows amount to a large share
of GDP, making them more sensitive to developments in foreign financial markets.
Furthermore, in the NMS the proportion of wealth allocated to equity by domestic
investors is still limited. As such, being the ECB rate the reference discount rate for
Euro Area investors, stock prices are sensitive to it.
Third, the analysis of variance revealed that overall external shocks account for
the bulk of variation in the stock price index in the considered countries. While ex-
change rate shocks are dominant in Hungary and Poland in the short-run, shocks to
the Euro Area interest rate are the main determinants in the medium to long-run in
Poland, in the long-run in Hungary and during the whole time horizon in Slovenia.
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Hence, stock prices in the new EU member states seem to be driven by shocks related
to external trade and finance. These findings have important implications for domes-
tic policy decisions, as financial integration made local stock markets more sensitive
to external shocks.
The presented analysis sheds a first light on an issue scarcely investigated be-
fore. Nevertheless, it omits important aspects worth exploring in future work. First
of all, this study does not explore the channels through which Euro Area monetary
policy shocks are transmitted to the NMS’ stock markets. Given the increased co-
movement between stock markets in the Euro Area and the NMS, the significant
reaction of NMS’ stock markets to Euro Area monetary policy shocks could result
from spillovers between stock markets. Modeling explicitly financial linkages be-
tween the Euro Area and the NMS by means of a Global VAR model in the spirit
of Dees et al (2007) will be the subject of future research. Moreover, our results
could be enriched by exploring the time constancy of the estimated responses of the
stock price index in the NMS. In particular, a time-varying coefficients model would
allow to investigate whether such responses changed with the increase in financial
integration.
3.A Appendix
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Table 3.2: Phillips-Perron Unit Roots Tests
Czech Republic Hungary
Specif. PP Specif. PP
EAint I -3.523 (0.626) I -3.523 (0.626)
ip I,T -1.860 (0.6750) I -1.835 (0.3635)
cpi I,T -3.481 (0,0410)* I,T -4.243 (0.0038)*
er I,T -2.739 (0.2203) I -4.262 (0.0005)*
i I -5.468 (0.0000)* I -3.623 (0,0053)*
m I,T -3,680 (0,0237)* I,T -1.409 (0.8582)
s I -0.892 (0.790) I,T -2.562 (0.2975)
Poland Slovenia
EAint I -3.523 (0.626) I -3.523 (0.626)
ip I,T -5.217 (0.0001)* I,T -4.933 (0.0003)*
cpi I,T -4.176 (0.0049)* I -2.806 (0.0575)*
er I -2.387 (0.1453) I -2.126 (0.2344)
i I -1.427 (0.5692) I,T -3.374 (0.0550)*
m I,T -3.800 (0.0165)* I -3.413 (0.0105)*
s I -1.482 (0.5424) I -0.613 (0.8681)
Note: I = Intercept, T = Trend. The correct specification has been chosen by visual inspection of the data and by consideration of statistical
significance
Note: *Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root
Table 3.3: Cointegration tests
Specification Relevant test statistic N. cointegrating relationships
Trace Max. Eigenv.
CZ R 12.557 11.9522 2
F 9.863 19.8935 4
HU R 12.365 8.264 2
F 45.411 22.358 3
PL R 14.811 21.612 2
F 37.470 28.762 3-4
SI R 49.888 14.025 1
F 29.453 14.930 3
Note: R = Restriced, F= Full. The Full model includes all 7 endogenous variables. The Reduced model includes only the non-stationary variables
resulting from Table A1
Note: Country names have been denoted as follows: CZ=Czech Republic, HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, SI=Slovenia
Note: The low number of detected cointegration relationships for Slovenia might be due to the fact that, given the limited sample size, the power
of the tests might be lower.
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Figure 3.7: Stability Check for Unrestricted VARs
Czech Republic Hungary
Poland Slovenia
87
Mara Pirovano
Table 3.4: Lag Length Selection
CZ HU PL SI
AIC 12 3 3 12
FPE 2 3 3 2
HQC 2 2 2 1
SC 1 1 1 1
Lag chosen 4 2 4 2
Note: Country names have been denoted as follows: CZ=Czech Republic, HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, SI=Slovenia
Table 3.5: Test for Overidentifying Restrictions
CZ HU PL SI
LR Test 2.0666* 4.9809* 2.3791* 5.4897*
p-value 0.5587 0.1732 0.6664 0.2406
Note:* significant at the 0.95 level
Note: The models for the Czech Republic and Hungary have 3 overidentifying restrictions; those for Poland and Slovenia have 4 overidentifying
restrictions
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CHAPTER 4
HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM LEVERAGE, CAPITAL FLOWS AND MONETARY
POLICY IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
For the purpose of this chapter, three aspects of the recent financial turmoil are worth
emphasizing. First, recent events demonstrate that financial imbalances with poten-
tially systemic implications can arise even in an environment of stable inflation and
economic growth. This put into question the well established objectives and instru-
ments of monetary policy in tranquil times. On one side, the approprateness of the
traditional monetary policy objectives, i.e. inflation and output stability, is being re-
examined, on the grounds that they might not be necessarily conducive of financial
stability. On the other hand, a debate spurred on the implementation of monetary
policy, reconsidering the effectiveness of inflation targeting regimes whereby cen-
tral banks set the policy rate reacting to inflation and a measure of economic activity.
Hence, the dispute on monetary policy conduct in the aftermath of the crisis evolves
around two main questions. Should central banks be concerned about financial, in
addition to macroeconomic, stability? And, if so, should central banks react to indi-
cators of financial overheating when setting the monetary policy rate? Secondly, the
crisis highlighted the importance of developments in the real estate market, involv-
ing credit to households and real estate price dynamics. A third lesson relates to the
amplification of downturns due to imbalances related to the dynamics of credit and
leverage built-up in good times. Understanding the interaction between credit flows,
leverage and monetary policy is essential for a thorough assessment of the adequate
monetary policy responses to be implemented to prevent excess vulnerabilities to ma-
terialize. This essay presents a framework to analyze the two issues relevant to the
current monetary policy debate in a small open economy reflecting the characteristics
of many emerging European economies in the run-up to the crisis. 89
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The model economy is populated by six agents: households, entrepreneurs,
firms, capital and housing producers, and the central bank. The model features fi-
nancial frictions affecting the credit relationships of both households and firms in a
New Keynesian small open economy model. In particular, credit frictions are mod-
eled following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), postulating the existence of
an asymmetric information problem between borrowers and lenders implying costly
state verification and generating an external finance premium directly linked to bor-
rowers’ leverage. Hence, in such a context, fluctuations in asset prices affect agents’
ability to borrow and contribute to their overall leverage position. Furthermore, debt
is denominated in foreign currency, therefore, exchange rate movements impact on
borrowers’ balance sheets.
The capital inflow shock is embedded into the asymmetric information set-up
following Curdia (2007, 2008). In particular, it is assumed that foreign lenders have
a distorted perception of borrowers’ creditworthiness. In good times, lenders be-
come optimistic about borrowers’ productivity, leading them to enforce looser credit
conditions to borrowers. Lower lending rates strengthen the balance sheet position
of borrowers, encouraging them to undertake more projects, thereby increasing in-
vestment and asset prices and leading to a self-fulfilling virtuous cycle of economic
expansion. This mechanism, albeit stylized, is able to replicate the credit and in-
vestment increases observed in the Central and Eastern European economies during
capital inflow surges. In order to introduce the capital inflow shock consistently in
the two sectors (real estate and capital investment), I assume the existence of capital
and housing producers that buy final goods and convert them in new housing and cap-
ital stock. In the production sector, entrepreneurs invest in new capital goods using
their own net worth and borrowing from foreign financial intermediaries, who face a
costly state verification problem and charge an external finance premium dependent
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on leverage. They rent their capital to production firms who produce for the domes-
tic and foreign market, and are subject to staggered price setting. In order to keep
consistency and tractability, the housing market is modeled following Aoki, Proud-
man and Vlieghe (2004). In particular, it is assumed that households are composed
of two behavioral types: homeowners and consumers. Homeowners are analogous
to entrepreneurs: they use own net worth and borrowed funds to finance housing
investment. The credit relationship is characterized by the same asymmetric infor-
mation problem faced by entrepreneurs. Homeowners then rent the housing stock to
consumers, which also consume domestic and imported goods and supply labor to
domestic firms. In order to capture wealth effects in the household sector deriving
from real estate price fluctuations, it is assumed that, at the end of each period, home-
owners perform a transfer to consumers within the household. This simple modeling
framework captures the fact that households can use their housing equity to finance
consumption.46 More specifically, the transfer is related to the household’s leverage:
when equity rises, the household can either accumulate the extra net worth thereby
easing her credit condition in the following period, or use it to increase current con-
sumption by increasing the transfer. Finally, the central bank sets the nominal interest
rate according to a policy rule.
4.1 The model
4.1.1 Households
Households are composed of two behavioral types, homeowners and consumers.
While the former undertake housing investment and own the housing stock, the lat-
ter rent housing services and consume consumption goods. Consumers are further
divided in two types. A fraction n of consumers is Ricardian (R), has access to do-
46 In other terms, households are able to borrow against the value of their home to finance consump-
tion, a practice often named mortgage equity withdrawal.
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mestic and foreign assets and is able to smooth consumption over time. The remain-
ing (1   n) consumers are non-Ricardian (NR), and consume their current income
in each period.47 Both types of consumers supply differentiated labor services to
unions, which act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets. Income
of NR consumers is then made up of wage income plus a transfer received from
homeowners. Finally, as the economy is open, the consumption bundle is composed
of domestic and imported goods.
Consumers
The utility function common to all consumers is expressed in terms of con-
sumption (Ct) and labor services (Nt) :
U (Ct;Nt) =
(Ct   Ct 1)1 
1     N
(Nt)
1+'
1 + '
Where  is the habit formation parameter,  and ' are respectively the elastic-
ities of intertemporal substitution and of labor supply, and N is a scaling parameter
for the disutility of working hours. The consumption bundle Ct is composed of con-
sumption goods ct and housing services ht:
Ct =
h

1
&
c (ct)
& 1
& + (1  c)
1
& (ht)
& 1
&
i &
& 1
Where & is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing ser-
vices, and c is the weight of goods consumption in the overall basket. Furthermore,
consumers allocate consumption between domestically produced (cHt ) and imported
47 In the context of this study, this modeling choice is dictated by the necessity to incorporate a trans-
fer from homeowners to consumers, in order to obtain wealth effects from investment. In general, the
introduction of Non-Ricardian households in DSGE models is motivated by the empirical evidence
suggesting a high dependence of consumption from current income, which cannot be obtained when
households satisfy the permanent income hypothesis (Gali’, Lopez-Salido and Vallés (2007). Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw (2000) provide empirical evidence on the relationship between
consumption and income in advanced economies).
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(cFt ) goods, so that ct =


1

h
 
cHt
  1
 + (1  h)
1

 
cFt
  1

 
 1
, where  represents
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. It follows that the
consumer price index Pt is defined as Pt =
h
h
 
PHt
1 
+ (1  h)
 
P Ft
1 i 11 
,
where PHt and P Ft are respectively the price of domestically produced and imported
goods. As all consumers share the same preferences and face the same prices, in-
tratemporal optimization results in the following demand schedules for consumption,
housing services, domestic and imported goods:
ct
ht
=
c
1  c

1
pht
 &
(4.1)
cHt = h
 
pHt
 
ct (4.2)
cFt = (1  h)
 
pFt
 
ct (4.3)
Furthermore, I assume that housing services are a constant fraction s of the
housing stock:
ht = sHt (4.4)
While intratemporal choices are analogous for the two types of consumers,
only Ricardian consumers face an intertemporal choice problem, maximizing the
discounted value of lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint48:
CRt +
RtBt
Pt
+Rt	t
StB

t
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
NRt +
Bt+1
Pt
+
StB

t+1
Pt
+ t   TRt
Ricardian consumers have access to domestic (Bt) and foreign (Bt ) borrowing.
While both assets are of a risk-free nature, access to the international financial market
is subject to small transaction costs 	t. Hence, while the domestic asset carries the
48 Variables pertaining to Ricardian (Non-Ricardian) consumers are denoted with the superscript R,
(NR).
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gross domestic risk-free interest rateRt, the cost of foreign borrowing isRt	t, where
the portfolio adjustment cost 	t is a function of the aggregate foreign debt of the
small open economy (Bt+1 + LEt+1 + LHt+1)49:
	t = exp

 B

St(B

t+1 + L
E
t+1 + L
H
t+1)
Yt
  S(B
 + LE + LH)
Y

(4.5)
Furthermore, Ricardian households receive profits from the ownership of firms
(t) and pay lump-sum taxes to the government (TRt ). Denoting with t the lagrange
multiplier on the budget constraint, the following conditions hold:
t =
 
CRt   CRt 1
  (4.6)
t = Et

t+1
Rt
t+1

(4.7)
t = Et

t+1
St+1
St
	t
Rt
t+1

(4.8)
Non-Ricardian consumers are of measure (1  n) and are assumed to fully
consume their income in every period. Consumption of NR households is then de-
termined by their wage income, dividends from homeowners50 (Dt) and lump-sum
taxes (TNRt ), as follows:
CRt =
Wt
Pt
NNRt +Dt   TNRt (4.9)
Aggregating over R and NR consumers, total consumtpion results in: Ct =
nCRt + (1  n)CNRt .
49 Variables without time subscript denote steady state values. This specification of the portfolio
adjustment cost implies that the cost of foreign borrowing is higher the higher the net indebtness
of the economy. While the coefficient B is so small that it does not affect the dynamics of the
model, introducing a portfolio adjustment cost in small open economy models guarantees the existence
of a well defined steady state and delivers a stationary path for net foreign assets and consumption
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)).
50 Details on the specification of the transfer follow in section 3.1.2.
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The wage setting process and the consequent labor supply decision are gov-
erned by unions. Both R and NR consumers supply differentiated labor services to a
continuum of monopolistically competitive unions51, which act as wage setters tak-
ing the aggregate wageWt and the aggregate labor demandNdt as given. Unions pool
the wage income of all consumers and then distribute the aggregate wage income in
equal proportion among the latter. The union then takes Wt and Ndt as given and sets
the optimal wage ~Wt(i) to equate the union’s expected average marginal return and
the marginal cost of supplying labor 52. However, in doing so the union faces nominal
rigidities in the Calvo fashion. Specifically, in each period the wage can be optimized
only in a fraction (1  w) of labor markets. In the remaining fraction w the real
wage is indexed to past inflation resulting in the following law of motion of the aggre-
gate wage (where "w represents the elasticity of substitution between different labor
types):
Wt =
h
(1  w) ~W 1 "wt + w (Wt 1(i)t 1)1 "w
i 1
1 "w (4.13)
Given the assumptions concerning the population of consumers, aggregate la-
bor supply is given by Nt = nNRt + (1  n)NNRt .
51 See Conen and Straub (2004) for this specification in the context of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian
consumers.
52 The first order conditions can be formulated in the following recursive fashion, where t+k =
(Ct+k)
  is the marginal utility of consumption of all consumers:
Kwt =

"w   1
"w

~WttNt

Wt
~Wt
"w
+ w
 
t+1
t
~Wt+1
~Wt
!"w 1
Kwt+1 (4.10)
Fwt = H
 
Ndt
'Wt
~Wt
"w
Nt + 
w
 
t+1
t
~Wt+1
~Wt
!"w
Fwt+1 (4.11)
Kwt = F
w
t (4.12)
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However, given the hypothesis that unions pool wage incomes of R and NR
consumers, labor market equilibrium requires:
Nt = N
R
t = N
NR
t (4.14)
In order to ensure that the wage rate is the same for the two consumer types,
hours worked must be equalized.53
Homeowners
Housing investment decisions are made by homeowners, who act like entre-
preneurs in the model. Homeowners are risk neutral, they purchase housing from
housing producers, transform it into homogeneous rentable units and rent them to
consumers. At the end of period t the i th homeowner has available net worth equal
to NWHt+1(i). At time t she purchases unfinished housing (Ht+1(i)) from housing
producers at a unit price Qh;t and finances the part of investment in excess of her net
worth by stipulating foreign currency loans LHt+1(i).54 In the next period, she will use
unfinished housing to produce rentable units, which will be rented to consumers at a
rental price Ph;t+1. Homeowners borrow from a competitive foreign financial inter-
mediary whose relevant opportunity cost is the gross risk-free rate prevailing in the
foreign country, Rt+1. The typical homeowner faces the following budget constraint,
expressed in domestic currency:
NWHt+1(i) = Qh;tHt+1(i)  StLHt+1(i)
53 This also arises as a result of the fact that firms allocate their labor demand uniformly across labor
varieties, independently of their consumer type (R or NR).
54 Note that loans are stipulated in period t but will be repayed at t+1, hence the choice of subscript.
Similarly, housing purchased at time t will be used in the next period, hence the time subscript.
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The expected gross return of a unit of housing investment is composed of the
return from renting houses to consumers (i.e. the rental price of houses, Ph;t) and the
value of the undepreciated housing stock, adjusted for the change in price:
Et

RHt+1
	
= Et

sP ht+1 + (1  h)Qh;t+1
Qh;t

(4.15)
Where h is the depreciation rate of the housing stock.
Each homeowner has access to a stochastic technology that transforms Ht+1(i)
units of unfinished housing into Ht+1(i) = !Ht+1(i)Ht+1(i) rentable units. The idio-
syncratic productivity shock !Ht+1(i) is iid across homeowners and time and it is
assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with density f(!H) and E

!H
	
= 155.
The realization of productivity is freely observed by homeowners, but lenders can
only observe it by incurring a monitoring cost proportional to the gross payoff to the
homeowner’s project (H(!Ht+1(i)RHt+1Qh;tHt+1(i))): this asymmetric information is
at the core of the external finance premium. Furthermore, following Curdia (2007), I
assume that lenders have a distorted perception of the productivity parameter. In par-
ticular, the lenders’ perception of productivity is !Ht+1 = !Ht+1Ht where Ht 2 [0; 1]
is the misperception factor which evolves according to ln(Ht ) =  ln(Ht 1) + H .
H is a shock to lenders perceptions of homeowners’ productivity and it is the origin
of capital inflows in the model. When Ht increases, lenders perceive homeowners’
to be more productive or, in other words, they perceive their default probability to
be lower. Hence, they will charge a lower premium, allowing borrowers to expand
their balance sheet. The optimal credit contract between financial intermediaries and
homeowners specifies a fixed payment (equal to RHL;t+1) to the lender whenever the
return to to investment is above the cutoff value (!Ht+1(i)) that determines default.
Otherwise, the homeowner defaults on her debt and the lender seizes the remaining
55 In particular, !H  logN

 2H2 ; 2H

, where 2H represents the variance of the underlying Nor-
mal distribution.
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value of the project, after paying the monitoring cost. The non-default cutoff value is
the productivity level !Ht+1(i) equating the homeowner’s receipts with the repayment
of the loan:
!Ht+1(i)
Qh;tHt+1(i)R
H
t+1
St+1
= RHL;t+1
(Qh;tHt+1(i) NWHt+1(i))
St
(4.16)
Taking as given Qh;t, RHt+1 and net worth NWHt+1(i), the optimal contract is
fully specified in terms of the threshold productivity level !Ht+1(i) and demand for
initial investment Ht+1(i).56 The optimal contract maximizes the expected payoff of
the borrower subject to the lender’s participation constraint. The expected payoff of
the homeowner is:
Et
 
QhtH
H
t+1(i)R
H
t+1
  
AH(!Ht+1(i))

= (17)
Et
" Z 1
!Ht+1(i)
!Ht+1(i)f(!
H)d!H
! 
Qh;tHt+1(i)R
H
t+1
  Z 1
!Ht=1(i)
f(!H)d!H
!
RHL;t+1L
H
t+1(i)
#
WhereAH(!Ht+1(i)) represents the fraction of the expected payoff captured by home-
owners. As foreign lenders are risk neutral, they engage in the contract if it guaran-
tees an expected payoff at least equal to what they would obtain by investing in the
risk-free asset. The following participation constraint has to hold:
RHt+1Qh;tHt+1(i)
St+1

BH
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t

= RtL
H
t+1(i) (4.18)
Where RHt+1Qh;tHt+1(i)

BH
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t

=
56 Recall that Pht+1 is a market price, and as such it will be determined by the equilibrium between
demand and supply of rentable houses.
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24 R1!Ht+1(i) f(!H)d!HRHL;t+1LHt+1(i)+R !Ht+1(i)
0
!Ht+1f(!
H)d!H

(1  H)Qh;tHt+1(i)RHt+1
35 is the lender’s ex-
pected payoff and BH
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t

is the fraction of homeowner’s payoff captured by
the lender (recall the definition !Ht = !Ht Ht ), net of monitoring cost.
As !Ht+1 is iid and independent of all other shocks in the model, homeowners
are identical ex  ante, face the same contract and will be charged the same lending
rate. The first order conditions of the optimal credit contract are obtaining maximiz-
ing (4.17) subject to (4.18) 57:
Et
 
Rht+1

= Rt+1
"
A0H(!Ht+1)
BH
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t

A0H(!Ht+1) B0H
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t

AH(!Ht+1)
Et

St+1
St
#
(4.19)
Qh;tHt+1
NWHt+1
=
1
1  St
St+1
RHt+1
Rt+1
BH
 
!Ht+1; 
H
t
 (4.20)
Equation (4.20) implies that the demand for unfinished housing by homeown-
ers is positively related to the rental price of housing P ht+1, which enters Rht+1, and
inversely related to the price of housing good, Qh;t. Equation (4.19) is the basis of
the financial accelerator in the model. It links the cost of external finance to home-
owners’ financial position and, hence, to their demand for housing good. In fact, risk
premia are a positive function of !Ht+1 which is, in turn, a positive function of the
homeowner’s leverage. Hence, lower leverage implies lower probability of default
and hence a lower risk premium. Furthermore, as borrowing is denominated in for-
eign currency, exchange rate movements also affect the risk premium: a domestic
currency appreciation (decrease in St+1) lowers the risk premium both directly and
indirectly by decreasing the value of outstanding debt and thereby lowering leverage.
The description of homeowners’ behavior is by the description of the evolution
of their net worth. A the end of each period, non-defaulting homeowners keep their
57 Here, A0(!) = @A(!)@! .
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payoff net of loan repayment, which is going to increment their stock of equity. Fur-
thermore, homeowners perform a transfer (Dt) to consumers within the household58,
which positively depends on the inverse leverage ratio ( NWHt+1
Qh;tHt+1
) and is given by:
Dt = D

NWHt+1
Qh;tHt+1

(4.21)
This simple rule captures the concept that, following a rise in real estate prices,
homeowners are faced with two choices. They can either keep the transfer constant
and accumulate more net worth (thereby increasing their equity and enjoying looser
credit conditions in the future), or they can increase the transfer to consumers lead-
ing to an increase of current household consumption. Hence, this is a simple way
to generate wealth effects of real estate prices, and a positive correlation between
housing prices and consumption observed in the data (see Iacoviello (2010)). Fur-
thermore, homeowners are assumed to be endowed with a unit of labor, which they
supply inelastically to domestic firms. The evolution of homeowners’ net worth can
be represented as:
NWHt+1 = A
H(!Ht )R
H
t Qh;t 1H
H
t  Dt +WHt NHt (4.22)
4.1.2 Housing and Capital Producers
Housing and capital producers operate in a regime of perfect competition.59 In each
period, they combine investment goods (Ij;t, with price P Ij;t, j = k; h) and the old
undepreciated capital (housing) stock to produce new capital (housing) goods, which
will be sold at the real price Qk;t (Qh;t)60. Investment is subject to adjustment costs,
58 Here, the transfer is not fully microfounded. Its specification follows Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe
(2004).
59 Here, I denote with subscript k (h) variables pertaining to capital (housing) producers.
60 The investment bundle for both producers has a similar composition of the consumption bundle,
cfr equation ().
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represented by the function j;t = j2

Ij;t
Ij;t 1
  1
2
(Smets and Wouters (2003)).
Capital producers choose the optimal amount of investment so as to maximize the
profits, leading to the following first order condition:
1 = qk;t
"
1  t
2

Ik;t
Ik;t 1
  1
2
  t

Ik;t
Ik;t 1
  1

Ik;t
Ik;t 1
#
(4.23)
+Et
(
t+1
t
qk;t+1
"


Ik;t+1
Ik;t
  1

Ik;t+1
Ik;t
2#)
Where qk;t is the real price of the capital stock defined as Qk;tPt . The law of
motion of the economy wide capital stock is:
Kt+1 =
"
1  t
2

Ik;t
Ik;t 1
  1
2#
Ik;t + (1  k)Kt (4.24)
Analogous expressions hold for housing producers, with the subscript k re-
placed by h.
4.1.3 Entrepreneurs
The behavior of entrepreneurs closely mirrors that of homeowners. Entrepreneurs
engage in capital investment, and in each period they purchase capital from capital
producers (Qk;tKt+1) using their net worth (NWEt+1) and borrowing from foreign
financial intermediaries (LEt+1) with a lending rate REL;t+1. The return from capital
investment, REt+1, is given by the return from renting capital to firms (rKt ) and the
capital gain:
REt+1 =
rKt+1 + (1  k)Qk;t+1
Qk;t
(4.25)
Furthermore, each entrepreneur has a stochastic technology
!Et+1(i)  logN( 
2
E
2
; 2E), the realization of which determines the profitabil-
ity of their investment and, then, their default probability. The threshold productivity
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level that discriminates between defaulting and non-defaulting entrepreneurs is given
by:
!Et+1(i)
Qk;tKt+1(i)R
E
t+1
St+1
= REL;t+1L
E
t+1(i) = R
E
L;t+1
(Qk;tKt+1(i) NWEt+1(i))
St
(4.26)
Finally, as in the case of homeowners, lenders have a distorted perception of
entrepreneurial productivity, given by !Et+1 = !Et+1Et where Et 2 [0; 1] is the mis-
perception factor which evolves according to ln(Et ) =  ln(Et 1)+E . The optimal
financial contract is identical to that faced by homeowners and the first order condi-
tions result in:
Et
 
REt+1

= Rt+1
"
A0E(!Et+1)
BE
 
!Et+1; 
E
t

A0E(!Et+1) B0E
 
!Et+1; 
E
t

AE(!Et+1)
Et

St+1
St
#
(4.27)
Qk;tKt+1
NWEt+1
=
1
1  St+1
St
REt+1
Rt+1
BH
 
!Et+1; 
E
t
 (4.28)
Contrary to the case of homeowners, entrepreneurs do not pay a transfer. In or-
der to characterize the evolution of their net worth it is assumed that entrepreneurs
have finite horizon: in particular, a proportion (1   %) of entrepreneurs die in each
period but are immediately replaced by newcomers, so that the total population is
constant. This is necessary to guarantee that the net worth of entrepreneurs does not
grow to the point they can finance their investment using their equity only. Further-
more, entrepreneurs are endowed with a unit of labor that they supply inelastically to
firms, paying a wage WEt . At the end of period t, entrepreneurs collect their invest-
ment payoff and honour the debt obligations contracted in the previous period. Net
worth of surviving entrepreneurs is then composed of the profits from investment and
wage income:
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NWEt+1 = %

AE(!Et )R
E
t Qk;t 1Kt

+WEt (4.29)
Entrepreneurs exiting the market consume their remaining equity:
PtC
E
t = (1  %)AE(!Et )REt Qk;t 1Kt 1 (4.30)
Entrepreneurs consume domestic and import good in the same mix as con-
sumers, the deman functions of which are:
CEH;t = h
 
pHt
 
CEt (4.31)
CEF;t = (1  h)
 
pFt
 
CEt (4.32)
4.1.4 Firms
There exist two types of firms in the economy. A continuum of intermediate pro-
ducers indexed by f 2 [0; 1] operates in a monopolistically competitive environment
and produce differentiated goods employing capital and labor. Furthermore, these
firms face price rigidities à la Calvo, implying staggered priced setting. Then, a set
of perfectly competitive final goods producers aggregate costlessly the differentiated
intermediate goods into a single final good, which is then sold to consumers (both
domestically and abroad).
Final good producers
Final good producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. They
purchase intermediate goods Yt(f) and aggregate them to obtain the final good Yt =hR 1
0
Yt(f)
" 1
" df
i "
" 1 61
. The final good is sold both domestically and abroad. In par-
ticular, the export good is produced one-for-one by a representative competitive pro-
61 " denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods.
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ducer, using the domestic final good as input. The foreign demand for the domestic
good is given by:
Xt = 


P xt
P t
 x
Y t (4.33)
Where P t is the foreign price index and Y t is foreign output. x represents the
elasticity between domestically produced and imported goods in the foreign coun-
try. Finally,  is the share of imports in the foreign country’s consumption basket.
I assume that the law of one price holds in the export market, implying that the do-
mestic good sells for the same price on the two markets when converted to the same
currency. Hence, defining the nominal exchange rate St as the price of the foreign
currency in terms of domestic currency, the price of exports in foreign currency is
P xt =
PH;t
St
:
Intermediate goods producers
A continuum of intermediate good producers indexed by f operate under mo-
nopolistic competition and is owned by Ricardian households. Producers use capital
and three types of labor inputs (Nt,NEt andNHt , supplied respectively by consumers,
entrepreneurs and homeowners) to produce differentiated goods. The production
function for domestic intermediate good producers is:
Yt (f) = e
AtKt (f)Nt (f)
(1 )(1 
E 
H) NEt (f)
(1 )
E NHt (f)
(1 )
H (4.34)
Where  is the share of capital in production, 
E and 
H are the shares of
entrepreneurial and homeowners’ labor in production. Cost minimization implies
the following standard factor demand functions, where rk;t denotes the rental rate of
capital:
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Wt = MCt (1  ) (1  
E   
H) Yt (f)
Nt (f)
(4.35)
WEt = MCt (1  ) 
E
Yt (f)
NEt (f)
(4.36)
WHt = MCt (1  ) 
F
Yt (f)
NHt (f)
(4.37)
rKt = MCt
Yt (f)
Kt (f)
(4.38)
Price setting is staggered. In each period, only a fraction (1 ) of firms are al-
lowed to reset their price optimally. The fraction  that is not allowed to optimize sets
the price equal to that prevailing in the previous period, indexing it to past inflation
at a rate p and to the steady state inflation rate at rate
 
1  p

. As all firms allowed
to optimize set the same price, denoted as ~PH;t, the domestic good price evolves as:
PHt =



PHt 1
 
Ht 1
p  H1 p1 " + (1  ) ~PHt 1 " 11 " .
Import firms
Importers operate in a monopolistically competitive environment. They pur-
chase the foreign differentiated good at the (domestic currency) price StP t , repack-
age it and resell it in the domestic market. Price setting is staggered à la Calvo:
in each period, they can optimally reset prices with probability m. This intro-
duces imperfect exchange rate pass-through in import prices following Monacelli
(2003). The price index of imported goods is given by P ft = [(1  m) (P newf;t )1 m+
m(P
f
t 1)
1 m ]
1
1 m , where m is the elasticity of substitution between different va-
rieties of import goods. Each firm in the import sector chooses the optimal price
as to maximize discounted profits62 subject to the demand constraint Y Mt+k(j) =
62 As import firms are owned by Ricardian consumers, t;t+k = C
R
t

CRt+k
 is the consumers’ stochastic
discout factor.
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
P ft (j)
P ft+k
 m
Y Mt+k, where P
f
t =
R 1
0
P ft (j)
1 dj
 1
1 
and Y Mt denotes aggregate
imports demand. In the symmetric equilibrium, all firms allowed to reset price will
set it at the same level, equal to a markup over current and expected future marginal
costs (which in the case of import firms are equal to St+kP t+k
P ft+k
).
4.1.5 Aggregate demand and balance of payments
Domestically produced goods are used for domestic consumption by consumers and
entrepreneurs, investment by housing and capital goods producers, government ex-
penditure (Gt), exports (Xt) and to pay monitoring costs arising from imperfect infor-
mation in the credit relationships between financial intermediaries and homeowners
and entrepreneurs (MHt and MEt )63. Hence, the national accounting identity reads:
Yt = c
H
t + C
E
H;t + I
H
k;t + I
H
h;t +Gt +Xt +M
H
t +M
E
t (4.39)
Imported goods are used for consumption and investment, hence total imports
(Y Mt ) are defined as:
Y Mt = c
F
t + C
E
F;t + I
F
k;t + I
F
h;t (4.40)
Finally, the balance of payments of the small open economy is obtained by
aggregating the budget constraints of consumers, homeowners and entrepreneurs,
and results in the following expression:
63 Given the distribution of !Ht and !Et , the fraction of payoff used to monitor borrowers in the two
sectors amounts to:
MHt = 
H  F

ln !Ht   0:52H
H

RhtQh;t 1Ht
MEt = 
E  F

ln !Et   0:52E
E

REt Qk;t 1Kt
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StR

t (	tB

t + L
E
t + L
H
t )  St(Bt+1 + LEt+1 + LHt+1) = StP t Xt   StP t Y Mt (4.41)
Where the nominal foreign interest rate, Rt , is taken as given by the small open
economy.
4.1.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
Government in this setting is in charge of conducting monetary and fiscal policy. As
for the latter, the government simply aims at maintaining fiscal balance:
Gt = T
R
t + T
NR
t (4.42)
The general form of the rule used by the central bank to conduct monetary
policy is:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R t

 Yt
Y
Y  St
St 1
S  Lt
Lt 1
L(1 R)
exp
 
R;t

(4.43)
Where  and Y are, respectively, the weights that the monetary authority
places on deviations of inflation and output from the steady state and R;t is a mon-
etary policy shock. It is assumed that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest
rate also in response to changes in the exchange rate and total credit growth, the
latter obtained aggreagating loans granted to homeowners and entrepreneurs. How-
ever, setting the coefficients of the last two terms to zero, leads to a standard Taylor
Rule. Furthermore, when S !1, the central bank follows a pegged exchange rate.
Finally, the monetary authority engages in interest rate smoothing whenever R > 0.
4.1.7 Exogenous processes
In the following analysis, three exogenous shocks are considered: aggregate technol-
ogy (At), and perception of lenders on homeowners and entrepreneurial productivity
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(Ht and Et ). In particular, the latter two shocks are used as a proxy for capital in-
flows shocks to the small open economy. An increase in Ht and Et , i.e. an increase
in foreign lenders’ perception of domestic borrowers’ productivity, leads to a low-
ering of the external finance premium in the sector hit by the shock, and hence an
increase in the demand for loans, which is satisfied by foreign lenders and hence
amounts to a capital inflow.
Focussing on these particular two shocks is interesting because while both ex-
pansionary in nature, they affect different sides of the credit market. The technology
shock increasese firms’ productivity and leads firms to expand production, increasing
their capital demand. This, in turn, translates in an increase in the demand for credit
of the entrepreneurial sector. While demand for foreign funds increases, so does en-
trepreneurial leverage, thereby worsening balance sheet conditions.64 On the other
hand, capital inflow shocks affect the supply side of credit. When foreign lenders be-
come optimist regarding domestic borrowers’ productivity, they loosen credit condi-
tions demanding a lower external finance premium, which drives down leverage and
encourages borrowing. Hence, while a domestic technology shock "pulls" foreign
capital in the small open economy, the capital inflow shock is of a "push" nature.65
Exogenous variables obey the following autoregressive processes:
log(At) = A log(At 1) + A;t
ln(Ht ) =  ln(
H
t 1) + 
H
;t
ln(Et ) =  ln(
E
t 1) + 
E
;t
4.1.8 Calibration
64 We will see in the next section that, in case of foreign borrowing, the increase in leverage is
partially offset by the exchange rate appreciation.
65 See Fernandez-Arias (1996) for the introduction of the "push-pull" terminology in the context of
capital inflows.
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The calibration of the model parameters is largely drawn from existing studies on
small open economies. In particular, I set the discount factor  = 0:99, implying an
annual risk-free interest rate of 4%. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution () is
set to 1, so as the elasticity of labor supply (') following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1997). In order to obtain a steady state labor supply of 0:33 the coefficient on
labor in the utility function (N ) is calibrated at 8:8394. Regarding the composition
of consumption, I set the share of imported goods in the consumption basket at 0:4,
consistent with the value set for Latvia by Ajevskis and Vitola (2011), which implies
some degree of home bias. Furthermore, I set the consumption habit parameter at
0:8, following the estimates for Estonia by Gelain and Kulikov (2009). As in Aoki,
Proudman and Vlieghe (2004) and Forlati and Lambertini (2011), the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and housing services is set to 1. The same value
is chosen for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in the
consumption basket, following Gertler, Gali’ and Natalucci (2003). Furthermore, I
set the share of housing services in the consumption bundle (1   c) to 0:0950, so
that in steady state, the imputed rents to consumption ratio is equal to 10:5, which is
consistent with pre-crisis data of Central and Eastern European countries.66 Setting
a depreciation rate for the housing stock (h) to 1% annually results to a steady state
housing investment to output ratio of 1%, which is consistent with the average of
1; 06% observed in the data.67
Turning to the production side of the economy, I set the elasticity of substitu-
tion between different varieties of domestic goods to 6, implying a price markup of
20%. Following Ajevskis and Vitola (2011) and Merola (2010), I set the same elas-
ticity of substitution for different varieties of labor. Furthermore, I set the price and
66 The ratio has been calculated dividing imputed rents by total consumption expenditures, for the
period 2003-2007 (Eurostat data).
67 Here, I used Eurostat data on gross capital formation in the construction sector as a proxy for
investment the real estate sector. Again, the average is computed over the period 2003-2007.
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wage stickiness parameters to 0:75, implying that prices and wages are adjusted, on
average, every 4 quarters. The share of capital in production, , is set to 0:35. Fur-
thermore, the share of homeowners’ and entrepreneurial labor in production is set to
0:01.
The parameters in the benchmark model calibration are set following Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In particular, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock of homeowners and entrepreneurs (H and E) are set to 0:28.
The monitoring cost parameters are calibrated at 0:12, implying a quarterly default
probability of homeowners and entrepreneurs of 0:87% (3:48% annually). This re-
sults in an external finance premium equal to 228 basis points on an annual basis
and in a steady state leverage ratio of 0:5. I can then back out the survival probabil-
ity of entrepreneurs, which is calibrated at 0:98. The elasticity of the transfer from
homeowners to consumers is calibrated at 0:0526.68
Finally, the standard deviation of the technology shock is set to 1, whereas that
of the two perception shocks is set to 1%. All three shocks share the same persistence
parameter, equal to 0.9.
4.2 Simulation Results
In what follows, I illustrate the dynamic evolution of the main model’s variables in
response to technology and capital inflow shocks, under different specifications of
the Taylor rule. First, this exercise allows to shed light on the interplay between
financial frictions in both the financing of capital and real estate investment, and
68 While, for firms, this calibration is largely consistent with the values set by Ajevskis and Vitola
(2011) for Latvia, they report much higher leverage ratios for the household sector. Hence, I also
calibrate the model in order to deliver a higher leverage ratio (equal to 2:5) of homeowners. This
amounts to setting the monitoring cost and the idiosyncratic volatility parameters to 0:18 and 0:2053
respectively. While the steady state default probability is unchanged, the steady state external finance
premium rises to 340 basis points annually. This, however, does qualitatively alter the results.
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analyze the transmission of shocks across sectors. Secondly, it will allow comparison
between different monetary policy rules, illustrating their effect not only on output
and inflation, but also on credit variables and their interactions across sectors.
I consider four Taylor rules obtained as special cases of equation (4.43). In the
first scenario, the central bank sets the interest rate according to a standard Taylor
rule, reacting to deviations of output and inflation:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R t

 Yt
Y
Y (1 R)
exp
 
R;t
 (4.44)
Where variables without time subscript refer to steady state values (in particu-
lar, I set  = 1:5, Y = 0:5 and R = 0:8).
The second rule I consider is one in which the central bank sets the nominal in-
terest rate reacting to a financial aggregate. The issue is then to choose what financial
indicator is more appropriate for inclusion in the central bank’s Taylor rule. Evidence
presented by the IMF (2009) finds common patterns in economic variables in the pe-
riod preceding an asset price bust. In particular, significant expansions in domestic
credit and investment accompanied by current account deficits have been found to be
recurrent in the run-up to a bust. Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2011) argue that in
the context of middle income countries, central banks should conduct monetary pol-
icy by reacting to the economy’s credit growth gap. They claim that, in so doing, the
central bank can offset the acceleration mechanism that leads to credit growth and
asset price inflation that is at the heart of financial imbalances. In particular, during
upturns, informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are enhanced,
and the prevailing loosening of lending standards erodes the resilience of the coun-
try to financial distress. Furthermore, studies as Claessens et al. (2011) and Calderón
and Fuentes (2011) affirm that credit aggregates are useful leading indicators of as-
set price bubbles. In particular, while credit booms are not necessarily conducive of
a crisis, the evidence suggests that almost all crises are preceded by a credit boom.
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Hence, I consider a scenario where the central bank monitors the growth in loans in
addition to output and inflation when setting the policy rate69:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R t

 Yt
Y
Y  Lt
Lt 1
L(1 R)
exp
 
R;t
 (4.45)
The third policy rule considered represents a situation where the central bank
reacts to exchange rate movements. Rules of this kind have been widely consid-
ered for small open economies with a high degrees of dollarization, especially in
light of the fact that many emerging economies engaged in exchange rate stabiliza-
tion or opted for a fixed exchange rate regime. In particular, the main argument for
exchange rate stabilization in this context relies on the fact that, when debt is denom-
inated in foreign currency, exchange rate fluctuations affect the economy not only
through trade, but also through balance sheet effects on borrowers.70 In this context,
an exchange rate appreciation that, on one side, reduces exports with negative effects
on aggregate demand, relaxes credit conditions of indebted agents, thereby stimulat-
ing further borrowing. Studies in this field71 find that the suboptimality of exchange
rate stabilization as a monetary policy strategy is strictly connected with the degree
of openness of the economy (Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006)) and the source of the
shock (Faia (2010)).
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R t

 Yt
Y
Y  St
St 1
S(1 R)
exp
 
R;t
 (4.46)
Here, the central bank reacts to devaluation pressures with a coefficient S =
1:5.72
69 Here, I set  = 1:5, Y = 0:5; R = 0:8 and L = 1:5.
70 Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001).
71 Cespedes (2000), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006), Gertler,
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), Batini and Levine (2008), Faia (2010).
72 The coefficients on credit growth and exchange rate depreciation in the Taylor rules are set to the
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Finally, I consider the case in which the central bank pursues a fixed exchange
rate regime, obtained setting S !1:
St = 0 (4.47)
4.2.1 Domestic technology shock
A positive, one standard deviation technology shock (depicted in Figure 4.1) implies
an unexpected improvement in domestic firms’ productivity and an abatement of
marginal costs. On one side, this leads to a decreased demand for labor which drives
down employment and wages. The resulting decrease in labor income depresses
households’ consumption of both goods and housing services. On the other hand, the
reduction in marginal costs leads firms to revise prices downwards, lowering home
goods inflation. The decline in the price of domestic goods has two consequences on
external balance. As domestic goods are cheaper, on one side export demand rises,
and on the other hand a substitution effect kicks in, which shifts domestic purchases
towards home produced goods, causing a decrease in imports. As a result, the trade
balance shifts to surplus, and the resulting net inflow of currency puts appreciation
pressures on the exchange rate. The reaction of the central bank depends on the
chosen monetary policy strategy. If the central bank follows a fixed exchange rate
regime, it keeps the nominal interest rate unaltered; if it follows a Taylor rule, it
lowers the nominal interest rate in response to the decrease in inflation.
The overall macroeconomic adjustment and the behavior of financial variables
in both the entrepreneurial and the homeowners’ sector crucially depend on the mon-
etary policy regime, mainly through its effects on aggregate demand and on borrow-
ers’ balance sheets. Concerning aggregate demand, the domestic technology shock
same value, equal to 1:5, to enhance comparability between responses across different specifications
of the monetary policy rule.
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exerts opposite effects on the demand of consumption goods and housing. While im-
proved productivity leads to a decrease in firms’ demand of labor and hence a drop in
wages, dampening domestic consumption (including housing services), external de-
mand offsets the decline in consumption and boosts production, increasing firms’ de-
mand for capital. Hence, while demand for capital investment rises, demand for real
estate investment contracts. Furthermore, it is important to notice that under a fixed
exchange rate regime, the increase in export demand is much more pronounced, lead-
ing to a sharper expansion in production leading firms to limit their cutback in labor
demand, which counteracts the fall in domestic consumption through a more muted
decline in wage income. In any case, as capital demand surges, entrepreneurs engage
in more projects, demand more credit and more unfinished capital goods, pushing
up their price. While the raise in credit demand puts upwards pressures on entrepre-
neurial leverage, the increase in the price of capital partially offsets the worsening of
entrepreneurs’ balance sheet.
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Figure 4.1: Responses to a domestic technology shock under different Taylor rules
Note: Responses to a one standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
However, the monetary policy regime directly affects credit markets through
balance sheet effects arising from exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate
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appreciation occurring when the central bank follows a taylor rule decreases the ef-
fective debt burden of entrepreneurs and homeowners. In the entrepreneurial case,
this counteracts the increased demand for loans by lowering the (foreign currency)
value of debt, pushing leverage below steady state values and lowering the external
finance premium. In the fixed exchange rate case, the favorable exchange rate effect
does not occur, hence the loan burden increases, and with it entrepreneurial leverage,
dampening the overall acceleration and leading to a smoother increment in capital in-
vestment. Hence, the interaction between monetary policy regime and credit frictions
affects entrepreneurs through two effects acting in opposite directions. A fixed ex-
change rate regime boosts exports but dampens the financial accelerator mechanism.
An inflation targeting regime limits the effect of external demand, but strengthens the
financial accelerator.
The balance sheet effect on homeowners operates in a similar fashion. Under
flexible exchange rate, the loan burden decreases, thereby leading to lower lever-
age and external finance premium for homeowners and encouraging new real estate
projects that ultimately reduce the rental price of houses. Hence, the positive balance
sheet effect is able to offset the initial decrease in housing demand caused by the drop
in overall consumption, leading to increased housing investment. In the case of a
fixed exchange rate regime, a similar positive effect on real estate investment occurs,
but for different reasons. Here, the increase in export demand leads domestic firms
to reduce employment by less, implying a more muted effect on households’ wage
income and hence a smoother drop in consumption. Hence, demand for housing ser-
vices decreases less markedly. Hence, loan demand from homeowners declines by
less, as well as leverage and the external finance premium, leading to an increase
in housing investment that is even higher than in the case of flexible exchange rate.
Hence, also in the case of homeowners, the interaction between monetary policy
regime and credit frictions exerts two effects acting in opposite directions. A fixed
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exchange rate regime impacts less on housing demand but dampens the financial ac-
celerator mechanism. An inflation targeting regime implies a greater fall in rental
housing demand, but strengthens the financial accelerator.
Hence, in the event of a technology shock, credit frictions at the entrepreneurial
and homeowners’ level can lead to different scenarios concerning the co-movement
of financial variables in the two sectors depending on the monetary policy regime.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, albeit a positive co-movement of investment
and asset prices in the two sectors, financial variables exhibit a negative correlation.
While external finance premia and leverage increase in the entrepreneurial sector,
they decrease in the real estate sector. On the contrary, under a flexible exchange rate
regime as in the three taylor rules considered, financial variables co-move following
a technology shock. While in both cases the shock exerts an opposite effect on the
demand for goods (positive) and housing services (negative), in the flexible exchange
rate regime, the balance sheet effect is able to offset the increase in leverage caused
by the increased loan demand, while this effect does not operate in the case of pegged
currency.
Finally, it is worth noting how the three considered Taylor rules do not imply
large differences in the dynamic adjustment of real and financial variables. This is a
direct consequence of the pattern of co-movement between financial variables in the
entrepreneurial and homeowners’ sectors. Following the shock, while entrepreneurs
demand more credit, homeowners do not and, as a result, aggregate credit does not
increase so much to warrant a stronger reaction of the central bank.
4.2.2 Capital inflow shock: entrepreneurs
Figure 4.2 depicts the responses to a positive increase in foreign lenders’ perception
of entrepreneurs’ productivity under the three Taylor rules and fixed exchange rate
scenarios. As foreign lenders become more optimist concerning the profitability of
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entrepreneurs, implying a smaller perceived probability of default, they loosen credit
conditions. Hence, on impact, the external finance premium charged on domestic
entrepreneurs decreases. As borrowing conditions improve and entrepreneurial net
worth rises, leverage declines. Therefore, the abatement of the cost of external fi-
nance prompts entrepreneurs to engage in new investment projects, and to demand
more credit. As capital investment increases and with it the supply of capital, pro-
duction surges, and so does domestic price inflation. Furthermore, the positive inflow
of capital exerts appreciating pressures on the domestic currency (the exchange rate
decreases). After this impact effect, the macroeconomic adjustment crucially de-
pends on the monetary policy rule followed by the domestic central bank. Under any
Taylor rule, implying a flexible currency, the exchange rate appreciation leads to a
decrease in the price of imports, which offsets the increase in domestic price infla-
tion and leads to a decline in CPI inflation. Under an inflation targeting regime, as
output rises above steady state values more than inflation contracts, the central bank
raises the policy rate, thereby accommodating the exchange rate appreciation after
the initial impact. While this doesn’t improve the country’s export performance, it
has positive consequences on borrowers’ balance sheet and it is the key channel of
transmission of the shock to the real estate investment sector. In fact, as the exchange
rate appreciates, borrowing conditions of homeowners improve. As the debt burden
decreases, and with it the external finance premium and leverage, investment in the
real estate sector grows. Hence, the positive effect of the initial shock to entrepre-
neurs’ borrowing conditions positively spills over to homeowners through balance
sheet effects, leading to a positive co-movement of financial variables across sectors.
If the central bank engages in exchange rate targeting, it tries to offset the initial ex-
change rate appreciation and increases the nominal interest rate by a smaller amount.
While this reduces the negative effect on exports and boosts aggregate demand, it
somewhat dampens the positive balance sheet effect. However, even in this case the
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shock positively spills over to homeowners leading to an increase in housing invest-
ment and prices.
Figure 4.2: Responses to a one standard deviation capital inflow shock (entrepre-
neurs), under different Taylor rules
Note: Responses to a one standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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In case the Taylor rule reacts to credit growth involves a stronger monetary
policy contraction. As the capital inflow shock boosts entrepreneurial demand for
credit and the balance sheet effect on homeowners’ debt is not strong enough, overall
credit growth rises. The increase in inflation and in agregate loans growth prompts
the central bank to increase the interest rate. However, in case of foreign currency
borrowing, the relevant opportunity cost of investment is the foreign interest rate,
which is taken as given by the small open economy and stays constant. As the mone-
tary policy tightening results in a stronger exchange rate appreciation, it strengthens
borrowers’ balance sheets, leading to a sharper decrease in leverage and a stronger
improvement in balance sheet conditions. Furthermore, the stronger currency appre-
ciation harms competitiveness, leading to a more pronounced fall in export demand
which offsets the increase in output driven by the rise in domestic demand.
4.2.3 Capital inflow shock: homeowners
Figure 4.3 reveals that the effect of a capital inflow to the homeowners’ sector im-
plies a similar macroeconomic dynamics as a shock to credit to entrepreneurs. On
impact, the shock reduces the external finance premium paid on real estate mort-
gages, thereby increasing the net worth of homeowners and reducing their leverage.
As homeowners find it more convenient to invest in real estate projects, investment
in the housing sector increases and house prices rise. The shock has a positive ef-
fect on overall consumption through three effects. On one side, the rise in housing
prices boosts households’ wealth, encouraging consumption. On the other hand,
the increased supply of finished housing lowers their rental price, boosting demand.
Finally, as the domestic currency appreciates, imports become cheaper and over-
all CPI inflation declines, stimulating purchases. The increased demand for domes-
tic goods for consumption and housing investment purchases stimulates production,
which leads to a raise in demand for capital goods. Hence, as returns to capital in-
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crease, the entrepreneurial sector is stimulated to undertake new investment projects.
While this increases leverage and the external finance premium under a fixed ex-
change rate regime, if the central bank follows a Taylor rule, the appreciation of the
domestic currency exerts a favorable balance sheet effect on entrepreneurial leverage.
However, once again, when the central bank reacts to credit growth, the increase in
the domestic interest rate is stronger, leading to a sharper decrease in exports which
depress demand. In this case, production remains below steady state for quite some
time after the shock. As a result, in spite of the decrease in entrepreneurial lever-
age, capital investment is negatively affected by the decline in capital demand by
firms. On the contrary, when the central bank engages in exchange rate smoothing,
it prevents a sharp fall in exports while still allowing for a positive balance sheet ef-
fect arising from the currency appreciation. Hence, the growth in domestic demand is
able to compensate the fall in foreign demand, leading to an expansion of production.
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Figure 4.3: Responses to a one standard deviation capital inflow (homeowners)
shock, under different Taylor rules
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the value of the currency is kept con-
stant. This implies that the consumer price index does not benefit from the effect of
the exchange rate appreciation, as the price of foreign goods is not affected. This,
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combined with the increase in domestic prices due to demand pressures implies that
overall consumer price inflation rises. Furthermore, as the exchange rate does not
appreciate, exports are only affected to the extent that the price of domestic goods
rises. However, the fall in exports is negligible, and does not significantly counteract
the increase in domestic demand, leading to higher production and hence higher cap-
ital investment. Furthermore, as balance sheet effects of exchange rate fluctuations
are absent in this setting, entrepreneurial borrowing conditions are worse than in the
case of flexible currency. Therefore, after an initial decrease in leverage and premium
due to the increase in asset prices, as capital investment peaks leverage rises, albeit
to a small extent. Hence, once again the exchange rate regime determines the ex-
tent of co-movement between sectorial borrowing conditions in the small dollarized
economy. While a monetary regime implying a flexible exchange rate leads to posi-
tive co-movement, when the currency is pegged, the correlation weakens and slightly
reverts direction.
4.3 Optimal monetary policy
In this section, I compute the optimal unrestricted optimal rule for the presented small
open economy subject to productivity and capital inflow shocks. I assume the cen-
tral bank’s objective is represented by a quadratic loss function, which the monetary
authority attempts to minimize. I consider different scenarios according to the objec-
tives of the central bank. In the first setting, the central bank is only concerned about
stabilizing the real economy, and attempts to avoid excessive fluctuations in output
and inflation. In a second setting, the monetary authority also cares about financial
stability and considers fluctuations in loans growth undesirable.
The optimal monetary policy strategy with respect to financial stability issues
has since long been a contentious issue, which has intensified with the eruption of the
global financial crisis. The fact that the primary objective of a central bank should be
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price stability is widely accepted and remains unchallenged. However, the view that
the central bank should only be concerned with price stability has been challenged
in the last decade, on the grounds of the inherent fragility of the financial system.
On one side, it is claimed that by always pursuing the goal of price stability cen-
tral banks will in fact best promote financial stability (see for example Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) and Cogley (1999)), whereas a separate weight on financial stability
considerations in the monetary policy objective is likely to have destabilizing effects
on the economy. In most recent years, however, the unicity of the traditional objec-
tive of monetary policy has been more strongly put into question, on the grounds that
an environment of low inflation and sustained economic growth might not be suffi-
cient to guarantee financial stability. In particular, it has been argued that asset price
bubbles and excessive credit growth might occur as a consequence of stable infla-
tion expectations and optimistic prospects about the future economic outlook, which
encourage risk taking and financial fragility. Among the advocates of this view are
Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002 and 2004), Bordo and Jeanne (2002),
White (2006) and Woodford (2012). Their argument rests on the claim that set-
ting monetary policy only considering developments in inflation and the output gap
might be a too narrow approach, and that better results in terms of stabilization could
be achieved by explicitly targeting unsustainable increases in asset prices and exces-
sive credit growth, even at the cost of increased variability in inflation and output.
In particular, it is argued that ensuring a stable path of credit growth is conducive
of both financial stability (through reduced swings in asset prices and sustainable
leverage dynamics) and macroeconomic stability (hampering excessive fluctuations
in consumption and investment). More specifically, Woodford (2012) argues that the
monetary policy trade-off between inflation and financial stability is very similar to
that between inflation and output stabilization and that central banks might be able to
strike a balance between the two objectives by means of a form of "flexible inflation
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targeting regime". The validity of a central bank’s financial stability objective from
a welfare standpoint has been emphasized by Angeloni and Faia (2013). By making
a quantitative comparison of welfare under different central bank’s objectives, they
conclude for the appropriateness of financial stability being included as one of such
objectives.
In what follows, I consider three specifications of the monetary authority’s pref-
erences. First, I consider a central bank which aims at macroeconomic stability,
thereby trying to limit fluctuations in inflation and output. Furthermore, the central
bank considers desirable to limit the volatility of the domestic interest rate. Hence,
the loss function in this first instance is defined as follows73:
LMS = Et
h
^2t + yY^
2
t + rR^
2
t
i
(4.48)
Where variables with a hat denote log deviations from steady state values. y
represents the relative weight the central bank places on output stability relative to
inflation stability, and r denotes the relative weight on interest rate variability.
In the second scenario, I consider a central bank also concerned with financial
stability. In this setting, I specify the central bank’s loss function as being a positive
function of the volatility of aggregate credit growth in addition to output, inflation
and interest rate volatility. In this case, the loss function is defined as:
LFS = Et
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In particular, I consider two specifications of the loss function with financial
stability objective, according to the central banks’ relative preference for macroeco-
nomic versus financial stabiliy. In the first case, which I denote LFS1 , the monetary
authority of the small open economy considers monetary stability a priority, which
translates in a lower weight on credit growth. Specifically, I set L = y = 0:1. The
73 In particular, I set y = 0; 1, r = 0:05.
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second specification corresponds to the case in which the central bank considers the
macroeconomic stability and the financial stability objectives equally important. I de-
note the loss function corresponding with this case with LFS2 , which is characterized
by a weight on credit growth volatility equal to 1.
In what follows, I assume the economy is affected by the three considered
shocks (i.e. domestic technology, and foreign lenders’ perception of domestic entre-
preneurs’ and homeowners’ productivity) at the same time. The calibration of the
shock is similar to that used for the impulse response functions analysis, i.e. one
standard deviation technology shock and 1% positive perception shocks. The opti-
mized Taylor rule coefficients and the corresponding value of the loss functions are
presented in Table 4.174.
Table 4.1: Optimized Taylor rule
'r ' 'y 'L 'S Loss
Loss MS 0.7620 1.3659 0.7447 0.099 0.088 0.4526
Loss FS1 0.7752 1.3615 0.7592 0.099 0.4826 0.4550
Loss FS2 0.7818 1.373 0.7273 0.0997 0.487 0.4681
In all cases the coefficient on lagged interest rate reveal a quite high optimal in-
ertia of the monetary policy rule. Given that, in the model, the relevant risk free rate
for lenders is the foreign one, this result might be puzzling. However, in a small open
economy, changes in the nominal interest rate are mirrored by exchange rate fluc-
74 Optimal Taylor Rule coefficients are obtained implementing the "osr" (optimal simple rule) proce-
dure in Dynare, which relies on the csminwel.m numerical algorithm provided by Chris Sims. The al-
gorithm performs a numerical optimization of the objective function (the central bank’s loss function)
based on the Quasi-Newton implemented through the BFGS (Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno)
algorithm. Here, the iteration procedure will cease when it proves impossible to improve the func-
tion value by more than 1e-7. The algorithm found a solution after 7 iterations for Loss MS and Loss
FS1, and after 6 iterations for Loss FS2.
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tuations, which impact the balance sheet of borrowers with foreign currency debt,
leading to more volatility in financial variables, including credit growth. Therefore,
even when the central bank is not concerned about financial stability, it considers de-
sirable to smooth movements in the monetary policy rate. The optimized coefficients
on inflation and output are broadly similar across loss function specifications. While
going from LMS to LFS1 the optimal weight on inflation increases, that on output
decreases, but these differences are of negligible importance. The most important re-
sult emerging from Table 4.1 concerns the optimized coefficients on aggregate credit
growth and exchange rate stabilization. In the case the monetary authority is not con-
cerned with financial stability, both optimized coefficients are close to zero. In this
case, reacting to inflation and output deviations is optimal. On the contrary, when
financial stability considerations are included in the central bank’s objective, the op-
timized coefficient on exchange rate depreciation is positive and equal to 0.48, while
the optimized coefficient on credit growth is still close to zero. These results can
be better understood referring to the impulse-response functions analysis presented
in the previous section. In Figure 4.2, I presented the responses to a 1% shock to
foreign lenders’ perceptions of entrepreneurial productivity. Comparing the impulse
responses for the Taylor rule with exchange rate stabilization and the Taylor rule
with credit growth reveals the reason why reacting to credit growth is suboptimal.
The perception shock leads foreign lenders to lower the price of credit, which en-
courages borrowing and hence credit growth. The central bank observes the increase
in loans and tightens the domestic interest rate quite sharply. Hence the central bank
reacts by increasing the policy rate by a larger amount than under a standard Taylor
rule with exchange rate smoothing.75 However, in case of foreign currency borrow-
ing, the relevant opportunity cost of investment is the foreign interest rate, which is
75 Note that the coefficients on exchange rate depreciation and credit growth in the simple Taylor
rules are equal, so as to enhance comparability between the two monetary strategies.
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taken as given by the small open economy and stays constant. As the monetary policy
tightening results in a stronger exchange rate appreciation, it strengthens borrowers’
balance sheets, leading to a sharper decrease in leverage and a stronger improve-
ment in balance sheet conditions. Furthermore, the stronger currency appreciation
harms competitiveness, leading to a more pronounced fall in export demand which
offsets the increase in output driven by the rise in domestic demand. As a result, in
pursuing such a monetary policy strategy, the domestic central bank obtains results
that conflict with its objectives. First, it does not succeed in smoothing credit de-
velopments as the economy is dollarized: on the contrary, it strengthens borrowers’
balance sheets. This encourages the build-up of financial vulnerabilities of the kind
many Eastern European economies were exposed to before the crisis: overexpansion
of foreign currency debt and increase in leverage. Second, it offsets the positive ef-
fect of export demand on output, counteracting the expansionary effect of the capital
inflow shock. Hence, the central bank can achieve a better result in terms of macro-
economic and financial stabilization if it includes an exchange rate term in the Taylor
rule, simultaneously smoothing the volatility of credit aggregates and containing the
negative effects of the domestic currency appreciation on exports.
One natural question that arises is whether these results are driven by the rel-
atively small magnitude of the capital inflow shocks compared to the technology
shock. Would the monetary authority of an economy hit by large capital inflow shock
find it optimal to react to credit aggregates? In Table 4.2, I present optimized Taylor
rule coefficients for different calibrations of the perception shocks.
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Table 4.2: Optimal Taylor rule for different magnitudes of the perception shocks
'r ' 'y 'L 'S Loss
ve = vh = 0:01
Loss MS 0.7620 1.3659 0.7447 0.099 0.088 0.4526
Loss FS1 0.7752 1.3615 0.7592 0.099 0.4826 0.4550
Loss FS2 0.7818 1.373 0.7273 0.0997 0.487 0.4681
ve = vh = 0:1
Loss MS 0.7619 1.365 0.744 0.100 0.088 0.4528
Loss FS1 0.775 1.3615 0.7595 0.099 0.481 0.4552
Loss FS2 0.7816 1.373 0.728 0.100 0.487 0.4613
ve = vh = 0:5
Loss MS 0.7583 1.3655 0.7492 0.1054 0.087 0.4562
Loss FS1 0.7707 1.360 0.766 0.106 0.485 0.4612
Loss FS2 0.7751 1.368 0.749 0.1149 0.4868 0.4887
As it can be noticed, optimized Taylor rule coefficients do not change much
across specifications and are similar to the baseline. Increasing the magnitude of the
perception shocks results in slightly higher reaction coefficients on all variables in the
Taylor rule. Furthermore, even for 10% perception shocks, the optimal reaction coef-
ficient to credit growth is small, albeit it slightly increases. However, even confronted
with capital inflow shocks of greater magnitudes, a strong reaction of the central bank
to credit developments is not optimal. Hence, a central bank equipped with only one
instrument cannot adequately manage capital inflow surges, as a monetary tightening
results in a strengthening of borrowers’ balance sheets through exchange rate effects
and an even higher demand for foreign loans. This warrants the establishment of
macroprudential instruments, especially designed to counteract the surge in financial
imbalances. The analysis of such issues requires expanding the present model to in-
clude a financial sector channeling foreign loans to domestic borrowers, which will
be a subject of future work.
129
Mara Pirovano
4.4 Robustness analysis and sensitivity to model assumptions
The model presented earlier is based on specific choices in the modeling framework
and in the calibration of parameters. Three assumptions in the presented model could
be considered of key importance for the relevance of the results.
First, to introduce homeowners and incorporate them to the household sec-
tor, it has been postulated that the consumers can behave either is a Ricardian or
a Non-Ricardian fashion, with the share of Ricardian consumers set at 0:8. Sec-
ondly, it is assumed that homeowners are linked to Non-Ricardian consumers via
a transfer scheme. In particular, in each period, homeowners perform a transfer to
Non-Ricardian consumers, which depends on the inverse leverage ratio. Finally, the
presented model assumes that homeowners and entrepreneurs borrow exclusively in
foreign currency, i.e. the economy is characterized to full financial dollarization. In
what follows, I explore the sensitivity of results to the composition of the consumers
population and to the presence of the transfer scheme. The Appendix to this chap-
ter presents a possible extension to the current framework allowing for borrowing in
different currencies.
4.4.1 Importance of the composition of consumers on the model’s dynamics
In what follows, I will present the impulse-response functions of the model obtained
for different shares of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian households. In the model, n
represents the share of Ricardian consumers, i.e. those consumers that solve an in-
tertemporal optimization problem in each period, maximixing their utility subject to
a budget constraint. The remaining (1   n) consumers are Non-Ricardian, and they
consume their full current income in each period, thus not operating an intertemporal
choice. The depicted impulse-response functions refer to the case in which the cen-
tral bank of the small open economy sets the policy rate following a standard Taylor
Rule with a coefficient of 1:5 on inflation and 0:5 on output. I consider various val-
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ues of n (specifically 0:2, 0:4, 0:6, 0:8 and 1), where the case n = 1 corresponds to a
case where all consumers are Ricardian. I exclude the case where n = 0 because, in
this instance, all consumers would be Non-Ricardian and there would be no optimal
intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving over time. Hence, the interest
rate would have no role in shaping consumption and saving decisions, and the model
can no longer be solved.
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Figure 4.4: Responses to a domestic technology shock under standard Taylor rule
and different shares of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers
Note: Responses to a one standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.5: Responses to a capital inflow shock to entrepreneurs under standard Tay-
lor rule and different shares of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviation capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
133
Mara Pirovano
Figure 4.6: Responses to a homeowners’ capital inflow shock under standard Taylor
rule and different shares of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations homeowners’ capital inflow shock, in percentage devi-
ations from the steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Before discussing the impulse-responses, few remarks are in order. Ricardian
consumers determine their optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, savings
and working hours. Non-Ricardian households do not operate these choices: instead,
they consume their current income in each period, which consists of labor income,
transfers from homeowners, net of taxes. As such, their consumption decisions are
independent of the interest rate. As only Ricardian consumers operate consump-
tion and labor decisions, they are those that determine the labor supply. As labor
is assumed to be homegenous, Non-Ricardian consumers work the same hours and
receive the same wage as Ricardian consumers.
I will now discuss the case of a positive technology shock (depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4) to illustrate the dynamics of the model under different shares of Ricardian
and Non-Ricardian consumers. The technology shock decreases marginal costs and
firms’ demand for labor, thereby putting downward pressures on wages. As we could
expect, the effect of a decrease in employment and in the wage has stronger effects on
consumption when the share of Non-Ricardian consumers is high (n = 0:2). Their
consumption decreases sharply following the decrease in labor income. Consump-
tion of Ricardian consumers also falls, but it does so much more smoothly. Why?
Because, as the central bank lowers the interest rate in response to the decrease in
inflation, Ricardian consumers substitute some savings with consumption, thereby
mitigating its fall. Furthermore, it is important to notice that, the larger the share of
Non-Ricardian consumers (i.e. the smaller n), the smaller the positive effect of the
technology shock on output. While for n = 1 the technology shock leads to a persis-
tently higher output, when n decreases output increases less and even decreases on
impact for smaller values of n. This is due to the much stronger decline in domestic
demand driven by the larger fall in consumption, which is not compensated by the
increase in external demand. As a result of the stronger decline in output, the cen-
tral bank decreases the policy rate more strongly when n is low, inducing a domestic
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currency depreciation which encourages exports and further discourages imports (im-
ports decrease much more also because consumption falls more heavily when a large
share of consumers are Non-Ricardian). The difference in the responses of financial
variables are a direct consequence of the dynamics of output and the exchange rate
for different values of n. Output influences the demand for capital, which influences
investment in the capital sector and the variables related to entrepreneurs. The ex-
change rate directly influences leverage, impacting the external finance premium and
financing conditions.
A similar discussion holds for the capital inflow shocks (depicted in Figures
4.5 and 4.6, so the main message we can draw from this exercise is that changing
the share of Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers impacts on the model dynam-
ics through the different behavior of consumption, which is more (less) sensitive to
interest rate movements and less (more) sensitive to wage income when the share of
Ricardian consumers is high (low).
4.4.2 Importance of the transfer scheme on the model’s dynamics
In this section, I quantify the effect of the presence of the transfer from homeown-
ers to consumers on the dynamics of the model. To do so, I compare the behavior of
the baseline model (which includes the transfer) to a model where the transfer is re-
moved. Specifically, in the latter specification, I assume a homeowners behave as en-
trepreneurs: in each period, a fraction of homeowners exits the market and consumes
the remaining net worth. It is important to notice, however, that, while removing
the transfer, the distinction between Ricardian and Non-Ricardian consumers is con-
served, so as to isolate the effect of the transfer. The impulse-response functions are
depicted below, for the case in which the central bank sets the interest rate following
a standard Taylor rule.
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Figure 4.7: Responses to a domestic technology shock under standard Taylor rule.
Comparison of model with and without transfer
Note: Responses to a 1 standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the steady
state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.8: Responses to an entrepreneurs’ capital inflow shock under standard Tay-
lor rule. Comparison of model with and without transfer
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
138
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
Figure 4.9: Responses to a homeowners’ capital inflow shock under standard Taylor
rule. Comparison of model with and without transfer
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 lead to two main conclusions. First, the presence of
the transfer does not alter the response of the main macoreconomic variables: it ex-
erts an effect on variables pertaining to homeowners, and impacts consumption only
negligeably. Only in the case of a capital inflow shock affecting homeowners it is
possible to notice some difference between a model with and without transfer. This
happens because the shock directly affects the balance sheet of homeowners, and has
a direct impact on the transfer homeowners remit to (Non-Ricardian) consumers. The
positive capital inflow shock to homeowners lowers the external finance premium on
impact and with it borrowing costs, having a positive impact on net worth. As net
worth increases (and leverage decreases), the transfer increases as well, increasing
the income of Non-Ricardian consumers. This extra income is used for consumption
purposes, hence consumption increases more when the transfer is active. As con-
sumption is allocated between domestic and imported goods, also imports increase
by a larger amount in the model with the transfer. Higher consumption in the model
with transfer is met by a stronger increase in output and, with it, a stronger increase
in capital demand and in investment in capital goods. Furthermore, as consumption
is allocated between goods and housing services, also the demand for the latter in-
creases, thereby reinforceing the effect of the initial shock on homeowners’ balance
sheet and leading to higher investment in housing.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the interplay between financial frictions at the household and
firm level, liability dollarization and monetary policy in a small open economy sub-
ject to productivity and capital inflow shocks, motivated by the pre-crisis experience
of many Eastern European countries where large inflows of capital directed to the fi-
nancing of investment and mortgage loans resulted in the build-up of vulnerabilities
in the financial sector. In particular, I focus on the interaction of firm and household
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leverage in the transmission of shocks to domestic technology and capital inflows, un-
der three specifications of the monetary policy rule that have been widely considered
in the literature for emerging economies (i.e. inflation targeting, exchange rate target-
ing and fixed exchange rate) and a Taylor rule reacting to credit growth. Furthermore,
I compute the optimal unrestricted monetary policy rule under two specifications of
the central banks’ objectives, namely macroeconomic stability and macroeconomic
plus financial stability.
I find that, first, regardless of the monetary authorities’ preferences, the opti-
mized coefficient on lagged interest rate reveal a quite high optimal inertia of the
monetary policy rule. Given that, in the model, the relevant risk free rate for lenders
is the foreign one, this result might be puzzling. However, in a small open econ-
omy, changes in the nominal interest rate are mirrored by exchange rate fluctuations,
which impact the balance sheet of borrowers with foreign currency debt, leading to
more volatility in financial variables, including credit growth. Therefore, even when
the central bank is not concerned about financial stability, it considers desirable to
smooth movements in the monetary policy rate.
A second result concerns the optimized coefficients on exchange rate depre-
ciation and credit growth. In the case the monetary authority is not concerned with
financial stability, reacting only to inflation and output deviations is optimal. When fi-
nancial stability considerations are included in the central bank’s objective, the mon-
etary authority finds it optimal to react to exchange rate depreciation with a positive
coefficient, but not to credit market indicators. In fact, the optimized coefficient on
credit growth is close to zero, even when the central bank considers the objectives of
macroeconomic and financial stability as equally desirable. Following a shock that
increases the demand for foreign loans (e.g. the perception shocks), a central bank
monitoring the credit market tightens the domestic interest rate quite sharply. How-
ever, in case of foreign currency borrowing, the relevant opportunity cost of invest-
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ment is the foreign interest rate, which is taken as given by the small open economy
and stays constant. As the monetary policy tightening results in a stronger exchange
rate appreciation, it strengthens borrowers’ balance sheets, leading to a sharper de-
crease in leverage and a stronger improvement in balance sheet conditions. Further-
more, the stronger currency appreciation harms competitiveness, leading to a more
pronounced fall in export demand which offsets the increase in output driven by the
rise in domestic demand. As a result, in pursuing such a monetary policy strategy,
the domestic central bank obtains results that conflict with its objectives. First, it
does not succeed in smoothing credit developments as the economy is dollarized: on
the contrary, it strengthens borrowers’ balance sheets. This encourages the build-up
of financial vulnerabilities of the kind many Eastern European economies were ex-
posed to before the crisis: overexpansion of foreign currency debt and increase in
leverage. Second, it offsets the positive effect of export demand on output, counter-
acting the expansionary effect of the capital inflow shock. Hence, the central bank
can achieve a better result in terms of macroeconomic and financial stabilization if
it includes an exchange rate term in the Taylor rule, simultaneously smoothing the
volatility of credit aggregates and containing the negative effects of the domestic cur-
rency appreciation on exports. These results are robust to the relative magnitude of
the capital inflow relative to the technology shock: even when faced when faced with
large capital inflow shocks, reacting to credit growth is not optimal. This suggests
that a central bank equipped with only one instrument cannot adequately manage cap-
ital inflow surges, as a monetary tightening results in a strengthening of borrowers’
balance sheets through exchange rate effects and an even higher demand for foreign
loans.
Finally, this framework allows to draw interesting insights on the interaction
of firm and household leverage in an open economy setting, on the transmission of
shocks, and on the role of the monetary policy regime in shaping it. In the case of
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both technology and capital inflow shocks, the extent of co-movement of financial
variables pertaining to entrepreneurs and homeowners crucially depends on whether
the exchange rate is flexible or pegged. Specifically, under a fixed exchange rate
regime, a negative correlation arises, i.e. stronger balance sheet conditions of en-
trepreneurs lead to weakened or virtually unchanged balance sheet conditions for
homeowners. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a positive correlation of financial
variables of the two types of borrowers arises, mainly operating through the balance
sheet effect of exchange rate fluctuations. More specifically, a positive domestic
productivity shock exerts opposite effects on capital and housing investment: while
housing demand decreases (through a general decline in consumption demand due
to lower wage income), capital demand increases because of increased production
and external demand. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a fall in homeowners’ leverage
and a surge in entrepreneurial leverage. While this happens in the case of fixed ex-
change rate, under a Taylor rule the shock leads to a domestic currency appreciation,
which strengthens the balance sheet of borrowers and offsets the opposite effect on
investment demand in the two sectors.
In case of capital inflow shocks, similar conclusions can be drawn concerning
the interaction between the monetary policy regime and the dynamics of financial
variables across sectors. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that sectoral capital inflow
shocks spill over to the other sector mainly through their effect on domestic produc-
tion through increased demand of domestic goods used for investment purposes, and
through balance sheet effects of currency appreciation.
The presented analysis can be extended in numerous directions, which will be
explored in future research. First and most important, given the results of the opti-
mal monetary policy analysis, a natural avenue for extending the present analysis is
to consider the role of macroprudential policies in dealing with foreign capital in-
flows at the household and entrepreneurial level. To offer a meaningful modeling of
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macroprudential policy, a financial sector has to be added, which channels foreign
funds to investors in the real estate and the production sector. Furthermore, in the
presented model, I assumed that all debt is denominated in foreign currency, which
is of course an extreme case. Current work is being done in these directions, and on
the analysis of the interaction between monetary and macorprudential policy under
different degrees of liability dollarization and economic openness. Further research
could then be devoted to enriching the international dynamics, examining the inter-
national co-movement of asset (including real estate) prices, their consequences on
banks’ balance sheets and international policy coordination. Extending the model to
a two country setting featuring banks engaging in cross-border activities would allow
to study issues related to the international transmission of real estate price shocks as
well as the effect of policies aimed at regulating the banking sector. Furthermore, this
setting would allow to study the interplay between monetary and prudential policies
both within a country and from an international cooperation perspective.
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Derivation of the optimal contract between borrowers and lenders
Here I solve for the optimal credit contract. As entrepreneurs face the same problem
as homeowner, in what follows I solve the optimization problem faced by the latter.
Analogous first order conditions apply to the entrepreneurial sector. The first order
conditions of the optimal contract are obtained by maximizing the expected payoff
of homeowners subject to the lenders’ participation constraint:
max
!Ht+1;H
H
t+1
Et

Qh;tHt+1R
h
t+1A
H(!Ht+1)

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4.A.2 Steady State
In the steady state, I set S = 1 and A = 1. Furthermore, all relative prices are
set to 1, so as all inflation rates: Pd
P c
= pd = 1,
Pf
P c
= pf = 1, P
h
P c
= ph = 1,
 = H = F = 1. Also the parameters representing lenders’ misperception of
borrowers’ productivity are set to 1 in steady state: H = E = 1. The Euler
equation implies, together wit the assumption that domestic and foreign interest rates
are equal in steady state:
R = R =
1

From which it follows that
	 = 1
Equation (4.23) and its counterpart for housing investment imply that in steady
state:
Qk = Qh = 1
The steady state of the credit market is computed assuming target values for
three quantities: (1) The risk premium (Rj  R), (2) The leverage ratio of borrowers
and (3) the annualized default probability of borrowers F (!j) for both entrepreneurs
and homeowners. I choose the value of parameters related to monitoring costs in
the contract between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs (E) and between
financial intermediaries and homeowners (H), volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks
(E , H), steady state threshold productivity levels (!E , !H) and the survival rate of
entrepreneurs (E) to match the aforementioned steady state quantities.
Given values of E , H and a target value for the default probability in each
sector F (!E;E), F (!H ;H) I can calculate the threshold productivity levels:
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!j = Ncdf 1

log !j + 0:52j
j

Which I can now use to calculate the quantities A(!j), A0(!j), B(!j) and
B
0
(!j).
I can then calculate the steady state external finance premium in both sectors:
EFP j =
A0j(!j)
Bj (!j)A0j(!j) B0j (!j)AE(!j)
From which it follows that
RE = EFPE R
Rh = EFPH R
Using (4.20) and (4.28) and denoting levH = QhH
NWH
and levE = QkH
NWE
:
levH =
1
1 B(!H)EFPH
levE =
1
1 B(!E)EFPE
I can now compute the rental rate of capital and the steady state share of hous-
ing services, using (4.25) and (4.15):
rK = RE   (1  k)
s = Rh   (1  h)
I now turn to the production side of the economy. From (??) (??) and (??) it
results that:
MC =
"  1
"
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Then, using ():
K
Y
=
MC  
rK
And from the production function:
K
N
=

K
Y
 1
(1 )
Then using the labor demand equation:
W = MC  (1  )

K
N

Fixing total labor supply at 1
3
of available time, N = 0:33 allows to compute76:
K =
K
N
N
Y = K 

K
Y
 1
FH =
MC  Y
(1  )
DH =
Y
(1  )
~PH =
"
"  1
FH
DH
WE = MC (1  ) 
EY
WH = MC (1  ) 
FY
Equipped with K, I can solve for investment and the expressions related to
entrepreneurial net worth and consumption:
76 Recall that homeowners and entrepreneurs supply one unit of labor inelastically, hence NH =
NE = 1.
148
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
NWE =
K
levE
V E = REQkKA(!
E)
~ =
NWE   (1  ) 
EMC  Y
V E
LE = QkK  NWE
REL =
!ERE
1  NWE
QkK
CE = (1  ~)REQkKA(!E)
Now, fixing the steady state government expenditure at 20% of GDP: G =
0:2  Y , i can use the national accounting identity, and back out the steady state value
of the housing stock:
H =
(Y  G  EF

ln !E 0:52E
E

REQkK   kK   CE)
c
1 c sP
h + h + HF

ln !H 0:52H
H

RhQh
Which I can now use to calculate:
NWH =
H
levH
V H = RhQhHA(!
H)
D = V H + (1  ) 
HMC  Y  NWH
D = D  levH
LH = QhH  NWH
RHL =
!HRh
1  NWK
QhH
h = sH
c =
c
1  c
h
 
P h
&
Ih = hH
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I set consumption of Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers equal in steady
state:
CR = CNR = C
Then:
TNR = D +W N   CNR
TR = G  TNR
Now I can solve for the steady state of the labor market:
N =
1
C
W N ' "w   1
"w
Kw =
"w   1
"w
W
1
C
N
(1  w)
Fw =
NN
(1+')
(1  w)
Finally, I set the net foreign asset position in steady state equal to zero, meaning
a balanced current account in steady state:
B = 0
X = cF + CEF + I
F
k + I
F
h
Y  =
X

4.A.3 Derivations of A(!), B(!,), A’(!), B’(!,)
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In order to compute the external finance premia (cfr equations (21) and (22) in the
text), I have to compute exact expressions for the quantitiesAj(!jt+1) andBj
 
!jt+1; 
j
t

,
where j = H;E. For notational simplicity, in what follows I will omit the time sub-
script and the superscript j. Recall:
A(!) =
Z 1
!
!f(!)d!   !
Z 1
!
f(!)d! (4.50)
B (!; ) = !
Z 1
!
f (!)d! + (1  )
Z !
0
!f (!)d! (4.51)
The idiosyncratic shock ! is i.i.d., and is assumed to have log-normal distri-
bution with parameters  and !: !  logN(; 2!). The density function at !
is:
f!(!) =
1
!!
p
2
exp

 (ln !   )
2
22!

=
1
!!


ln !   
!

(4.52)
Where  () is the standard normal pdf. The corresponding cumulative distri-
bution function is:
F!(!;; !) =
Z !
0
1
!!
p
2
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
 (ln!   )
2
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
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Where  is the standard normal cdf. The partial expectation is computed as:
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And
Z !
0
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In order to derive the necessary expressions for (4.51), recall that lenders have
a distorted perception of homeowners’ productivity, defined as ! = ! where  is
the misperception factor and f (!) and F (!) denote respectively the pdf and cdf of
the productivity parameter as perceived by lenders. Hence,
F!(!;; !) = Pr (!
  !) = Pr (!  !) = Pr

!  !


= (4.55)
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The partial expectation is:
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And, plugging (4.53) and (4.54) into (4.50):
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Likewise, plugging (4.55) and (4.56) into (4.51):
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And
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Now I calculate the second derivatives A00(!) = @
@!
A0(!) and B00 (!; ) =
@
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B0 (!; 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For the log-linearized model, I need the following derivatives: d
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4.A.4 Extension of the model to different currency denomination of borrowing
The baseline specification of the model implies that borrowing in the small open
economy is contracted with foreign lenders only and that it is entirely denominated
in foreign currency. Before proceeding, it is important to stress the difference be-
tween the nationality of lenders (domestic vs foreign) and the currency denomina-
tion of loans (domestic vs foreign). The nationality of lenders is key in defining the
participation constraint of lenders in the financial contract, and the external finance
premium resulting from the optimal contract. In fact, while the relevant opportu-
nity cost for domestic lenders is the domestic interest rate, that of foreign lenders is
the foreign interest rate. This implies that, in case of domestic borrowing, the ex-
ternal finance premium facing borrowers will depend on the domestic risk-free rate,
while in case of foreign borrowing it will depend on the foreign risk-free rate. On the
other hand, the currency denomination of loans influences the balance sheet of bor-
rowers, and the external finance premium through leverage effects. It is important
to notice that the currency denomination of the loan can be disentangled from the
residence of the lender: in fact, we can have loans in foreign currency granted by do-
mestic lenders and loans in domestic currency granted from foreign lenders. When
borrowers contract loans in foreign currency, an exchange rate depreciation raises the
domestic currency value of debt and increases borrowers’ leverage, even if the loan is
granted by domestic lenders (and thence the external finance premium will be related
to the domestic interest rate).
Having said that, different degrees of financial dollarization can be introduced
in two ways, each of them characterized by strenghts and drawbacks.
First, we can assume that a fraction of borrowers (say (1   )) borrows from
domestic lenders (in domestic currency) and the remaining fraction () borrows from
foreign lenders (in foreign currency). This modeling strategy has already been adopted
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in the literature, for example in studies by Unsal (2011) and Saxegaard et al (2010),
and it is theoretically sound. However, it raises some concerns on the grounds of
practical implementation in the context of the present study. This framework im-
plies that the external finance premium of borrowers receiving loans from domes-
tic lenders depends on the domestic risk-free rate, while for borrowers contracting
loans with foreign lenders the external finance premium would depend on the foreign
risk-free rate. For practical purposes, imagine that each group of borrowers stipu-
lates a contract with lenders: (1   ) borrowers stipulate a contract with domestic
lenders, while  borrowers do so with foreign lenders. In this setting, only borrow-
ers receiving loans from foreign lenders would be affected by the capital inflow (i.e.
perception shock), because the remaining fraction of borrowers are receiving funds
from domestic financial intermediaries. Therefore, this modeling framework implies
that as  ! 0 not only the degree of financial dollarization desappears, but also the
capital inflow shock. This problem could be mitigated by calibrating the perception
shock such that the magnitude of the capital inflow induced by the shock is the same
for different values of  (for example by calibrating it so that the initial impact on
capital inflows to GDP is of the same magnitude across values of ). However, this
will have important implications for the optimal monetary policy analysis. In fact,
the optimized Taylor rule coefficients are calculated assuming the economy is hit by
all shocks at the same time. The optimized Taylor rules for different central bank’s
loss functions will still be comparable, but only for given . In fact, as the degree of
foreign borrowing decreases, the capital inflow (perception) shock will have less and
less impact on the economy: even if the magnitude of the shock won’t change, its
impact on the economy will decrease with . This makes two optimized policy rules
obtained for a given assumed loss function, but different values of , hardly compara-
ble. Furthermore, this framework does not allow to disentangle liability dollarization
from origin of loans (domestic or foreign). In fact, this setting implies that a de-
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gree of sensitivity of borrowers to the domestic interest rate is introduced, while it
was not present in the original model specification. This would shift the focus of the
paper on the difference between domestic and foreign borrowing rather than domes-
tic vs foreign currency borrowing. This will also have implications for the optimal
monetary policy results. In fact, in this case a contractionary monetary policy ac-
tion in response to a capital inflow shock will exert opposite results on borrowers’
balance sheets according to the origin of loans they are contracting. On one side,
the resulting currency appreciation will decrease the debt burden of those borrowing
from foreign lenders; on the other side, it will increse the external finance premium
of those borrowing domestically.
Second, we can still assume that loans come exclusively from foreign lenders,
but that a fraction of them ((1  )) is in domestic currency while the remaining frac-
tion () is in foreign currency. In this case, the external finance premium would still
depend entirely on the foreign risk-free rate (which is the relevant opportunity cost
for lenders) for all borrowers, but the degree of financial dollarization will affect the
net worth only of borrowers receiving loans in foreign currency. A lower value of 
(i.e. lower financial dollarization) implies that changes in the exchange rate have a
lower impact on borrowers’ leverage, which means that a domestic monetary policy
contraction which leads to exchange rate appreciation will have a smaller accelera-
tion effect. This modeling framework is appealing because it allows to isolate the
effect of currency denomination of borrowing from the country origin of loans. Fur-
thermore, in this setup, the perception shock will not desappear as  ! 0, because
all borrowers are borrowing from foreign lenders and are then affectd by the capi-
tal inflow shock. As  ! 0, the fraction of borrowers borrowing in foreign currency
shrinks, which reduces the overall balance sheet effect of currency fluctuations as
domestic currency borrowers become predominant. However, from a theoretical per-
spective, this modelling framework poses two challenges. First, there is the issue of
162
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
who is bearing the exchange rate risk: borrowers or foreign lenders? Foreign lenders
are lending in different currencies, so their portfolio of assets will be affected by cur-
rency fluctuations, and they risk to incur losses when the currency of the small open
economy appreciates (because they will receive less when they convert loans repay-
ments in the small economy’s currency to the foreign currency). We can assume that
foreign lenders transfer this burden to borrowers, implying that the external finance
premium they charge to domestic currency borrowers will be adjusted by exchange
rate appreciation. However, this implies that even domestic currency borrowers’ bor-
rowing conditions will be affected by currency fluecutations, which detriments our
intent to isolate the effect of currency denomination of loans. The second challenge
comes from the balance of payments. In fact, as borrowers receiving domestic cur-
rency are borrowing from foreign lenders, loans received from abroad should be clas-
sified as capital inflows and included in the balance of payments equation. However,
they are denominated in domestic currency, which means that if they were to be ac-
counted in the balance of payments (in foreign currency), there should somewhere
be an adjustment for currency fluctuations.
Hence, the choice is not simple. While the first method is correct from a mod-
eling perspective but lacks practical applicability for the purposes of this paper, the
second framework fits the purposes of the paper but has some theoretical shortcom-
ings. Therefore, I decide not to include any of these modifications in the final thesis.
However, here I provide the results I obtain by applying the second method, i.e. the
one that at leas allows isolating the effect of liability dollarization and allows for com-
parability of the resulting optimal policy rules. Here below I describe how I model
the contract between entrepreneurs and banks, as the setup is similar for homeown-
ers.
Entrepreneurs finance capital investments borrowing from foreign lenders. Let
us assume that the continuum of entrepreneurs is composed of two groups: a fraction
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of them (1   ) borrows in domestic currency while the remaining fraction () bor-
rows in foreign currency. Specifically, the entrepreneurial sector as a whome has net
worth NWEt+1and uses a fraction (1   ) to finance an expenditure (1   )QtKEDt+1
with loans in domestic currency, and a fraction  to finance an expenditure QtKEFt+1
with loans in foreign currency77. Therefore, loans of each type of entrepreneurs (in
domestic currency) are given by:
LEDt+1 = (1  )(QtKEDt+1  NWHt+1) (4.60)
StL
EF
t+1 = (QtK
EF
t+1  NWHt+1) (4.61)
I assume that each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic technology shock
!Ejt+1(i)  logN( 
2
E
2
; 2E), j = D;F , the realization of which determines the prof-
itability of their investment and, then, their default probability. The threshold produc-
tivity level that discriminates between defaulting and non-defaulting entrepreneurs is
given, for each type, by:
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St
(4.63)
Where REDt+1 and REFt+1 is the return from capital investment for each type of
entrepreneur, composed of the return to capital and the capital gain78:
REDt+1 = R
EF
t+1 =
rKt+1 + (1  k)Qk;t+1
Qk;t
(4.64)
77 Here I denote with a superscript ED (EF ) variables pertaining to entrepreneurs borrowing in
domestic (foreign) currency.
Note also that capital (K) is homogeneous in the economy. The distinction between KED and
KEF is made only for notational convenience.
78 As capital is homogeneous, returns are equal.
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Each type of entrepreneur stipulates a financeal contract with the foreign lender.
The expected payoff of entrepreneurs from the financial contract is given by:
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The participation constraint of the foreign lender in the contract with each type
of entrepreneur is:
Et
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WhereBEj
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
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Recall that, as in the original specification, lenders have a distorted perception
of entrepreneurial productivity, given by !Ejt+1 = !
Ej
t+1
E
t where Et 2 [0; 1] is the
misperception factor which evolves according to ln(Et ) =  ln(Et 1)+E . I assume
that the misperception factor Et is the same for both types of entrepreneurs, as they
are homogeneous in the eyes of the foreign lender.
The first order conditions of the financial contract for domestic currency bor-
rowers are given by:
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The first order conditions of the financial contract for foreign currency borrow-
ers are given by:
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Net worth accumulates according to the following equation:
NWEt+1 = %

(1  )  AED(!EDt )REDt Qt 1KEDt +   AEF (!EFt )REFt Qt 1KEFt
	
+WEt
(4.73)
Finally, total capital in the economy is equal to:
Kt+1 = (1  )KEDt+1 + KEFt+1 (4.74)
Figures 4.10 to 4.13 depict the response of the main model variables to a one
standard deviation technology shock, for different degrees of financial dollarization
and specifications of the cental bank’s monetary policy rule.
As in the baseline case, the technology shock reduces marginal costs and the
price of domestically produced goods, leading to a decrease in firms’ demand for
labor and hence a fall in wages, which in turn dampens the demand for consump-
tion goods and housing services. However, as domestic inflation decreases, external
demand surges, which compensates the fall in domestic demand, encourages produc-
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tion and firms’ demand for capital goods. As a consequence, entrepreneurs engage in
more investment projects, pushing up the price of capital and the demand for credit.
As exports increase and imports decrease, the trade balance switches into surplus and
the exchange rate appreciates. From these figures, it emerges that the share of foreign
currency borrowing mainly affects variables related to entrepreneurs and homeown-
ers, but it has a negligible repercussions on variables such as output, inflation and the
interest rate. Specifically, we can observe differences in the responses of leverage,
external finance premia, asset prices and, in smaller magnitude, investment, which
are mainly given by the different balance sheet effect of currency movements as the
degree of financial dollarization changes.
As the exchange rate appreciates, borrowers receiving loans in foreign currency
see the domestic currency value of their loan burden decrease, and their balance sheet
position becoming stronger. In fact, leverage and the external finance premium de-
crease and the fall is more pronounced the greater the degree of liability dollarization.
Furthermore, entrepreneurs receiving loans in domestic currency benefit from posi-
tive spillovers of the increase in the price of capital and the increase in net worth in
the sector. In fact, as the price of capital and net worth increase, their leverage de-
creases, leading them to enjoy more favorable borrowing conditions. In the limit case
when the degree of foreign currency borrowing is zero, the relevant line to look at
is the dashed-dotted blue line. In this case, only domestic currency borrowers exist.
Since they no longer benefit from the reduction of the loan burden deriving from the
currency appreciation, the initial effect of their increased demand for credit results
in an increase in the external finance premium on impact (cfr graph EFP ED) and a
decrease in the asset price. However, as the return to capital is high, they start in-
vesting and, by doing so, they push up the price of capital and the external finance
premium down. A simila reasoning holds for homeowners. As the demand for hous-
ing decreases as a consequence of the technology shock, homeowners demand less
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credit and they push down the external finance premium. This decrease is magnified
the higher the degree of financial dollarization, due to the additional balance sheet
effect of currency appreciation. As financing conditions improve, homeowners de-
mand more credit and start investing in new housing projects, which pushes up the
price of unfinished houses. However, the asset price decreases much less when the
degree of financial dollarization is zero.
However, overall, the effect of these developments on output is limited. It can
be noticed that output increase slightly more in the case of full liability dollarization,
but the difference is not significant.
Turning now to the comparison of the responses across monetary policy rules,
we can see that the effect of changing the degree of liability dollarization is broadly
similar. Financial conditions significantly improve the stronger the share of foreign
currency borrowing, but the effects on output, inflation and the interest rate are small.
Only in the case of Talylor rule augmented with loan growth the effect on the interest
rate differs across degrees of liability dollarization. As the central bank reacts to the
domestic currency value of loans, the lower the degree of foreign currency borrowing
the stronger the decrease in the interest rate. As it can be expected, in the case of fixed
exchange rate, there are no difference across degrees of liability dollarization.
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Figure 4.10: Responses to a domestic technology shock under standard Taylor rule
and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a one standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.11: Responses to a technology under Taylor rule + Loan growth and differ-
ent shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 1 standard deviations technology shock, in percentage deviations from the steady
state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.12: Responses to a technology shock under Taylor rule + Exchange rate and
different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.13: Responses to a technology shock under Fixed exchange rate regime and
different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figures 4.14 to 4.17 depict the impulse-response functions to a 0.01 capital in-
flow shock to the entrepreneurial sector, for different degrees of liability dollarization
and monetary policy rules.
Once again, different degrees of foreign currency borrowing mainly affect fi-
nancial variables, and this time the difference is magnified for homeowners. Specifi-
cally, as entrepreneurs are the ones subject to the shock, which impacts their borrow-
ing conditions directly, the responses do not vary for different values of .
As the capital inflow shock hits, entrepreneurs’ borrowing conditions improve,
so they undertake more investment projects, the asset price increase and the rental
price of capital for firms decrease, which leads them to purchase more, thereby in-
creasing production. The positive capital inflow puts appreciating pressures on the
currency, which has a beneficial effect on balance sheets of homeowners borrowing
in foreign currency. In fact, the greater the degree of financial dollarization, the more
the external finance premium for homeowners decreases on impact.
In case the central bank sets the interest rate according to a Taylor rule aug-
mented with loans growth (cfr figure 4.15), the differences in the impact of the shock
across digree of financial dollarization on output, inflation and the interest rate are
more marked. Specifically, the lower the degree of financial dollarization, the smaller
is the effect of the exchange rate appreciation of the domestic currency value of loans.
Therefore, loans (in domestic currency) are greater in case of low liability dollariza-
tion: as the central bank reacts to loans growth, the magnitude of the interest rate
increase is greater the lower the share of foreign currency borrowing. The larger in-
terest rate hike in this case leads to a stronger appreciation of the domestic currency,
which brings the trade balance even more into negative. As exports decrease and im-
ports increase, demand for domestic goods diminishes, depressing production and
offsetting the positive impact of the capital inflow shock. In fact, in the limit case of
no financial dollarization, the impact effect on output is negative.
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Figure 4.14: Responses to a capital inflow shock to entrepreneurs under standard
Taylor rule and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.15: Responses to a capital inflow shock to entrepreneurs under Taylor rule
+ Loan growth and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.16: Responses to a capital inflow shock to entrepreneurs under Taylor rule
+ Exchange rate and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.17: Responses to a capital inflow shock to entrepreneurs under Fixed ex-
change rate regime and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Finally, figures 4.18 to 4.21 depict the impulse-responses to a capital inflow
shock to homeowners. The discussion is broadly similar to that of a capital inflow
shocks to entrepreneurs. Here, the shock affects directly the external finance pre-
mium of homeowners, improving their borrowing conditions and decreasing their
leverage. Therefore, homeowners engage in more investment projects, pushing up
the price of unfinished houses. The shock has a positive impact on consumption
through two main effects. First, the increase in the transfer from homeowners to
consumers increases consumers’ wealth. Second, the increased supply of finished
houses lowers their rental price, which encourages demand. The increase in con-
sumption demand affects both domestic and imported goods. Hence, as demand for
domestic goods increases, so does domestic inflation. As imports increase, exports
are discouraged, which leads the trade balance to become negative and it puts de-
preciating pressures on the currency on impact, albeit of a small magnitude. Output
decreases on impact, while inflation slightly decreases. In the case of a standard Tay-
lor Rule, the central bank lowers slightly the interest rate in impact, but then slowly
increases it as output picks up driven by the increase in domestic demand. This leads
the currency to start appreciating. In the case of Taylor Rule augmented with loans
growth, the central bank reacts to the increase in credit in the economy by raising
the interest rate by a larger amount, which offsets the depreciating pressures on the
currency. In case of Taylor Rule augmented with a reaction to the exchange rate,
the central bank reacts to the depreciating pressures by raising the interest rate more
strongly than in the case of a standard Taylor Rule, which again leads to an appreci-
ation of the exchange rate after a few quarters. Finally, when the central bank pegs
the exchange rate, it increases the interest rate on impact to counteract the currency
depreciation. In this case, the price of foreign goods remains unchanged and over-
all inflation rises due to the increase in growth of the domestically produced goods’
price.
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Figure 4.18: Responses to a capital inflow shock to homeowners under standard
Taylor rule and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.19: Responses to a capital inflow shock to homeowners under Taylor rule +
Loan growth and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.20: Responses to a capital inflow shock to homeowners under Taylor rule +
Exchnage rate and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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Figure 4.21: Responses to a capital inflow shock to homeowners under Fixed ex-
change rate regime and different shares of foreign currency borrowing
Note: Responses to a 0.01 standard deviations capital inflow shock, in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The response of the domestic interest rate is in basis points
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As in the baseline case, we can now derive the optimal monetary policy rules,
for different degrees of financial dollarization. In particular, I specify three loss func-
tions the central bank attempts to minimize. In the first scenario, named "Macro-
economic stability", the central bank is only concerned about stabilizing the real
economy, hence the loss function is defined in terms of volatility of output and infla-
tion. Furthermore, the central bank considers desirable to smooth the volatility of the
domestic interest rate. In the second scenario (named "Financial stability1"), I spec-
ify the central bank’s loss function as a function of the volatility of aggregate credit
growth, in addition to output, inflation and interest rate volatility. In this scenario,
the monetary authority of the small open economy considers monetary stability a
priority, which translates in a lower weight on credit growth (0:1) than on inflation
volatility. The third case (named "Financial stability2") is similar to the second, ex-
cept that in this case the central bank puts equal weight on inflation and credit growth:
hence, in this case, macroeconomic and financial stability are of equal importance in
the eyes of the central bank. The results are reported in Table 4.3 below.
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Table 4.3: Optimized Taylor rules for different degrees of financial dollarization
'r ' 'y 'L 'S Loss
=1
Loss MS 0.764 1.364 0.749 0.0874 0.0876 0.4530
Loss FS1 0.796 1.3605 0.7563 0.0859 0.4862 0.4574
Loss FS2 0.851 1.385 0.656 0.0937 0.4922 0.4755
 = 0:75
Loss MS 0.7658 1.364 0.746 0.0891 0.0876 0.4539
Loss FS1 0.7908 1.3613 0.7543 0.0675 0.4862 0.4579
Loss FS2 0.859 1.383 0.670 0.0917 0.4903 0.4745
 = 0:5
Loss MS 0.7669 1.365 0.743 0.090 0.087 0.4549
Loss FS1 0.7876 1.3615 0.754 0.088 0.4859 0.4589
Loss FS2 0.8726 1.382 0.683 0.088 0.486 0.4739
 = 0:25
Loss MS 0.7682 1.365 0.7403 0.0925 0.0874 0.4560
Loss FS1 0.784 1.361 0.7527 0.090 0.4857 0.4598
Loss FS2 0.8872 1.3818 0.6959 0.079 0.4775 0.4739
 = 0
Loss MS 0.7695 1.366 0.737 0.094 0.0873 0.4571
Loss FS1 0.7829 1.3621 0.7511 0.0920 0.4855 0.4687
Loss FS2 0.7918 1.381 0.698 0.0936 0.4881 0.4756
As it was the case in the original version of the model, optimized monetary
policy rules are characterized by a quite high degree of inertia, which increases the
more the central bank is concerned with financial stability. Furthermore, it decreases
with the share of foreign currency borrowing in the model. As financial dollariza-
tion decreases, there is less need for the monetary authority to smooth interet rate
movements that could lead to excessive swings in the exchange rate. The optimal
coefficients on inflation and output are bradly similar across specifications and de-
gree of foreign currency borrowing. As in the baseline case, reacting to loans growth
is still not optimal, as for all considered specifications the optimized coefficient is
very small. In fact, even in this version of the model the opportunity cost of lend-
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ing for lenders is the foreign interest rate, which is not affected by the monetary
policy conduct of the small open economy. In the limit case of 100% domestic cur-
rency borrowing, if the central bank reacts to loan growth by increasing the policy
rate, it won’t impact the financial sector direclty, since contracts are stipulated using
the foreign interest rate as reference risk-free rate. The interest rate hike will im-
pact intertemporal consumption and saving decisions, and the exchange rate, but it
won’t, at least in the first round effect, impact on borrowers’ financing conditions.
Finally, as in the baseline case, when the central bank is only concerned with macro-
economic stability, reacting to exchange rate movements is not optimal. However,
when financial stability is an objective of the monetary authority, the optimal coeffi-
cient on exchange rate depreciation is positive, and it is slightly higher as the degree
of financial dollarization increases.
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CHAPTER 5
CROSS-COUNTRY BALANCE SHEET INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE
CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
Understanding the role of banks in cross-border finance has become an urgent re-
search priority since the onset of the global crisis, as issues related to cross-border
banking have played a central role in its origin and propagation. The tightening of
financial linkages is a phenomenon that gained particular importance for the Central
and Eastern European countries which joined the European Union in the enlarge-
ment waves of 2004 and 2007. The drawbacks of financial interdependence became
evident during the financial crisis. As the new EU member states weren’t directly ex-
posed to toxic assets, in a financially autarkic world they would have been hit by the
crisis through exchange rate and external demand effects. However, given the high
degree of financial interdependence with Western Europe (in turn heavily connected
to American banks), the new EU member states got dragged in the spiral and suf-
fered major losses in terms of GDP growth. In particular, the greatest magnitude of
the economic downturn was observed in countries which adopted a pegged exchange
rate regime. Motivated by this background, this chapter studies the interplay between
exchange rate regimes and financial integration in a two-country, general equilibrium
setting characterized by real and financial frictions.
The analysis presented in this essay has multiple purposes. First, it analyzes
the transmission mechanism of foreign real and financial shocks under different ex-
change rate regimes and different degrees of cross-border lending relationships. Sec-
ond, it addresses the issue of the ranking of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes
and its relationship to the strength of cross-border borrowing. In particular, the rel-
ative performance of exchange rate regimes is evaluated from the point of view of
both the Home country’s central bank and Home country households’ welfare. More
186
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
specifically, the relationship between exchange rate regime and cross-border borrow-
ing is evaluated for different objectives of the Home country’s central bank.
The model portrays two countries with symmetric structures but different sizes.
It is assumed that the home country (denoted by the superscript H) is of size n, while
the foreign country (F ) is of size (1   n), where n 2 [0; 1]. In the calibration, I set
n! 0, allowing me to model the Home country as a small open economy while still
allowing for trade and financial linkages. On the real side, the two economies are
characterized by imperfectly competitive product and labor markets, coupled with
Calvo pricing and wage setting whose implied inefficiencies warrant an explicit role
for monetary policy. Each economy produces a variety of internationally traded in-
termediate goods. Households in each country can access the international financial
market and invest in domestic and foreign instruments. Credit markets, however,
are characterized by frictions at different stages of the intermediation process, in the
spirit of Ueda (2012). In particular, in each country a continuum of financial interme-
diaries lends to entrepreneurs in both countries and finances its loan portfolio by col-
lecting deposits from domestic and foreign households. The presence of asymmetric
information between households and financial intermediaries and between financial
intermediaries and entrepreneurs implies a costly state verification problem leading
to an optimal contract whereby the cost of external finance is tied to balance sheet
conditions. Hence, in contrast with the standard model of the financial accelerator
model, the leverage of financial institutions, together with that of entrepreneurs, plays
a role in determining the tightness of credit conditions in the economy. Furthermore,
integration in international credit markets implies interdependency of credit condi-
tions between countries, strengthening the degree of business cycle correlation, as
shown by Ueda (2012).
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5.1 The model
5.1.1 Households
In each country the preferences of the representative household are represented by
the utility function:
Et fU(Ct; Ht)g = Et
( 1X
t=0
t
(Ct   hCt 1)1 
1     H
H1+'t
1 + '
)
(5.1)
Where Ct and Ht are composites of consumption goods and labor services
respectively, and h is the degree of consumption habit formation. The consumption
index C is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of home produced (CH;t) and imported (CF;t)
goods, where  is the share of domestic good in the consumption basket of Home
households:
Ct =
CH;tC
1 
F;t
(1  )1 
As in De Paoli (2009) and Corsetti and Müller (2011), I assume that the rela-
tive weight of domestic and foreign goods in the consumption bundle is a function
of the relative country size and the degree of trade openness. In particular, I assume
(1 ) = (1 n), where  2 (0; 1) is the openness parameter: when  = 1 there is
no home bias, and the share of imported goods in consumption equals (1 n). A sim-
ilar specification holds for the Foreign economy, where the aggregate consumption
bundle is
Ct =
C

H;tC
1 
F;t
(1  )1 
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and  = n.79 Hence, in the limit case when the Home economy becomes
small (n ! 0),  ! (1   ) and  ! 0, the Foreign country becomes closed, but,
as long as  > 0, the Home country consumes Foreign goods.80
The consumption sub-indices CH;t; CF;t; CH;t and CF;t are in turn aggregates
of intermediate goods produced in the Home and foreign country, i.e.:
CH;t =
"
1
n
 1
"
Z n
0
ct;H(j)
" 1
" dj
# "
" 1
; CH;t =
"
1
n
 1
"
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0
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" 1
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# "
" 1
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"
1
1  n
 1
"
Z 1
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ct;F (j)
" 1
" dj
# "
" 1
; CF;t =
"
1
1  n
 1
"
Z 1
n
ct;F (j)
" 1
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# "
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Where " > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of
intermediate goods. The price indices corresponding to the consumption bundles in
the two countries are, respectively:
Pt = P

H;tP
1 
F;t (5.2)
P t = P

H;t P
1 
F;t (5.3)
Households choose the optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic
and imported consumption goods solving an expenditure minimization problem, which
results in the following optimality conditions:
79 Here I follow a notation whereby subscripts refer to the country where the good is produced (H or
F). The presence (absence) of an asterisk indicates that the good is consumed or used as an input in
the foreign (domestic) country.
80 Specifically, the consumption shares are defied as:  = 1   (1  n), (1  ) = (1  n) in
the Home country and  = n, (1  ) = 1   n in the Foreign country. Therefore, when the
Home economy becomes very small, n ! 0, we have that:  = 1   , (1  ) =  and  = 0,
(1  ) = 1. Therefore, if n ! 0, the price indices in the two countries reduce to Pt = P 1 H;t PF;t
and P t = P F;t. This implies that, while the Foreign country prices still matter in the aggregate price
level of the Home country, the price level of the Foreign country is not influenced by prices of Home
country goods.
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CH;t = 

PH;t(jH)
PH;t
 "
PH;t
Pt
 1
Ct (5.4)
CF;t = (1  )

PF;t(jF )
PF;t
 "
PF;t
Pt
 1
Ct (5.5)
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006), I assume the existence of a contin-
uum of labor markets of measure 1 indexed by i 2 [0; 1], in each of which wages are
set by a monopolistically competitive union facing downward sloping labor demand,
given by

Wt(i)
Wt
 "w
Hdt , where W (i)t denotes the wage set by the wage union for
the i  th labor market, Hdt denotes labor demand by firms, "w represents the elastic-
ity of substitution between different labor types, and the aggregate wage prevailing
in the economy is given by
Wt =
Z 1
0
Wt(i)
1 "wdi
 1
1 "w
(5.6)
Given the contracted Wt(i), the union is assumed to supply enough labor to
satisfy demand, i.e. Ht(i) =

Wt(i)
Wt
 "w
Hdt . This condition, coupled with the re-
quirement that the total labor supply satisfies the market clearing condition Ht =R 1
0
Ht(i)di, yields:
Ht =

Wt(i)
Wt
 "w
Hdt (5.7)
The union then takes Wt and Hdt as given and sets the optimal wage ~Wt(i) so
as to equate the union’s expected average marginal return with the marginal cost of
supplying labor. However, in doing so the union faces nominal rigidities in the Calvo
fashion. Specifically, in each period the wage can be optimized only in a fraction
(1  w) of labor markets. In the remaining fraction w the real wage is indexed to
past inflation and it is therefore given by:
Wt(i) = Wt 1(i)t 1
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The reoptimizing union sets the optimal wage ~Wt(i) so as to maximize81:
Et
1X
k=0
(w)k t+k
0B@ ~Wt
Yk
i=1

t+i 1
t+i

Wt+k
1CA
 "w
Hdt

~Wt
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i=1

t+i 1
t+i

  U
0
H
t+k

Where the first term in parenthesis represents the marginal gain for the union of
supplying an extra unit of labor, and the second term represents the marginal disutility
of doing so. The first order conditions can be formulated in the following recursive
fashion:
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It follows from (5.6) and staggered wage setting that the law of motion of the
aggregate wage is82:
Wt =
h
(1  w) ~W 1 "wt + w (Wt 1(i)t 1)1 "w
i 1
1 "w (5.11)
Besides labor income, households receive dividends from ownership of do-
mestic firms and returns from their investments in domestic and international asset
81 In what follows I drop the index (i) as all firms allowed to reoptimize in a given period set the
same wage.
82 Staggered wage setting implies an inefficient wage dispersion, arising from the fact that wages are
not set simultaneously. The law of motion of such wage dispersion, defined as w;t =
R 1
0

Wt(i)
Wt
 "w
di,
is given by:
w;t = (1  w)

Wt
~Wt
"w
+ w

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So that the effective labor supply is Ht = H
d
t
w;t
.
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markets. Households have access to a complete set of internationally traded Arrow-
Debreu securities. They acquire a portfolio B(st+1) of real state-contingent securi-
ties, each of which pays one unit in t + 1 at the occurrence of the state of nature
st+1, which carries the pricing kernel m(st+1jst). Furthermore, they can invest in
real deposits in Home or Foreign financial intermediaries (denoted respectively Dt
and Dt )83, which yield a one period return of DtRt and DtRt .
The budget constraint of the representative household in the Home country can
then be formulated in real terms as:
Ct +Dt + "tD

t +
X
st+1
m(st+1jst)B(st+1)  Ht
Z 1
0
Wt(i)

Wt(i)
Wt
 "w
di+
+Rt 1Dt 1 +Rt 1"t 1D

t 1 +Bt + 
H
t   Tt
Where "t = StP

t
Pt
is the real exchange rate. The first order conditions de-
riving from the household’s optimization problem define the optimal intertemporal
consumption path and labor supply which, denoting as t the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint, are given by:
t = (Ct   hCt 1)  (5.12)
Et

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HH
'
t
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Where equation (5.13) results from maximization with respect to bonds and de-
posits. In particular, it states that the price of the state contingent portfolio relates to
the changes in marginal utility of consumption and that, in equilibrium, the expected
83 Although deposits are redundant, their presence is needed as they are demanded from domestic
and foreign financial institutions, and necessary to satisfy the market clering conditions in the general
equilibrium. For a similar specification, cfr. Faia (2002).
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return of the state contingent portfolio has to equal that of deposits (arbitrage condi-
tion). Note that in the absence of staggered wage setting, (5.14) reduces to a standard
labor supply equation.
An analogous utility maximization problem applies in the Foreign economy. In
particular, the Foreign counterpart of equation (5.13) reads:
Et

t+1
t
t+1
t
"t
"t+1

= m(st+1jst); 1
Rt
"t
"t+1
=
X
st+1
m(st+1jst) (5.15)
From (5.13) and (5.15) I obtain:
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From which an expectational version of the uncovered interest parity condition
results:
X
st+1
m(st+1jst)

Rt  Rt
"t+1
"t

= 0
5.1.2 Production
There exist a continuum of monopolistic intermediate good producers in each coun-
try, indexed jH and jF respectively. Each producer operates under monopolistic com-
petition and is owned by households, with the demand for its products given by:
Yt (jH) =

PH;t(jH)
PH;t
 "H
Yt
Producers use capital and three types of labor inputs (Ht, HEt and HFt , sup-
plied respectively by households, entrepreneurs and bankers) to produce differenti-
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ated goods. The production function for domestic intermediate good producers is
given by:
Yt (jH) = AtK

t (jH)H (jH)
(1 )(1 
E 
F )
t H
E
t (jH)
(1 )
E HFt (jH)
(1 )
F
(5.18)
Where  is the share of capital in production, 
E and 
F are the shares of
entrepreneurial and bankers’ labor in production. Cost minimization implies the fol-
lowing standard factor demand functions, where rKt denotes the rental rate of capital:
Wt = MCt (1  ) (1  
E   
F ) Yt
Ht
(5.19)
WEt = MCt (1  ) 
E
Yt
HEt
(5.20)
W Ft = MCt (1  ) 
F
Yt
HFt
(5.21)
rKt = MCt
Yt
Kt
(5.22)
5.1.3 Price setting
Price setting is staggered. In each period, only a fraction (1 H) of firms are allowed
to reset their price optimally. The fraction H that is not allowed to optimize in each
period sets the price equal to that prevailing in the previous period, indexing it to
past inflation at a rate p and to the steady state inflation rate at rate
 
1  p

. Hence,
denoting as ~PH;t the optimal reset price, the law of motion of the domestic good price
evolves as:
PH;t =
h
H
 
PH;t 1
p
t 1 (
ss)1 p
1 "H
+ (1  H) ~P 1 "HH;t
i 1
1 "H (5.23)
The firm then chooses the optimal price ~PH;t(jH) so as to maximize the dis-
counted sum of future real profits. Hence, each producer maximizes:
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k=0
(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2666664
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i=1
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p
t+i 1 (
ss)1 p
!1 "H
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PH;t+k
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i=1
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p
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ss)1 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! "H
3777775Yt+k
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The first order conditions can be written in a recursive manner as follows:
~PH;t
PH;t
=
"H
"H   1
FH;t
DH;t
(5.24)
FH;t =
t
Pt
PH;tmcH;tY
H
t + HEt
 
Ht+1
"H FH;t+1	 (5.25)
DH;t =
t
Pt
PH;tY
H
t + HEt
n 
Ht+1
"H 1DH;t+1o (5.26)
5.1.4 Capital goods producers
Capital producers operate in a regime of perfect competition. In each period, they
combine investment goods (It, with price P It ) and old undepreciated capital ((1  
)Kt, purchased from entrepreneurs at price QH;t) to produce new capital goods,
which will be sold at the real price QH;t. Investment is subject to adjustment costs,
represented by the function t = 2

It
It 1
  1
2
(Smets and Wouters (2003)). Capital
producers choose the optimal amount of investment84 so as to maximize the following
profit function:
Et
( 1X
k=0
k
t+k
t
1
PH;t+k
[qH;tPH;t+k ((1  )Kt+k + (1  t) It+k  Kt+k)  PH;t+kIt+k]
)
84 The investment bundle has a similar composition as the consumption bundle, and can therefore be
defined as:
It =
IH;tI
1 
F;t
(1  )1 
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The first order condition with respect to It yields:
1 = qH;t
"
1  
2

It
It 1
  1
2
  

It
It 1
  1

It
It 1
#
+ (5.27)
+Et
(
t+1
t
qH;t+1
"


It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2#)
Where qH;t is the real price of the capital stock defined as QH;tPH;t . The law of
motion of the economywide capital stock is:
Kt+1 =
"
1  
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
It + (1  )Kt (5.28)
5.1.5 Entrepreneurs, banks and international lenders
Credit markets are characterized by chained credit contracts in the spirit of Hirakata
et al. (2009) and Ueda (2012). Entrepreneurs in a given country borrow from do-
mestic and foreign financial intermediaries (banks) to finance capital purchases. In
turn, financial intermediaries in each country borrow from domestic and foreign in-
vestors in order to finance their loan portfolio. The presence of financial frictions in
both contracts (i.e. between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries and between
financial intermediaries and international investors) makes the external finance pre-
mium faced by entrepreneurs in each country dependent on balance sheet conditions
in the other country.
In each country a continuum of entrepreneurs purchase unfinished capital goods
from capital producers and transform them into finished capital goods through a sto-
chastic technology. Capital is then rented to firms at the rental rate rKt . Entrepre-
neurs finance capital purchases partly using their own net worth (NWEH;t) and partly
borrowing from domestic and foreign financial intermediaries. Specifically, entre-
preneurs in the home country use a fraction
 
1  EH

of net worth to borrow from
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home intermediaries and purchase an amount
 
1  EH

QH;tKHH;t of capital, and a
fraction EH to borrow from foreign intermediaries and purchase EHQH;tKHF;t.85 En-
trepreneurs in the foreign economy behave analogously. The credit contract is char-
acterized by asymmetric information in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999).
Denote REHH;t and REHF;t the expected return from capital investment of home
entrepreneurs borrowing from domestic and foreign financial intermediaries respec-
tively. The return to capital is made of the return from selling capital to production
firms and the return from selling undepreciated capital to capital producers86:
REHH;t =
rKt + (1  )QH;t
QH;t 1
REHF;t =
rKt + (1  )QH;t
QH;t 1
Contract between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs
Let us consider the problem of financial intermediaries in the home country,
which stipulate credit contracts with entrepreneurs in the home and foreign country.
Entrepreneurs in the Home country own net worth NWEH;t and use a fraction 
1  EH

of it to finance a capital expenditure of
 
1  EH

QH;tKHH;t. Hence, the
Home entrepreneur borrows an amount given byLEHH;t =
 
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

from domestic financial intermediaries. Entrepreneurs borrowing in the Home coun-
try are subject to a stochastic shock !EHH;t+1 following a lognormal distribution with
85 In what follows, the subscripts i; j = H;F refer, respectively, to the nationality of the agent and
the origin of the loan. Furhtermore, the superscript E pertains to entrepreneurs, while F denotes
financial intermediaries. Therefore, REHF denotes the return to capital for entrepreneurs in country H
borrowing from country F .
86 Note that capital is homogeneous within each country. The notation KHH and KHF is introduced
for convenience in the calulations, but within each country there is one capital stock (which results
from aggregating the quantitites purchased by the two types of entrepreneurs) and one asset price Q.
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E
 
!EHH;t+1

= 187. The ex-post return to capital is then REHH;t+1!EHH;t+1. Foreign
entrepreneurs borrowing from domestic financial intermediaries behave analogously,
using a fraction EF of their net worthNWEF;t to borrowLEFH;t = EF
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t

from domestic financial intermediaries, and they are characterized by the stochastic
technology !EFH;t+1.
The optimal contract (see Calstrom ad Fuerst (1997)) specifies a state-contingent
loan rate ZEij;t+1 and a threshold !Eij;t+1, such that for realizations !Eij;t+1 > !Eij;t+1 en-
trepreneurs repay the loan at the contractual rate and keep the remaining proceeds of
their investment, while for realizations !Eij;t+1 < !Eij;t+1, entrepreneurs default on
their debt, financial intermediaries pay a monitoring cost to verify entrepreneurial
output and seize the entrepreneur’s remaining assets, leaving the defaulting entre-
preneur with a zero payoff. It is then possible to define the threshold productivity
level as the minimum realization of productivity that allows entrepreneurs to repay
their debts. For domestic and foreign entrepreneurs borrowing from Home financial
intermediaries the thresholds (!EHH;t+1 and !EFH;t+1) are defined as:
!EHH;t+1R
E
HH;t+1QH;tKHH;t = Z
E
HH;t+1
 
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

!EFH;t+1R
E
FH;t+1QF;tKFH;t = Z
E
FH;t+1
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t

Where the left hand side represents the return to the entrepreneur correspond-
ing to productivity level !Eij;t+1, and the right hand side represents the required re-
payments on the contracted loan.
The expected returns of Home and Foreign entrepreneurs from the contract
with domestic financial intermediaries are given by the return of the capital invest-
87 As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) I assume that the stochastic shock is iid across
entrepreneurs and time, and follows a log-normal distribution !Eij  logN( 
2
E
2 ; 
2
E), where 2E
represents the variance of the underlying Normal distribution. In what follows, the density of the
idiosyncratic shock is denoted as f() and its cumulative distribution as F (). Foreign entrepreneurs
are characterized by an idiosyncratic shock with the same characteristics.
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ment minus loan repayment in case entrepreneurs do not default, and zero otherwise.
Formally, the expected return of entrepreneurs in the Home and Foreign country bor-
rowing from Home country banks are, respectively:
 
1  EH

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t
" R1
!EHH;t+1
!EHH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1+
 !EHH;t+1
R1
!EHH;t+1
f(!EHH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
#
EFR
E
FH;t+1QF;tKFH;t
" R1
!EFH;t+1
!EFH;t+1f(!
E
FH;t+1)d!
E
FH;t+1+
 !EFH;t+1
R1
!EFH;t+1
f(!EFH;t+1)d!
E
FH;t+1
#
Which, defining
 EHH
 
!EHH;t+1

= !EHH;t+1
 
1 
Z !EHH;t+1
0
f(!EHH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
!
+
+
Z !EHH;t+1
0
!EHH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
 EFH
 
!EFH;t+1

= !EFH;t+1
 
1 
Z !EFH;t+1
0
f(!EFH;t+1)d!
E
FH;t+1
!
+
+
Z !EFH;t+1
0
!EFH;t+1f(!
E
FH;t+1)d!
E
FH;t+1
can be rewritten as:

1   EHH
 
!EHH;t+1
  
1  EH

REHH;t+1QtKHH;t
1   EFH
 
!EFH;t+1

EFR
E
FH;t+1QF;tKFH;t
Where

1   Eij
 
!Eij;t+1

represents the share of payoff captured by the entre-
preneur, i.e. the payoff from her capital investment minus loan repayments multiplied
by the probability that the entrepreneur does not default88.
88 Recall that given a pdf f(!),
R !
0
f(!)d! = Pr(!  !), which in this case corresponds to the
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Entrepreneurs engage in the debt contract only if the expected return of doing
so is at least equal to the payoff they would obtain if they invested only their own
net worth. Hence, the following participation constraints for domestic and foreign
entrepreneurs have to hold:

1   EHH
 
!EHH;t+1

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t  REHH;t+1NWEH;t (5.29)
1   EFH
 
!EFH;t+1

REFH;t+1QF;tKFH;t  REFH;t+1NWEF;t (5.30)
The expected payoff of the domestic financial intermediary from lending to
home entrepreneurs is given by the loan repayment in the case the entrepreneur does
not default and by the remaining payoff of the entrepreneurs minus monitoring costs
in case the entrepreneur defaults:
8<: Z
E
HH;t+1
 
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t
 hR1
!EHH;t+1
f(!EHH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
i
+ 
1  EH

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t
h 
1  EH
 R !EHH;t+1
0 !
E
HH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
i
9=; =
=
 
1  EH

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t
"
!EHH;t+1
R1
!EHH;t+1
f(!EHH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1+ 
1  EH
 R !EHH;t+1
0 !
E
HH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
#
Denoting:
 EHH
 
!EHH;t+1

= !EHH;t+1
 
1 
Z !EHH;t+1
0
f(!EHH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
!
+
+
Z !EHH;t+1
0
!EHH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
GEHH
 
!EHH;t+1

=
Z !EHH;t+1
0
!EHH;t+1f(!
E
HH;t+1)d!
E
HH;t+1
Defining
probability of default, and
R !
0
!f(!)d! = E(!j!  !). Furthermore, recall that the payoff of
defaulting entrepreneurs is zero.
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E
 
!EHH;t+1
   EHH  !EHH;t+1  EHGEH  !EHH;t+1
as the share of payoff of Home entrepreneurs borrowing from Home financial
intermediaries that is captured by Home financial intermediaries, made of the share of
expected payoff not retained by entrepreneurs ( EHH
 
!EHH;t+1
) minus the expected
monitoring cost the financial intermediary has to incur if the entrepreneur defaults
(EHGEH
 
!EHH;t+1
), I can write more compactly89:
 
1  EH

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t
E
 
!EHH;t+1
 (5.31)
The financial intermediary in the Home country will engage in the contracts
with domestic and foreign entrepreneurs only when the payoff of doing so (e.g. the
expected earnings of the loan portfolio) will at least be equal to the return the interme-
diary expects to receive, denoted RFt+1. Hence, the following participation constraint
has to hold:
 
1  EH

REHH;t+1QtKHH;t
 
!EHH;t+1

+ EFR
E
FH;t+1
"t+1
"t
QF;tKFH;t
 
!EFH;t+1

= RFH;t+1
 
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+ EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 (5.32)
Contract between financial intermediaries and international investors
The contract between financial intermediaries and lenders is similar to the one
just described for entrepreneurs: only, in this case, the financial intermediary is the
debtor party in the credit contract. Let us still consider the point of view of financial
intermediaries in the Home country. Financial intermediaries are endowed with net
worthNW FH;t and stipulate credit contracts with domestic and foreign lenders (house-
89 Analogous expressions hold in the contract stipulated between Home financial intermediaries and
Foreign entrepreneurs.
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holds) in order to finance the part of their loan portfolio exceeding net worth. Given
the amount of loans granted to home and foreign entrepreneurs, the domestic finan-
cial intermediary borrowsLFH;t =
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
  NW FH;t.
In particular, the financial intermediary uses a fraction (1   FH) of its net worth to
borrow from domestic lenders and a fraction FH to borrow from foreign lenders, and
uses profits from its loan portfolio to honor its debts. Each financial intermediary
is subject to an idiosyncratic iid productivity shock !Fij;t+1, so that the effective re-
turn to its assets is given by !Fij;t+1RFi;t+190. The financial intermediary stipulates two
credit contracts, one with domestic and one with foreign lenders91, which determine
the contractual lending rate for domestic (foreign) borrowing ZFHH;t+1(ZFHF;t+1) and
the default thresholds !FHH;t+1 (!FHF;t+1):
!FHH;t+1R
F
H;t+1
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
  = ZFHH;t+1LFH;t(5.33)
!FHF;t+1R
F
H;t+1
1
"t+1
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
  = ZFHF;t+1LFH;t(5.34)
Once again, if !Fij;t+1  !Fij;t+1the financial intermediary does not default and
keeps the profits after honoring its debt; if !Fij;t+1 < !Fij;t+1the financial intermedi-
ary goes bankrupt, and lenders incur a monitoring cost in order to seize the bank’s
remaining assets. The expected payoff of the financial intermediary from the debt
contract can be expressed as:
90 The stochastic shock is iid across financial intermediaries and time, and follows a log-normal
distribution !Fij  logN( 
2
F
2 ; 
2
F ), where 2F represents the variance of the underlying Normal dis-
tribution. In what follows, the density of the idiosyncratic shock is denoted as f() and its cumulative
distribution as F (). Foreign financial intermediaries are characterized by an idiosyncratic shock with
the same characteristics.
91 As in te previous section, I use the subscript ij, i; j = H;F to denote a financial intermediary in
country i borrowing from lenders in country j.
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(
(1  FH)RFH;t+1
 
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+ EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 hR1
!FHH;t+1
!FHH;t+1f(!
F
HH;t+1)d!
F
HH;t+1   !FHH;t+1
R1
!FHH;t+1
f(!FHH;t+1)d!
F
HH;t+1
i )
+(
FHR
F
H;t+1
 
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+ EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 hR1
!FHF;t+1
!FHF;t+1f(!
F
HF;t+1)d!
F
HF;t+1   !FHF;t+1
R1
!FHF;t+1
f(!FHF;t+1)d!
F
HF;t+1
i )
As in the previous case, lenders participate in the contract only if it is worthy
to do so. In particular, lenders in each country require that lending funds to financial
intermediaries yields an expected return at least equal to what they would obtain by
investing funds in the risk-free asset. The participation constraints of domestic and
foreign lenders in the contract with home financial intermediaries are respectively:
(1  FH)RFH;t+1
8<:
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
  
 F
 
!FHH;t+1
  FHHGF  !FHH;t+1
9=; (5.35)
 Rt(1  FH)
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 NW FH;t

FHR
F
H;t+1
8<:
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
  
 F
 
!FHF;t+1
  FHFGF  !FHF;t+1
9=;
 Rt
"t+1
"t
FH
  
1  EH
  
QH;tKHH;t  NWEH;t

+
+EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 NW FH;t

(5.36)
It is important to notice that this setup implies that banks in each country are
bearing the consequences of exchange rate movements on their balance sheets. In
fact, entrepreneurs in each country borrow from Home and Foreign financial inter-
mediaries in their own country’s currency. Therefore, they are not subject to currency
mismatch in their balance sheets. On the contrary, banks’ balance sheets in each
country are affected by the exchange rate. Consider for example banks in the Home
country. They grant loans to Home entrepreneurs in the Home country’s currency
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and loans to Foreign entrepreneurs in the Foreign country’s currency. Furthermore,
they receive funds from Home depositors (in the domestic currency) and from For-
eign depositors in foreign currency. Therefore, an exchange rate depreciation has
two effect on the balance sheet of Home country banks. On one side, it increases the
(domestic currency) value of loans obtained from Foreign lenders, thereby increas-
ing leverage. On the other side, it increases the value of loans granted to Foreign
entrepreneurs, boosting the asset side of the balance sheet. These two effects act in
opposite directions.
Optimal contract
The optimal contract is characterized by the levels of capital investment (KHH;t
and KFH;t), and the threshold values !FHH;t+1; !FHF;t+1; !EHH;t+1; !EFH;t+1 that max-
imize the financial intermediary’ s payoff subject to the participation constraints of
Home and Foreign lenders (5.36, 5.35) and of Home and Foreign entrepreneurs (5.29,
5.30).92
The first order conditions of the optimal contract resulting from the constrained
maximization problem are:
92 For computational details, refer to the Appendix.
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0 =
8<: REHH;t+1
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 
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
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
+
+ E0H
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
1   EHH
 
!EHH;t+1

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t = R
E
HH;t+1NW
E
H;t

1   EFH
 
!EFH;t+1

REFH;t+1QF;tKFH;t = R
E
FH;t+1NW
E
F;t
Net worth
As in BGG (1999) entrepreneurs and financial institutions have a finite life
horizon. In particular, in each period the probability to exit the market is equal to 
1  E for entrepreneurs and  1  F  for financial institutions. The dying agents
are immediately replaced by an equal number of newly born entrepreneurs and finan-
cial institutions, so that the population remains constant. This assumption ensures
that borrowers do not accumulate enough net worth to become fully self-sufficient.
Furthermore, both entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries receive payments, de-
noted respectivelyWEH;t andW FH;t, for labor services supplied to firms in their country
of origin93. Surviving agents accumulate net worth, which is made of the return from
investment net of debt repayments plus the wage income they gain by working in
intermediate goods producing firms. The dynamic evolution of net worth for entre-
preneurs and financial institutions in the home country can be expressed as:
NWEH;t = 
EV EH;t +W
E
H;t (5.39)
NW FH;tt = 
FV FH;t +W
F
H;t (5.40)
Where V EH;t and V FH;trepresent the equity of entrepreneurs and financial inter-
mediaries respectively:
93 The presence of wages guarantees that net worth is non-zero in steady state, but does not have a
significant effect on the dynamics of net worth given the small share of entrepreneurs’ and bankers’
labor in the production function.
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V EH;t =

1   EHH;t 1
 
!EHH;t
  
1  EH

REHH;tQH;t 1KHH;t 1 + (5.41)
+

1   EHF;t 1
 
!EHF;t

EHR
E
HF;tQH;t 1KHF;t 1
V FH;t =

1   FHH;t 1
 
!FHH;t
  
1  FH

RFHt
  
1  EH
  
QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 +
+

1   FHF;t 1
 
!FHF;t

FHR
F
H;t
  
1  EH
  
QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
  (5.42)
Hence, V EH;t represents the retained earnings of the domestic entrepreneurial
sector, derived from their capital investment using funds from domestic and foreign
financial institutions. V FH;t represents retained earnings of financial institutions on
their portfolio of loans to domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. Agents leaving the
market at any time period consume the entire value of their assets, hence consumption
of entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries is given by:
CEH;t =
 
1  EV EH;t (5.43)
CFH;t =
 
1  F V FH;t (5.44)
And it has the same composition as households’ consumption.
5.1.6 Exchange rate and terms of trade
Prices in the tradable sector are set in the producers’ currency. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the international law of one price holds, implying that the price of the
same good sold in the two countries is equalized using the nominal exchange rate St
(defined as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). This implies
that:
P H;t =
1
St
PH;t and PF;t = StP F;t (5.45)
I define the real exchange rate:
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"t =
StP

t
Pt
(5.46)
I define the terms of trade as the ratio between import and export prices in
domestic currency, which, given the law of one price, can be expressed as:
TOTt =
StP

F;t
PH;t
(5.47)
Monetary and fiscal policy
Monetary policy sets the short-term interest rate in both economies, according
to endogenous economic developments. The central bank in the Home country sets
the short-term nominal interest rate according to a rule of the following general form:
Rnt
Rn
=

Rnt 1
Rn
r H;t
H
 YH;t
YH
y St
S
S(1 r)
exp(R;t) (5.48)
Where variables without time subscript refer to steady state values. In partic-
ular, for S = 0 the Home country implements a floating exchange rate regime. On
the other hand, it follows a fixed exchange rate by setting S so large that Rt = Rt .
R;t represents an exogenous monetary policy shock.
The Foreign country’s monetary policy sets the policy rate according to the
following feedback rule:
Rnt
Rn
=

Rnt 1
Rn
r "F;t
F
 YF;t
YF
y#(1 r)
exp(R;t) (5.49)
The fiscal authority aims at attaining a balanced budget in every period:
Gt = Tt (5.50)
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5.1.7 Market clearing and equilibrium
Market clearing in each country requires that total production equals total absorp-
tion. In particular, domestic output is used for home consumption, home investment,
government expenditure and exports. Furthermore, a small fraction of output is lost
in each period due to monitoring costs incurred by lenders and financial institutions.
The total amount of monitoring costs is given by the following equation:
Mt = 
EGE
 
!EHH;t

REHH;t
 
1  EH

QH;t 1KHH;t 1+
+ EGE
 
!EFH;t

REFH;t"t 1
E
FQF;t 1KFH;t 1+
+ FGF
 
!FHH;t

RFHt
 
1  FH
   1  EH  QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1+
EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 +
+ FGF
 
!FFH;t

FF "t 1R
F
FH;t
 1
"t 1
EH
 
QH;t 1KHF;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+
(1  EF )
 
QF;t 1K

FF;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 
Where the first two terms on the right-hand side represent monitoring costs in-
curred by Home financial intermediaries involved in credit contracts with Home and
Foreign entrepreneurs, and the last two terms represent the cost incurred by domestic
lenders in the contracts with Home and foreign financial intermediaries.
The Home country’s resource constraint can then be written as94:
94 The resource constraint in the Home country and its Foreign counterpart hilight the implications
of the small open economy assumption. Specifically, substituting equations (5.4) and (5.5) and their
Foreign counterparts in the resource constraints of the Home and Foreign country, we obtain:
YH;t =
264 H;t (Gt +Mt) + H;t (1  (1  n))

PH;t
Pt
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + It

+
+H;t
(1 n)
n n

PH;t
Pt
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + I

t

375
Y t =
264 F;t (Gt +Mt ) + F;t(1  n)

PF;t
Pt
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + I

t

+
+F;t
n
(1 n) ((1  n))

PF;t
Pt
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + It

375(5.51)
Letting n! 0:
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YH;t = H;t
 
CH;t + C
E
H;t + C
F
H;t + IH;t +Gt +Mt

+H;t
(1  n)
n
 
CH;t + C
E
H;t + C
F
H;t + I

H;t

(5.52)
Where H;t and H;t are indexes of price dispersion implied by the staggered
price setting defined as:
H;t =
Z 1
0

Pt(jH)
Pt
 H
djH
H;t =
Z 1
0

P H;t(jH)
P t
 H
djH
and whose laws of motion are given by:
H;t = (1  H)
2641  H

1
H;t
1 "H
1  H
375
"H
"H 1
+ H

1
H;t
 "H
H;t 1(5.53)
H;t = (1  H)
2641  H

1
H;t
1 "H
1  H
375
"H
"H 1
+ H
 
1
H;t
! "H
H;t 1(5.54)
Market clearing in the labor market requires that total labor supply equals de-
mand, a condition represented by equation (5.7). Furthermore, for the capital market
Yt = H;t (Gt +Mt) + H;t (1  )

PH;t
Pt
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + It

+
+H;t

P H;t
P t
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + I

t

Y t = 

F;t (G

t +M

t ) + 

F;t

P F;t
P t
 1  
Ct + C
E
t + C
F
t + I

t

The demand for Home country output depends on Foreign demand of Home goods, but not vicev-
ersa. Thi implies that any shock that impacts demand for Home goods in the Foreign country will have
an impact in the Home country through demand effects. But the reverse is not true: demand shifts in
the Home country have no influence on the demand for Foreign goods.
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to be in equilibrium, the total capital investment by entrepreneurs (borrowing domes-
tically and abroad) has to equal the aggregate capital production, i.e.:
Kt =
 
1  EH

KHH;t + 
E
HKHF;t (5.55)
5.1.8 Steady state and calibration
Before simulating the model, I calculate the deterministic steady state by solving the
linear system of static equations implied by the model (cfr. Appendix).
Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
' 1 n !0
 1 h 0.5
 0.99 H
 0.4  0.35
!E 0.01 !F 0.01
 0.025  2.5
H 0.75 w 0.94
 6 w 10
E;H 0.033123 E;F 0.033123
F;H 0.243046 F;F 0.243046
p 0.2 E 0.98517
F 0.96918
The model parameters are calibrated following the literature. Concerning house-
holds’ preferences, I set the intertemporal discount factor () to 0:99, which corre-
sponds to a yearly risk-free interest rate of 4%. The intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution () is set to 1, so as the elasticity of labor supply (') following Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997). In order to obtain a steady state labor supply of 0:33
the coefficient on labor in the utility function (H) is calibrated to 9:02. Regarding
the composition of consumption, I set the share of imported goods in the consump-
tion basket at 0:4, which implies a degree of home bias and the consumption habit
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parameter at 0:5. Finally, note that the Cobb-Douglas specification of the consump-
tion aggregator implies unit elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods.95
On the production side, the rate of depreciation of capital () is set to 0:025,
implying a yearly depreciation rate of 10%. Furthermore, I set the adjustment cost
parameter, , to 2:5. The parameters of the production function are chosen such that
the share of capital in production is 0:35, while the shares of labor by entrepreneurs
and financial intermediaries (
E and 
F respectively) is 0:01. Following the standard
estimate used in the literature (Chari, Kehoe and McGratten (2000)), I assume a
Calvo price stickiness parameter H equal to 0:75, implying that price adjustment
happens, on average, every four quarters. Furthermore, I assume that firms that do
not optimally chose their price in a given period adjust their price to past inflation
with a coefficient of 0:2. Finally, the elasticity of substitution between varieties of
domestic goods () is set to 6, implying a 20% price markup. The parameters of the
wage setting process imply a higher persistence of wages compared to prices. I set
the parameter representing the elasticity of substitution between labor types(w) at
10, implying a 11% markup and the wage stickiness parameter (w) equal to 0:94
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006)).
The parameters pertaining to financial frictions in the banking and entrepre-
neurial sector are calibrated in order for the steady state values of key financial vari-
ables in the model to match time series data relative to Europe for the financial and
non-financial sector. In particular, the parameters related to the cost of monitoring
banks’ and entrepreneurial output (F and E respectively), the volatility parameters
of banks’ and entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic productivity (F and E) and the survival
probabilities (E and F ) are calibrated in order to match European data on leverage,
lending spreads and default probabilities. European data on bank default reveal that
95 For a similar specification see for example Kolasa and Lombardo (2011).
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the expected short-term (1 year) default probability of banks averaged 0.6% between
2000 and 2007 (Fiordelisi et al. (2010)): hence I set the quarterly default probability
of financial intermediaries to 0.0015. Following Faia (2010), I set the annual steady
state default of entrepreneurs to 3%, implying a quarterly value of 0.0075. Steady
state equity-to-assets ratios for entrepreneurs and banks are calibrated according to
the micro-level data reported in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011). In particular, I set the
inverse leverage ratios to 0.4904 and 0.1040 for entrepreneurs and banks respectively,
implying leverage ratios of 2.0939 and 9.6129. Finally, I calibrate the entrepreneur-
ial and financial intermediaries’ lending spreads according to Eurostat data on Euro-
pean interest rates between 2000 and 2007. Hence I target the steady state level of
the spread between the lending rates of entrepreneurs and banks at 0.0052 quarterly,
and the spread between financial intermediaries’ lending rate and the risk free rate at
0.0003 quarterly. The calibrated values of the model parameters are reported in Table
5.1, while Table 5.2 reports the key steady state values resulting from the calibration.
Table 5.2: Steady State
R 1.0101
C=Y 0.5382
I=Y 0.1821
G=Y 0.2
H 0.33
QK=NWe 0.4904
QK=NWf 0.1040
Rk=R 1.0049
ZE  R 0.0056
ZE   ZF 0.0052
ZF  R 0.0004
F ( !E) 0.0075
F ( !F ) 0.0015
The shocks considered involve the foreign interest rate R, foreign technology
A, and the shocks to the variance of the odiosyncratic productivity of banks and
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entrepreneurs in the Foreign country, E and F. Shocks are modeled as (log)
AR(1) processes with autoregressive parameter set at 0:85, with the exception of the
Foreign interest rate shock, which is white noise. The size of shocks is 1% standard
deviation in all cases.
The form of the interest rule allows for a variety of different types of monetary
policy strategies of the small open economy. Table 5.3 reports the two different rules
I am considering in the analysis, together with the parameters of the Taylor rule
of the foreign economy, and the values of the parameters referring to the extent of
international lending used in the model simulations96.
Table 5.3: Overview of alternative models
No cross-border borrowing E = 0 F = 0
Banks’ cross-border borrowing E = 0 F = 0:2
Full cross-border borrowing E = 0:2 F = 0:2
Monetary policy F r = 0:8  = 1:5 y = 0
Monetary policy H
Fixed exchange rate r = 0:8  = 1:5 y = 0 S!1
Flexible exchange rate r = 0:8  = 1:5 y = 0 S = 0
5.2 Impulse response analysis
In this section I present the simulated path of the main real and financial variables
of the small open economy in response to nominal, real and financial shocks. The
small open economy emerges as a limit, when the relative size of the Home country,
96 While in principle a standard Taylor rule reacting to output could be considered for the two coun-
tries, the choice of constraining coefficients and to zero is dictated by the desire to enhance the com-
parability of results in the current setting with those of Faia (2010), who examines the implications of
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a two country model without cross-border borrowing and
lending.
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n, tends to zero97. Hence, the Foreign country becomes relatively closed, but as long
as there is a positive degree of openness, the Home economy continues to consume
foreign produced goods. This allows to model the small open economy in a consistent
way, retaining its trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world.
In figures 5.1 to 5.8, the responses for the Home country are presented for dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes and degrees of cross-border lending98. In particular, in
the case of no international lending the coefficients FHH ; FHF ; FFF ; FFH ; EHH ; EHF ; EFH ; EFF
are set to zero; in the case of cross-border bank borrowing only, i.e. a situation
where banks can borrow from domestic and foreign lenders but entrepreneurs are
constrained to borrow from banks in their own country, I set FHH = FHF = FFF =
FFH = 0:2 and EHH = EHF = EFH = EFF = 0; finally, full cross-country lending
implies fully blown lending relationships between banks, entrepreneurs and lenders
in both countries (I set EHH = EHF = EFH = EFF = 0:2 and FHH = FHF = FFF =
FFH = 0:2).
5.2.1 Foreign interest rate shock
Figures (5.1) and (5.2) depict the impulse responses corresponding to a monetary
policy shock in the Foreign economy, for different exchange rate regimes (flexible
and fixed, respectively) in the Home country and different degrees of cross-border
lending.99
If the Home currency is allowed to float, the one percent standard deviation
shock to the Foreign interest rate causes the nominal exchange rate to increase on
impact, driving also the real exchange rate upwards, implying a real depreciation of
the domestic currency. By making foreign goods relatively more expensive, the real
97 For a similar approach, see Batini et al. (2007), De Paoli (2009) and Corsetti and Müller (2011).
98 For space reasons, the responses of the main foreign variables are presented in the Appendix.
99 The response of a set of Foreign country variables are presented in figure (5.9) in the Appendix.
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depreciation has two effects. First, it drives an expenditure-switching effect towards
domestic goods. Secondly, it contributes to the rise in inflation in the Home economy.
The increase in inflation, independently of the strength of financial linkages,
leads the Home central bank to increase the nominal interest rate, which results in a
real interest rate hike that depresses consumption, investment and output.
However, the negative effect on investment is more pronounced the greater the
extent of international lending relationships. While in the case of domestic borrow-
ing and lending only the financial sector is influenced by the foreign shock only to
the extent that this implies a contractionary monetary policy response of the Home
central bank, in the presence of financial linkages, the Domestic and Foreign inter-
est rate hikes reinforce each other. In fact, as the risk free return of domestic and
foreign lenders increase, the cost of external finance for domestic and foreign banks
increases more markedly and it is reflected in a sharper increase in loan rates for fi-
nancial intermediaries. As these are passed on to final borrowers, entrepreneurs’ loan
rates and borrowing spreads increase in both countries. As borrowing costs increase,
entrepreneurs undertake fewer projects, thereby reducing investment, the demand for
capital and hence asset prices by a larger amount. The combination of declining asset
prices and higher borrowing costs decrease the net worth of entrepreneurs and banks
worldwide. Figure (5.1) clearly shows that the decrease in entrepreneurial and banks’
net worth, the increase in lending spreads and the consequent decrease in investment
and asset prices are more pronounced with tighter internatioal lending relationships.
The reason for this is twofold. First, when cross-border borrowing by entrepreneurs
is shut off and only banks can borrow from abroad the foreign interest rate shock and
the consequent domestic interest rate increase lead to an rise in the loan rate charged
by Home banks on domestic entrepreneurs which is higher than in the case of finan-
cial autarky. Indeed, in the latter case the foreign monetary policy shock impacts the
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Figure 5.1: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign interest rate shock: Flexible
exchange rate
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domestic financial sector only through the domestic monetary policy response. In the
case cross-border borrowing also involves entrepreneurs, not only the foreign policy
rate matters for the cost of funds of domestic banks, but the deterioration in entrepre-
neurial net worth in the Foreign country impacts domestic banks negatively affecting
their net worth and leverage. Second, the real exchange rate depreciation increases
the value of foreign loans held by banks in the Home country. The combination of
these effects amplifies the effect of the foreign shock on the domestic economy.
In case the Home country follows a fixed exchange rate (cfr Figure (5.2)), the
decline of both real and financial variables is more pronounced. This is due to the
fact that, following the initial shock, the central bank in the home country increases
its policy rate on impact to defend the currency. In fact, the nominal interest rate in-
crease necessary to keep the exchange rate stable is of the same magnitude of the
initial foreign shock, implying that the Home country is fully importing the foreign
shock. As the nominal exchange rate is fixed and Home and Foreign inflation decline
by the same amount, the real exchange rate is roughly constant. This eliminates,
on the real side, expenditure switching effects and, on the financial side, balance
sheet effects due to currency denomination of loans. The steeper increase in the real
interest rate under a fixed exchange rate regime depresses consumption by a larger
amount. Furthermore, the constancy of the real exchange rate implies that consumers
demand less of both domestic and imported goods. The sharper decrease in consump-
tion leads to a more pronounced decrease in demand for domestic goods, leading to
a larger output drop and a lower demand for capital investment. Hence, output, in-
vestment and asset prices are lower than in the flexible exchange rate regime case.
On the financial side, it is interesting to notice that a fixed exchange rate neutralizes
differences across degrees of cross-border linkages. On one hand, in response to the
foreign monetary policy shock, the domestic central bank increases the nominal in-
terest rate to defend the parity roughly by the same magnitude, thereby "importing"
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Figure 5.2: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign interest rate shock: Fixed
exchange rate
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the foreign shock. On the other hand, in this model financial exposures across coun-
tries are symmetric. The joint effect of symmetric cross-country financial exposures,
a de-facto symmetric shock and a fixed exchange rate lead the response of domestic
and foreign variables to be parallel.
Table 5.4: Theoretical variances - Foreign interest rate shock
No cross-border borrowing Bank cross-border borrowing Full cross-border borrowing
Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix
Output 4.12 8.73 4.28 8.73 4.47 8.73
Investment 14.13 30.44 15.98 30.44 19.20 30.44
Consumption 3.77 5.02 3.66 5.02 3.46 5.02
Int.Rate 0.62 1.02 0.61 1.02 0.58 1.02
Asset Price 4.53 9.35 5.05 9.35 6.30 9.35
Inflation 1.32 1.40 1.31 1.40 1.31 1.40
Leverage E 8.60 17.82 10.39 17.82 12.14 17.82
Leverage B 27.69 58.81 32.65 58.81 33.58 58.81
Spread E 0.67 1.42 0.88 1.42 1.33 1.42
Note: In pecentage points
Table 5.4 reports theoretical variances for the main real and financial variables
under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes and different degrees of cross-border
borrowing following a foreign interest rate shock. Comparing exchange rate regimes,
it is evident that volatility in the domestic economy is much higher when the central
bank follows a strict peg: in particular, output is twice as volatile compared to the
case in which the currency is allowed to float, as well as investment and consump-
tion. This is the result of the much stronger monetary policy response to the shock
necessary to stabilize the exchange rate, which is reflected in the high standard de-
viation of the nominal interest rate. Furthermore, volatility increases with the de-
gree of financial linkages. Under a floating exchange rate regime, financial variables
are particularly more volatile when both financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs
engage in cross-border borrowing, thanks to the immediate transmission of the for-
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eign shock to the domestic economy via the financial sector and the direct spillover
from balance sheets of foreign entrepreneurs. However, the degree of international
borrowing is virtually irrelevant when the small country follows a strict peg, as the
impulse-response functions previously revealed.
5.2.2 Foreign productivity shock
Figures (5.3) and (5.4), illustrate the reaction of the main Home country variables in
response to a foreign productivity shock. In the foreign country (cfr Figure (5.10) in
the Appendix), the negative productivity shock raises marginal costs, which in turn
decrease production. This has two consequences: on one side, inflation increases;
on the other side, demand for capital decreases, pushing its price downwards. The
increase in inflation in the foreign country leads the foreign central bank to increase
the nominal interest rate.
This, jointly with the decrease in asset prices, deteriorates balance sheet condi-
tions of borrowers in the foreign country: both entrepreneurial and banks’ net worth
decrease in the foreign country, leading to an increase in borrowing spreads for both
agents. Furthermore, the contractionary Foreign monetary policy depreciates the ex-
change rate, albeit by a small amount. The increase in Foreign inflation appreciates
the foreign currency in real terms, and improves the terms of trade for the Home
country. However, as the Home country is relatively small and open, the real de-
preciation pushes up domestic CPI inflation, which leads the domestic central bank
to raise the nominal interest rate. In case the Home country follows a pegged ex-
change rate policy, the domestic central bank increases the nominal interest rate in
order to counteract the nominal depreciation. In this case, the increase in domestic
CPI inflation is more muted, so as the extent of real exchange rate depreciation and
the required monetary policy contraction is stronger than in the case of flexible ex-
change rate. While in the first periods the increase in inflation dominates in driving
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Figure 5.3: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign productivity shock: Flexi-
ble exchange rate
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Note: Responses are represented in percentage deviations from the steady state
222
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
the real interest rate down, after few periods the real interest rate starts increasing,
thereby determining a decrease in domestic consumption and a tightening of borrow-
ing conditions for domestic banks. In particular, the real interest rate increases more
sharply when the Home country’s monetary policy pegs the exchange rate, leading to
a sharper decrease in consumption, investment and GDP.
While the negative effect of the foreign productivity shock on the domestic
economy is stronger when the Home country’s central bank adopts a fixed exchange
rate regime, the difference in responses between different degrees of financial link-
ages is more muted. Under domestic borrowing only, the financial sector is affected
by the foreign productivity shock through two channels. First, the decrease in de-
mand for capital by domestic firms that reduces the demand for investment and loans,
thereby reducing leverage in the domestic financial sector and dampening the finan-
cial accelerator effect. Second, the increase in the domestic interest rate that increases
the cost of funds for domestic financial intermediaries, accentuating the financial ac-
celerator effect. Hence, the foreign shock is transmitted first to the real economy
through a change in international relative prices and its effects on domestic CPI in-
flation, and then to the credit market through leverage and cost of funds effects. In
case of bank cross-border borrowing, the financial accelerator effect is reinforced by
the foreign monetary policy contraction that follows the adverse productivity shock.
As the foreign interest rate hike is stronger than the domestic one, the cost of for-
eign borrowing increases by more than in the case of financial autarky. Furthermore,
the real exchange rate depreciation acts in the same direction, feeding the financial
accelerator effect and resulting in a sharper decrease in net worth and increase in
borrowing spreads. In case of full international lending, the increase in financial
acceleration caused by the foreign monetary policy contraction and real exchange
rate depreciation is somewhat counteracted and the responses look similar to those
obtained when cross-border borrowing is absent. This is due to the fact that the ex-
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Figure 5.4: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign productivity shock: Fixed
exchange rate
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change rate depreciation exerts a double effect on banks’ balance sheets. On one
side, it increases the loan burden (in domestic currency units) to be repaid to for-
eign lenders. On the other hand, it boosts banks’ asset side by increasing the value
of assets, i.e. loans granted to Foreign entrepreneurs. These effects act in opposite
directions and completely offset each other.
Table 5.5: Theoretical variances - Foreign productivity shock
No cross-border borrowing Bank cross-border borrowing Fulll cross-border borrowing
Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix
Output 1.45 1.49 1.47 1.50 1.49 1.51
Investment 6.56 6.66 6.85 6.91 6.96 6.94
Consumption 1.81 1.79 1.80 1.78 1.81 1.79
Int.Rate 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25
Asset Price 1.17 1.25 1.25 1.32 1.20 1.25
Inflation 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22
Leverage E 3.25 3.31 3.49 3.53 3.59 3.60
Leverage B 6.07 6.45 4.53 7.82 5.85 6.16
Spread E 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.11
Note: Values are reported in percentage
The qualitative results are confirmed by the analysis of volatilities reported in
Table 5.5. For all degrees of cross-border borrowing, the main real and financial
variables are more volatile under fixed exchange rate regime, with the exception of
consumption.
5.2.3 Foreign financial shocks
Figures (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7) and (5.8) illustrate the impulse-responses of the vari-
ables of interest to a shock to the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity of for-
eign banks and entrepreneurs respectively. The shock increases the volatility of the
idiosyncratic productivity of banks and entrepreneurs, and can be interpreted as an
increase in the riskiness of borrowers in the Foreign country. In fact, as the distribu-
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tion of the stochastic idiosyncratic productivity becomes more dispersed, uncertainty
about the realization of productivity increases, increasing borrowers’ default proba-
bility and inducing lenders to charge a higher loan premium.
The shock to the foreign bank’s idiosyncratic productivity leads to an increase
in banks’ borrowing spreads, which are passed on to entrepreneurs, rising their loan
spreads (cfr. figure 5.11 in the Appendix). As borrowing costs rise, entrepreneurs
in the foreign economy invest less, causing a decrease in the capital stock and in the
price of capital. This in turn implies a decrease in foreign banks’ and entrepreneurs’
net worth, which reinforces the initial shock. The simultaneous decrease in output
and inflation reveals that the riskiness shock has the effect of a demand shock on the
foreign economy, as prices and quantities move in the same direction. The foreign
central bank reacts to the fall in inflation by lowering the policy rate; however, in the
first period, this is not sufficient for lowering the real interest rate, which starts de-
creasing only in the second period after the shock, falling below steady state values
right after. The decrease in the real interest rate, by lowering the external finance
premium for foreign banks, mitigates the negative financial acceleration effect trig-
gered by the original shock. Furthermore, it increase foreign consumption, partially
counteracting the initial negative effect on aggregate demand.
The transmission of the foreign shock differs across degrees of financial link-
ages. In case of domestic borrowing only, the shock is mainly transmitted through
trade channels. The decrease in foreign output, investment and GDP implies a decline
in Foreign demand for Home produced goods, which depresses production in the
Home country. As a result, the shock is imported as a demand shock, and domes-
tic inflation declines, leading the Home central bank to enact a monetary expansion.
As the domestic nominal interest rate decreases only slightly on impact, the uncov-
ered interest parity implies that the nominal exchange rate slightly depreciates. As
a consequence of the domestic monetary policy easing, the real interest rate starts
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Figure 5.5: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign F shock: Flexible ex-
change rate
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Figure 5.6: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign F shock: Fixed exchange
rate
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decreasing, after a brief upward jump on impact, positively impacting consumption.
However, the foreign banking sector shock has virtually no effect on domestic in-
vestment and on the domestic financial sector, as lending spreads, leverage ratios and
net worths are unaffected by it. Under banking and full cross-border borrowing the
foreign shock spills over to the domestic economy directly through the international
credit market: in particular, the tighter the financial interlinkages, the stronger the
transmission of the shock. It is interesting to notice that tighter international borrow-
ing relationships imply different dynamics in the Home and Foreign country follow-
ing a banking financial shock. While stronger linkages imply a larger spillover of the
shock to the Home country, they decrease its impact on the Foreign country. This re-
sults from the positive impact of the monetary policy easing in the Home country on
the Foreign economy through a lowering of the cost of borrowing, while the Home
country suffers the consequences of the financial shock.
In case of banks’ international borrowing only, banks’ and entrepreneurial lend-
ing spreads increase more markedly in the Home country, while net worth decreases
more. In the case international borrowing of entrepreneurs is also allowed, the neg-
ative foreign shock is more heavily transmitted to the Home country by the credit
relationship between Home entrepreneurs and Foreign banks. Here, the shock in the
foreign banking sector translates in higher lending rates for domestic entrepreneurs
borrowing from abroad, thereby decreasing their ability to loan funds. Hence, invest-
ment and asset prices decrease even further.
The difference in responses between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes
are only marginal, as we can see from Table 5.6. This is due to the fact that the
shock, even in the case of floating currency, does not lead to sensible differences in
real exchange rate fluctuations.
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Table 5.6: Theoretical variances - Foreign B shock
No cross-border borrowing Bank cross-border borrowing Full cross-border borrowing
Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix
Output 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.4 0.41 0.41
Investment 1.39 1.38 1.14 1.22 1.81 1.84
Consumption 0.49 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.36
Int.Rate 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.07
Asset Price 0.12 0.11 0.33 0.35 0.78 0.78
Inflation 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.07
Leverage E 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.44 0.64 0.65
Leverage B 0.36 0.49 1.58 1.63 3.63 3.63
Spread E 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.29
Note: Values are reported in percentageFurthermore, Table 5.6 confirms the
highest volatility of the main real and financial variables in the case of full financial
integration. This effect arises through two channels. First, the increase in borrow-
ing spreads in the foreign country translates into an increase in the cost of external
finance for banks and entrepreneurs in the Home country borrowing abroad, which
decreases their willingness to borrow. Secondly, the decrease in foreign banks’ and
entrepreneurial net worth deteriorates balance sheet conditions in the Home country,
and worsens borrowing conditions even further.
Figures (5.7) and (5.8) report the impulse responses relative to a foreign entre-
preneurial idiosyncratic volatility shock.
Albeit in the foreign economy the shock has similar consequences as the idio-
syncratic productivity shock affecting banks, its transmission to the Home country
differs according to the strength of financial linkages. In the Foreign country, the
shock results in an increase in the external finance premium of foreign entrepreneurs,
a worsening of their borrowing conditions and a decrease in investment and asset
prices. As before, the shock acts on the supply of credit, by reducing loans and in-
creasing their price. Foreign output decreases because of the decrease in demand for
investment goods and the reduction in capital stock. As before, foreign inflation falls,
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Figure 5.7: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreignE shock: Flexible ex-
change rate
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Figure 5.8: Responses of Home country to a 0.01 foreign E shock: Fixed exchange
rate
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inducing the foreign central bank to ease monetary policy, which rises the real inter-
est rate after few periods. The monetary policy action causes foreign consumption to
rise and contributes to counteract the negative spiral of the financial accelerator, by
easing credit conditions. Once again, the decline in Foreign demand for Home goods
leads domestic output to decrease and inflation to fall, leading the Home central bank
to lower its policy rate.
However, under borrowing autarky, the foreign shock has virtually no effect on
domestic investment and on the domestic financial sector, as lending spreads, lever-
age ratios and net worths are unaffected. The case of bank cross-border borrowing is
largely similar, because the domestic credit market is still insulated from the shock to
entrepreneurial riskiness, as Home banks only lend to Home entrepreneurs: therefore,
the shock is still transmitted through real channels. The most interesting case is that
of full international borowing of banks and entrepreneurs. Now the shock to foreign
entrepreneurs directly affects banks in the Home country through their international
loan portfolio. As a consequence of the increase in Home banks’ leverage, borrowing
spreads for Home banks rise, and are passed on to entrepreneurs, even to those bor-
rowing domestically. Then, the shock is transmitted similarly in the two countries,
passing through increases in loan rates and decrease in loan demand. However, the
joint effect of the monetary policy easing in the two countries acts as to counteract
the negative effect of the foreign shock on the Home country. In fact, in both coun-
tries the decrease in interest rates leads to an easing of borrowing conditions. While
in the Foreign country, where the shock originates and its effects are stronger, this is
not sufficient to completely offset the shock, the Home country, where financial vari-
ables react less strongly than in the Foreign country, benefits from the two monetary
policy actions. This is evident by looking at the behavior of entrepreneurial spreads
and net worth in the Home country. After a deterioration in the first periods after the
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shock, spreads rapidly decrease and fall below steady state values; net worth, after an
initial fall, rises above the zero line.
Also in this case, tighter international borrowing relationships imply different
dynamics in the Foreign country following a entrepreneurial financial shock (cfr Fig-
ure 5.12 in the Appendix). While stronger linkages imply a larger spillover of the
shock to the Home country, they decrease its impact on the financial sector in the
Foreign country. This results from the positive impact of the monetary policy eas-
ing in the Home country on the Foreign economy through a lowering of the cost of
borrowing.
Table 5.7: Theoretical variances - Foreign E shock
No cross-border borrowing Bank cross-border borrowing Full cross-border borrowing
Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix
Output 0.1 0.12 0.1 0.12 0.08 0.1
Investment 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.91 0.83
Consumption 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.21
Int.Rate 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Asset Price 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
Inflation 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Leverage E 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.22
Leverage B 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.67 0.73
Spread E 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Note: Values are reported in percentageComparing the impulse-responses un-
der different exchange rate regimes (cfr Table 5.7) reveals that, although when the
Home central bank pegs the currency output decreases more and investment increases
less, the difference is not pronounced. Once again, this is due to the fact that the ini-
tial shock does not trigger sensible real exchange rate movements that induce expen-
diture switching and balance sheet effects.
5.3 Evaluation of policy regimes
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In this section, I present a formal evaluation of the alternative exchange rate regimes
from the perspective of the Home country. I compare the relative performance of
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes from two standpoints. First, I consider the
point of view of the policymaker, i.e. the small open economy’s central bank. Cen-
tral banks evaluate monetary policy strategies according to their ability to meet the
objectives defining their mandate. Second, I consider the ranking of alternative ex-
change rate regimes from the point of view of the small open economy’s households,
on the basis of welfare.
5.3.1 The central bank’s loss function
To evaluate the performance of alternative exchange rate regimes, I first take the
standpoint of the central bank in the small open economy (i.e. the Home country).
Central bank’s preferences are usually modeled in terms of a loss function depend-
ing on the objectives of the monetary authority. While the objectives of monetary
policy traditionally involve price stability and, secondarily, sustained and stable eco-
nomic activity, in recent years the issue as to whether financial stability should be
explicitly included among the monetary authority’s objectives has received a lot of
attention100. In the most straightforward case in which the central bank has the tradi-
tional objectives of inflation and output stability, the loss function can be specified as
follows:
LMS = Et
h
^2H;t + yY^
2
H;t + rR^
2
H;t
i
(5.56)
Where ^2H;t, Y^ 2H;t and R^2H;t denote, respectively, squared deviations of inflation,
output and the nominal interest rate from their steady state levels and the j (j = y; r)
100 Cfr. Section 2.6 and references therein.
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are the relative weights the central bank puts on output and interest rate stability
relative to inflation stability101.
In case the monetary authority is also concerned with financial stability, the
variability of financial variables is also included in the loss function, accompanied
by a relative weight F . I assume the central bank considers desirable to smooth the
variability of leverage in the banking sector, and hence includes this variable in the
set of objectives. The loss function then takes the following form:
LFS1 = Et
h
^2H;t + yY^
2
H;t + rR^
2
H;t + FdLev2BH;ti (5.57)
I specify two loss functions, considering different relative weights of the fi-
nancial stability objective. Specifically, I set F = 0:1 when the financial stability
objective is of secondary importance relative to inflation stability and F = 1 to
represent the case in which the central bank deems inflation and financial stability
equally desirable objectives.
Table 5.8: Central bank’s losses (in percentage)
No cross-border borrowing Banks’ cross-border borrowing Full cross-border borrowing
Flex Fix Fix/Flex Flex Fix Fix/Flex Flex Fix Fix/Flex
Foreign R shock
Macro 1.763 2.324 1.318 1.7685 2.324 1.3141 1.786 2.324 1.301
Macro+LevB 4.532 8.205 1.810 5.0335 8.205 1.630 5.144 8.205 1.595
Macro+LevB1 29.453 61.134 2.075 34.4185 61.134 1.776 35.366 61.134 1.728
Foreign A shock
Macro 0.3645 0.3715 1.019 0.3665 0.3825 1.043 0.3685 0.3835 1.040
Macro+LevB 0.9715 1.0165 1.046 0.8195 1.1645 1.420 0.9535 0.9995 1.048
Macro+LevB1 6.4345 6.8215 1.060 4.8965 8.2025 1.675 6.2185 6.5435 1.052
Foreign F shock
Macro 0.1275 0.1535 1.203 0.110 0.134 1.217 0.104 0.1045 1.004
Macro+LevB 0.1635 0.2025 1.238 0.268 0.297 1.108 0.467 0.4675 1.001
Macro+LevB1 0.4875 0.6435 1.320 1.690 1.764 1.043 3.734 3.7345 1.000
Foreign E shock
Macro 0.0415 0.054 1.301 0.0415 0.054 1.301 0.0395 0.0625 1.582
Macro+LevB 0.0535 0.07 1.308 0.0525 0.069 1.314 0.1065 0.1355 1.2
Macro+LevB1 0.1615 0.214 1.325 0.1515 0.204 1.346 0.7095 0.7925 1.116
101 In particular, I set y = 0:1, r = 0:05.
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Table 5.8 presents the values of the loss function (in percentage) calculated us-
ing the theoretical variances implied by the model under different shocks and differ-
ent degrees of cross-border borrowing. For all shocks and loss functions considered,
the small open economy’s central bank incurs in larger losses when pegging the ex-
change rate. This follows directly from the higher volatility of real and financial
variables under a fixed exchange rate regime. The relationship between central bank
losses and international financial linkages is more articulated. First, for a central bank
concerned only with macroeconomic stability, stronger cross-border lending relation-
ships result in a larger loss following foreign interest rate and productivity shocks.
This follows from the fact that these shocks imply a monetary policy tightening in
both countries as a result of inflationary pressures, which reinforce the negative im-
pact of the shock through the financial sector, which is stronger the more tied the
cross-border lending relationships between countries. On the other hand, foreign fi-
nancial shocks imply a decrease in monetary policy rates in both countries, which
counteract the initial impact of the shock. This effect is stronger the more coun-
tries engage in international borrowing, and smoothens the volatility of inflation in
the Home country. A central bank also concerned with financial stability consid-
ers cross-border lending relationships less desirable (when evaluated only through
volatilities), since they imply more variability in financial variables.
Columns 4, 7 and 10 of Table 5.8 report the relative loss experienced under
a fixed exchange rate regime versus a flexible one, which can be interpreted as the
relative cost of pegging for the Home economy’s central bank. The relative cost of
pegging decreases when shifting from a regime of domestic lending only to an envi-
ronment characterized by full cross-border lending relationships between countries.
When banks and entrepreneurs borrow only domestically, pegging the exchange rate
results in a stronger increase in the nominal interest rate which impacts the Home
country through its trading relationships with the Foreign economy and increaseses
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macoreconomic volatility. On the other hand, cross-border lending acts as a smooth-
ing device, increasing the correlation of variables across countries through a sharing
of the negative effect of shocks and policy actions. Therefore, the more countries en-
tertain international borrowing relationships, the less a country’s responses to a shock
can act to the detriment of the other.
5.3.2 Welfare
A second metric to evaluate alternative exchange rate policies can be computed from
the standpoint of Home country’s households. In the presented microfounded model,
the expected lifetime utility of the Home country household can be taken as a natural
welfare metric. Specifically, the value function pertaining to households in the Home
country conditional on the economy being in the steady state at time t = 0 can be
expressed as:
V0 = Et
P1
t=0 
tU(Ct; Ht) (5.58)
Where U(Ct; Ht) is the representative household’s utility function defined in
equation (5.1). Then, a comparison of the two exchange rate regimes can be per-
formed looking at the difference in the value function under fixed and under flexible
exchange rates. However, as the utility function is not cardinal, a measure based on
the value function is not very interesting. A more appealing measure is in terms of
consumption equivalents, namely the constant fraction of consumption that house-
holds should give away under a policy regime in order to make them indifferent to a
situation in which the alternative policy regime applies102. From equations (5.1) and
(5.58), I can define the value function of households in the Home country in policy
regime j = fix; flex as:
102 This approach is common in the welfare evaluation of alternative policy rule. See inter alia Dev-
ereux, Lane and Xu (2006), Ascari and Ropele (2010), Faia (2010), Kolasa and Lombardo (2011).
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Vj;0 = Et
( 1X
t=0
t
(Cj;t   hCj;t 1)1 
1     H
H1+'j;t
1 + '
)
Then, the consumption equivalent  necessary to make households indifferent
between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime can be calculating solving the
following equation:
Et
( 1X
t=0
t
[(Cfix;t   hCfix;t 1) (1 + )]1 
1     H
H1+'fix;t
1 + '
)
=
= Et
( 1X
t=0
t
(Cflex;t   hCflex;t 1)1 
1     H
H1+'flex;t
1 + '
)
A positive value of  implies the superiority of a flexible exchange rate regime
from the perspective of Home country households. Indeed, in this case households
should see their consumption increase under a peg to make them indifferent, implying
that welfare under a flexible exchange rate is higher.
As in our case  = 1 ) (Cj;t hCj;t 1)1 
1  = log (Cj;t   hCj;t 1), the consump-
tion equivalent measure is given by:
 = 1  exp [(1  ) (Vflex;0   Vfix;0)] (5.59)
To calculate welfare, I take a second order approximation of the model equa-
tions. Specifically, denoting as C and H the steady state values of consumption
and hours worked in the Home economy, the second order approximation of utility
around the steady state yields:
E0 fU(Ct; Ht)g  U(C;H) + U 0C(C;H)  E0 (Ct   C) + U 0H(C;H)  E0 (Ht  H) +
+
1
2
U
00
C(C;H)  E0 (Ct   C)2 +
1
2
U
00
H(C;H)  E0 (Ht  H)2
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This expression shows that households are concerned with both the first and
second moments of consumption and hours worked. Specifically, household utility
increases with the conditional mean of consumption, decreases the higher the con-
ditional mean of hours worked and decreases the higher the conditional variance of
both consumption and labor supply.
Table 5.9: Relative welfare ranking of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes
No cross-border borrowing Banks’ cross border borrowing Full cross-border borrowing
Foreign R shock 0.3052 0.3195 0.3100
Foreign A shock 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029
Foreign F shock 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004
Foreign E shock -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
Table 5.9 presents the consumption equivalents for each shock and different de-
grees of cross-border borrowing. For all shock considered except the shock to foreign
entrepreneurs’ productivity, a flexible exchange rate is preferable from a welfare per-
spective. The difference between exchange rate regimes is particularly pronounced
for foreign interest rate shocks. In fact, under a fixed exchange rate, households
should be offered more than 30% of consumption to bring their welfare equal to the
flexible exchange rate regime case. However, for foreign productivity and financial
shocks the welfare difference across exchange rate regimes is smaller, and becomes
almost negligible for foreign financial shocks. Concerning different degrees of finan-
cial linkages, the welfare difference between exchange rate regimes is slightly lower
when there is no international borrowing and lending.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In what follows, I report synthetic results obtained by perturbing the model on several
grounds, in order to test the robustness of the results reported in the previous sections
to alternative model specifications and parametrization.
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First, I test the sensitivity of my results to a specification of the model where
credit contracts are stipulated in nominal terms.
As noted by Dib, Mendicino and Zhang (2008), nominal assets introduce pri-
vate risk given by uncertain returns. In fact, the external finance premium in non-
indexed contracts is directly linked to expected inflation and, if foreign borrowing
is allowed, to expected movements in the nominal exchange rate. Credit contracts
stipulated in nominal terms, therefore, introuduce a Fisher "debt deflation" effect103:
unexpected changes in the price level alter the real value of debt. Furthermore, loan
repayments depend on the ex-post real value of debt. An unanticipated increase (de-
crease) in inflation reduces (increases) the the real cost of debt repayments, boosting
(reducing) borrowers’ net worth. Hence, nominal contracts introduce a redistribu-
tion of wealth between borrowers and lenders due to unexpected fluctuations in debt
services. Moreover, with nominal contracts, disinflation reinforces the financial ac-
celerator mechanism, thereby dampening the expansionary effects of a decrease in
prices. Therefore, from a monetary policy point of view, nominal contracts give a
central bank an incentive not to respond aggressively to a shock with inflationary
pressures.
Figures (5.13) to (5.16) in the Appendix report the results of model simulations
with nominal debt contracts. As a consequence of a foreign interest rate shock, the
negative effect on the small open economy’s output is slightly more pronounced than
in the baseline case. This a-priori counterintuitive result can be explained by the
dynamic of inflation in the two countries. In the Home country, the foreign shock
results in an increase in inflation. This counteracts the negative spiral induced by the
financial accelerator effect by making the real cost of debt cheaper and the real debt
burden lower. However, the opposite occurs in the Foreign country, where inflation
103 See Christensen and Dib (2008) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) for details on the
Fisher debt deflation effect in DSGE models with financial frictions.
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decreases after the shock, thereby reinforceing the negative acceleration effect and
decreasing Foreign output even more. This gets transmitted to the Home country
through trade channels, but also through cross-border exposures. Indeed, in case of
international borrowing, borrowers in the home country are negatively affected by
the decrease in foreign inflation.
The opposite result can be observed in case of a foreign productivity shock.
In this case, inflation increases in both countries and mitigates the adverse effect of
the shock. This results in a less strong effect of the disturbance on output in both
countries relative to the baseline scenario. Finally, differences between the nominal
contract and the baseline scenario are negligible in the case of financial shocks. This
is mainly due to the small effect these shocks exert on inflation.
As a second robustness exercise, I change the relative size of the small coun-
try and its trade openness. In the baseline specification presented in the main text, I
set n ! 0 and  = 0:4 (the trade openness parameter). This implied that the shares
of domestic and imported goods in the Home country’s consumption basket were
respectively equal to  = 0:6 and (1   ) = 0:4. This implied that economic devel-
opments in the Home country had no repercussions on the Foreign country, but not
vice-versa.
As a first check, I change the parameters n and  to imply a different relative
country size and trade openness, but the same values of the parameter . Specifically,
I set n = 0:5 (implying equal country size) and  = 0:8. In the second case, I set
n ! 0 and  = 0:1, so that  = 0:9 and (1   ) = 0:1, and the Home country
consumes only a very small share of Foreign goods.
This allows for stronger feedback effects between countries, which operate
mainly through trade channels. Allowing for greater inter-country feedbacks im-
plies that the Foreign country is going to be influenced by changes in international
relative prices, because now the share of imports from the Home country is not neg-
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ligible in the Foreign consumption basket, and this is going to have repercussions
on the small country. Therefore, the real exchange rate, which can be shown to be
dependent on the openness parameters of the two countries, in turn related to the rel-
ative country size in this model, is going to be influenced by domestic developments.
The impulse responses represented in Figures (5.17) and (5.18) in the Appendix104
show that these alternative calibrations show that the real exchange rate in this ver-
sion of the model is less volatile than in the baseline. However, this does not alter
the conclusions regarding the better performance of flexible exchange rates in iso-
lating the economy from external shocks, nor the interaction between exchange rate
regimes and degrees of financial integration
As a third robustness check, change the parametrization of the financial ac-
celerator mechanism, since my calibration based on European data yields different
values for the parameters representing monitoring costs and idiosyncratic volatili-
ties in the banking and entrepreneurial sectors than in the paper by Ueda (2012), as
shown in Table 5.10:
104 For space reasons I show only the responses to the main model variables to a foreign productivity
shock under a fixed and flexible exchange rate regime.
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Table 5.10: Alternative Calibration Financial Accelerator
Baseline calibration Ueda (2012) calibration
[0.5ex] E;H 0.033 0.013
E;F 0.033 0.013
F;H 0.243 0.033
F;F 0.243 0.033
E 0.985 0.984
F 0.969 0.963
QK=NWe 0.490 0.5
QK=NWf 0.104 0.1
Rk=R 1.0049 1.005
ZE   ZF 0.0052 0:0230:25
ZF  R 0.0004 0:0060:25
F ( !E) 0.0075 0.02
F ( !F ) 0.0015 0.02
As the alternative calibration does not alter the results, I omit the impulse-
response functions for space reasons.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the interaction between financial interlinkages and exchange
rate regimes in a small open economy, obtained as the limit of a two-country DSGE
model with real and financial frictions. In particular, it compares the performance
of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes in stabilizing a small open economy
facing foreign nominal, real and financial shocks under different degrees of cross-
border borrowing.
The superiority of a flexible exchange rate regime in stabilizing an economy
facing foreign shocks (affirmed, inter alia, by Faia (2010)) is confirmed. Specifically,
following a foreign interest rate and technology shock, economic activity in the Home
country suffers more when the currency is pegged. The difference across exchange
rate regimes is more muted in case of foreign financial shocks. This results from
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the very weak impact of these shocks on economic activity, inflation and the real
exchange rate in the Home country.
A floating exchange rate regimes ranks higher from the perspective of both the
central bank and household welfare in the Home economy. From the point of view of
the Home country’s monetary authority, the relative cost of pegging the currency in-
creases the larger the weight it places in the financial stability’s objective. This results
from the stronger monetary policy response necessary to preserve the parity, which
has repercussions for the volatility of financial variables. From a welfare standpoint,
pegging the exchange rate is least desirable when the economy is hit by foreign inter-
est rate shocks. In this case, the foreign shock is entirely "imported", implying a rise
in the domestic policy rate of the same magnitude of the adverse foreign shock. The
large swing in the policy rate leads to a revision of consumers’ intertemporal con-
sumption allocations, causing a decrease in average consumption and an increaase of
its volatility.
The interaction between exchange rate policies and degrees of cross-border
borrowing is less straightforward. Simulation results suggest that, first of all, the
greatest difference in responses across degrees of international borrowing is observed
following shocks that directly impact the financial sector (i.e. foreign interest rate and
financial shocks). The transmission of a foreign technology shock is not markedly
different the more the two countries engage in cross-border borrowing relationships.
This results because, unlike the other shocks considered, the technology shock is
transmitted mainly through "real" channels and it affects financial variables only
through changes in demand for capital investment and asset prices.
Secondly, when the Home country pegs the currency, the dynamic adjustment
of the Home economy after foreign interest rate and productivity shocks does not
differ across degrees of cross-border borrowing. This is largely driven by the assumed
structure of international credit contracts. A foreign interest rate shock under pegged
245
Mara Pirovano
exchange rate cause a specular increase of the nominal interest rate in the Home
country. Given the symmetric structure of cross-border exposures, the shock has
the same effect no matter whether banks or entrepreneurs borrow from the Foreign
country. In case of a foreing productivity shock, this applies even when the Home
country’s monetary authority allows the currency to float. In this case, however, the
result is driven by the opposite effect real exchange rate movements exert on the asset
and liability side of banks’ balance sheets, which offset each other.
From the Home country central bank’s viewpoint, stronger cross-border lend-
ing relationships result in larger losses when macroeconomic stability is the only ob-
jective and the economy is hit by foreign interest rate and productivity shocks. This
relationship is inversed when the economy is subject to foreign financial shocks.
Finally, I find that the relative cost of pegging the currency from the Home
monetary authority’s standpoint decreases the stronger the degree of cross-border
borrowing. International credit contracts act as a "smoothing" device, increasing
the correlation between countries and allowing them to share the burden of adverse
shocks and policy actions.
The present study constitutes a first attempt to study the interaction between
financial integration and exchange rate policy in a New Keynesian model with cross-
border lending. While the presented exercise leads to interesting insights, it opens the
way for further analysis. First of all, in its current formulation, the model specifies
symmetric cross-border financial exposures. This implies that, taking as examples
of the two countries Hungary and the Euro Area, in the current specification, the
Euro Area borrows from Hungary as much as the latter borrows from the Euro Area.
This hypothesis is clearly not representative of reality. However, its abandonment re-
quires a reformulation of the modeling of financial intermediaries and cross-border
credit contracts, and will be undertaken in future work. Secondly, in this study I ne-
glected issues related to the interaction between trade and financial openness. The
246
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
presented analysis was performed varying the degree of financial integration, but
leaving the trade openness parameter unchanged. Furthermore, it was conducted un-
der the assumption of perfect exchange rate pass-through. Examining the interaction
between trade and financial openness, the degree of exchange rate pass-through for
international transmission of shocks is surely an interesting avenue of future research.
Thirdly, this framework could be adapted to analyze issues related to small countries
with large, internationally operating financial sectors, as it is the case of Cyprus. Fi-
nally, testing the ability of the model to account for the transmission of the financial
crisis through Bayesian estimation would lead to interesting insights on the appropri-
ateness of the chosen modeling strategy in accounting for actual economic dynamics.
This exercise is currently in progress.
5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Model equations
In what follows, the complete set of stationary equilibrium relationships are pre-
sented. In equilibrium, only relative prices are define. In every country, nominal
prices are deflated by the composite price index, resulting in the following defini-
tions:
pHH;t =
PH;t
Pt
; pHF;t =
PF;t
Pt
;
pFH;t =
P H;t
P t
; pFF;t =
P F;t
P t
;
Hence, the following relationships linking relative prices and inflation are de-
rived:
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HH;t =
pHH;t
pHH;t 1
H;t
HF;t =
pHF;t
pHF;t 1
H;t
FF;t =
pFF;t
pFF;t 1
F;t
FH;t =
pFH;t
pFH;t 1
F;t
Furthermore, the equations of the price levels are rewritten as:
1 = pHH;tp
(1 )
HF;t
1 = p
(1 )
FF;t p

FH;t
In addition, the relationships between relative prices, the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade can be formulated as:
pFH;t =
1
"t
pHH;t
pHF;t = "tpFF;t
"t =
St
St 1
F;t
H;t
TOTt = "t
pHF;t
pHH;t
The complete equilibrium conditions for the Home country are presented. An
analogous set of equations holds for the Foreign economy.
t = (Ct   hCt 1) 
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Et

t+1
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HH
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EF "t
 
QF;tKFH;t  NWEF;t
 NW FH;t
1   EHH
 
!EHH;t+1

REHH;t+1QH;tKHH;t = R
E
HH;t+1NW
E
H;t
1   EFH
 
!EFH;t+1

REFH;t+1QF;tKFH;t = R
E
FH;t+1NW
E
F;t
NWEH;t = 
EV EH;t +W
E
H;t
NW FH;tt = 
FV FH;t +W
F
H;t
V EH;t =

1   EHH;t 1
 
!EHH;t
  
1  EH

REHH;tQH;t 1KHH;t 1+
+

1   EHF;t 1
 
!EHF;t

EHR
E
HF;tQH;t 1KHF;t 1
V FH;t =

1   FHH;t 1
 
!FHH;t
  
1  FH

RFH;t
  
1  EH
  
QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 +
+

1   FHF;t 1
 
!FHF;t

FHR
F
H;t
  
1  EH
  
QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 
CEH;t =
 
1  EV EH;t
CFH;t =
 
1  F V FH;t
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CEH;t = 

PH;t(jH)
PH;t
 "
PH;t
Pt
 1
CEt
CEF;t = (1  )

PF;t(jF )
PF;t
 "
PF;t
Pt
 1
CEt
CFH;t = 

PH;t(jH)
PH;t
 "
PH;t
Pt
 1
CFt
CFF;t = (1  )

PF;t(jF )
PF;t
 "
PF;t
Pt
 1
CFt
Kt =
 
1  EH

KHH;t + 
E
HKHF;t
YH;t = H;t
 
CH;t + C
E
H;t + C
F
H;t + IH;t +Gt +Mt

+H;t
(1  n)
n
 
CH;t + C
E
H;t + C
F
H;t + I

H;t

Mt = 
EGE
 
!EHH;t

REHH;t
 
1  EH

QH;t 1KHH;t 1+
+ EGE
 
!EFH;t

REFH;t"t 1
E
FQF;t 1KFH;t 1+
+ FGF
 
!FHH;t

RFHt
 
1  FH
   1  EH  QH;t 1KHH;t 1  NWEH;t 1
+EF "t 1
 
QF;t 1KFH;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 +
+ FGF
 
!FFH;t

FF "t 1R
F
FH;t
 1
"t 1
EH
 
QH;t 1KHF;t 1  NWEH;t 1

+(1  EF )
 
QF;t 1K

FF;t 1  NWEF;t 1
 
H;t = (1  H)
2641  H

1
H;t
1 "H
1  H
375
"H
"H 1
+ H

1
H;t
 "H
H;t 1
H;t = (1  H)
2641  H

1
H;t
1 "H
1  H
375
"H
"H 1
+ H
 
1
H;t
! "H
H;t 1
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Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r "H;t
H
 St
S
 1
1 S
#(1 r)
exp(R;t)
5.A.2 Expressions related to optimal credit contract
As in BGG(1999), the idiosyncratic shocks of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs
and financial intermediaries (!EHH;t; !EHF;t; !EFH;t; !EFF;t; !FHH;t; !FHF;t; !FFH;t; !FFF;t)
are log-normally distributed with E(!ij;t = 1). I denote f(!ij) the probability
distribution function and F (!ij) the cumulative distribution function of !ij . Hence:
f(!ij; 
2
2
; ) =
1
!ij
p
2
e 

log !ij+
2
2
2
22 =
1
!ij
Npdf

log !ij + 0:5
2


F (!ij; 
2
2
; ) =
Z !ij
0
f(!ij)d!ij =
1p
2
Z log!ij+22

0
e t
2
dt = Ncdf

log !ij + 0:5
2


G(!ij;) =
Z !ij
0
!ijf(!ij)d!ij = Ncdf

log !ij   0:52


 (!ij;) = !ij [1  F (!ij)] +G(!ij;)
 0(!ij;) = [1  F (!ij)]
G0(!ij;) = !ijf(!ij)
(!ij;) =  (!ij;)  ijG(!ij;)
0(!ij;) =  0(!ij;)  ijG0(!ij;)
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5.A.3 Steady state
As the model is not solvable in closed form, I perform the analysis by linearizing
the model equations around the non-stochastic steady state with zero inflation and
no exchange rate depreciation. In the deterministic steady state, all shocks are equal
to their mean values, and all (gross) inflation rates are equal to 1. Furthermore,
marginal costs and markups are the same for all firms in the economy, hence all
relative prices are equal to 1 and price dispersion is equal to 1. Finally, in the steady
state consumption is equalized across countries and the net foreign asset position is
zero.
Assume ANT = AH = ANT = AF = 1.
t = 

t = 
H
t = 
NT
t = 
F
t = 
NT
t = 1
Normalize nominal exchange rate:
St = 1
Use Consumption Euler:
Rt =
1

= Rt
From the Tobin’s Q equation I obtain:
Qt = Q

t = 1
5.A.4 Credit markets and financial frictions
The steady state of the credit market is computed assuming target values for six quan-
tities: (1) The risk premium for entrepreneurs (RE   R), (2) The leverage ratio for
financial intermediaries NWF
QK
, (3) the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs NWE
QK
, (4) the
annualized default probability of financial intermediaries F (!Fij), (5) the annualized
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default rate of entrepreneurs F (!Eij), (6) the spread between the FI ’s loan rate and
the FI ’s borrowing rate
 
ZE   ZF  and, finally, (7) the spread between the FI’s bor-
rowing rate and the risk free rate
 
ZF  R. I choose the value of parameters related
to monitoring costs in the contract between banks and entrepreneurs (E) and be-
tween banks and lenders (F ), volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks (E , F ), steady
state threshold productivity levels (!EH , !FH) and survival rate of entrepreneurs and fi-
nancial intermediaries (E , F ) to match the aforementioned steady state quantities.
In the calibration I assume that countries are fully symmetric, including in
the degree of financial frictions, both within and between countries. This implies
that domestic (foreign) financial intermediaries incur the same cost of monitoring
domestic and foreign lenders, and domestic (foreign) lenders are subject to the same
cost of monitoring domestic and foreign financial intermediaries. Furthermore, these
costs are equalized across countries.
Given values of EF ; EH and FH ; FF , and a target value for the default probabil-
ities in each sector F (!EH ;EH); F (!EF ;EF ) and F (!FH ;FH); F (!FF ;FF ), I can calcu-
late the threshold productivity levels:
!ij = Ncdf
 1

log !ij + 0:5
2


Now i can calculate the following quantities:
F 0!(!ij;
i
j) = f(!ij;
i
j) =
1
!ijij
Npdf

log !ij + 0:5
2
i
i

G(!ij;
i
j) =
Z !ij
0
!ijf(!ij)d! = Ncdf

log !ij   0:52


 (!ij;) = !ij (1  F (!ij;)) +G(!ij;)
 0!(!ij;) = 1  F (!ij)
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G0!(!ij;) = !ijF
0
!(!ij;)
Given ij , I can calculate:
(!ij;
i
j) =  (!ij;)  ijG(!ij;)
0!(!ij;) =  
0
!(!ij;)  ijG0!(!ij;)
Assume countries are symmetric, i.e. they have the same degree of financial
frictions (E = E = E , F = F = F , E = E = E , F = F = F ,
!E = !E = !E , !F = !F = !F ) and the same degree of openness (FH = FF =
F , EH = 
E
F = 
E).
Then from the first order conditions of the optimal contract in country H (recall
that in steady state, Rt = Rt = 1 ):
REH
 
1     !E0  !E+  0  !E  !E   1     !F  (1  F ) +  1     !F  F +
(1  F ) 
0  !F 
0 (!F )

 0
 
!E


 
!F

REH
 
!E

+ 
 
!F

0
 
!E
  
1     !EREH+
F
 0
 
!F

0 (!F )

 0
 
!E


 
!F

REH
 
!E

+ 
 
!F

0
 
!E
  
1     !EREH =
=
1

(1  F ) 
0  !F 
0 (!F )
 0
 
!E

+
1

F
 0
 
!F

0 (!F )
 0
 
!E

REH
8><>:
 
1     !E0  !E+  0  !E  !E  
1     !F  (1  F ) +  1     !F  F +
 0(!F )
0(!F ) 
 
!F

0
 
!E
  
1     !E+  0(!F )
0(!F )  
0  !E  !F   !E
9>=>; =
= R
 0
 
!F

0 (!F )
 0
 
!E

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REH
R
=
 0(!F )
0(!F )  
0  !E8><>:
 
1     !E0  !E+  0  !E  !E  
1     !F  (1  F ) +  1     !F  F 
+
 0(!F )
0(!F ) 
 
!F

0
 
!E
  
1     !E+  0(!F )
0(!F )  
0  !E  !F   !E
9>=>;
And,similarly:
REF
R
=
 0(!F )
0(!F )  
0  !E8><>:


 
!E

 0
 
!E

+ 0
 
!E
 
1     !E 
(1  F ) 1     !F + F 1     !F 
+
 0(!F )
0(!F ) 
0  !E  !F  1     !E+  0(!F )
0(!F )  
0  !E  !F   !E
9>=>;
Given symmetry, it results that:
REH
R
=
REH
R
=
REF
R
=
REF
R
Part. constraint entrepreneurs borrowing from FI H
K =
 
1  EKH + EKF

1     !EREHQKH = REHNWE (60)
NWE
QKH
=

1   EH
 
!E


1     !EREH QKH = REH NWE (61)
NWE
QKH
=

1     !E
Part. constraint entrepreneurs borrowing from FI F:
Kt = 
EKH;t +
 
1  EKF;t
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
1     !EREFQKF = REFNWE (62)
NWE
QKF
=

1     !E

1     !EREF QKF = REF NWE (63)
NWE
QKF
=

1     !E
From previous 4 equations + definition of aggregate capital I get:
NWE
QK
=
"
E
[1    (!E)] +
 
1  E
[1    (!E)]
# 1
=

1     !E
NWE
QK
=
"
E
[1    (!E)] +
 
1  E
[1    (!E)]
# 1
=

1     !E
Part constraints lenders to FI H:
(1  F )RF  1  E  QKH  NWE+ E  QKH  NWE    !F  (64)
= R(1  F )  1  E  QKH  NWE+ E  QKH  NWE NW F 
FRF
 
1  E  QtKH  NWE+ E  QKH;t  NWE    !F 
= RF
 
1  E  QKH  NWE+ E  QKH  NWE NW F  (65)
The two expressions are equivalent in steady state as R = R. Furthermore, if
countries are symmetric: QKH = QKH = QK and NWE = NWE so that:
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 R
F
R
 
QK  NWE    !F +  QK  NWE = NW F 
QK  NWE 1  RF
R
   !F  = NW F (66)
1  NW
E
QK

1  R
F
R
   !F  = NW F
QK
(67)
Part constraint FI H:
 
1  EREHQKH  !E+ EREH QKH  !E =
= RF
 
1  E  QKH  NWE+ E  QKH  NWE (68)
Again imposing symmetry:

 
!E

1  NWE
QKH
 = RF
RE
Similarly for foreign financial intermediaries:
Part constraint lenders to FI F:
FRF

E
 
QKF  NWE

+ (1  E)  QKF  NWEF  !F  (69)
= RF

E
 
QKF  NWE

+ (1  E)  QKF  NWE NW F
(1  F )RF E  QKF  NWE+ (1  E)  QKF  NWEF  !F  (70)
= R(1  F ) E  QKF  NWE+ (1  EF )  QKF  NWE NW F
So that:

1  NW
E
QK

1  R
F
R
F
 
!F

=
NW F
QK
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Where RF
R can be derived from the participation constraint of foreign FIs:

 
!E

1  NWE
QK
 = RF
RE
Finally, using the default threshold definitions (equations (5.48) and (5.49)) I
can compute the steady state loan rate to entrepreneurs and to financial intermediaries
(interbank rate):
ZE = ZEH = Z
E
F = Z
E
F = Z
E
F =
!ERE
1  NWE
QK

!FHR
F
 
QK  NWE = ZFH  QK  NWE NW F 
ZF = ZFH = Z
F
H = Z
F
F = Z
F
F =
!FHR
F

1  NWE
QK

h
1  NWE
QK

  NWF
QK
i
Given the steady state values for the financial side of the model, I can solve for
variables pertaining to the real sector.
Real side of the model
Given RE , I can use equation (5.37) to compute rK :
rK = RE   (1  )
MCH =
"H   1
"H
H = 

H = 1
K
Y
=
MC
rK
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K
H
=

K
Y
 1
1 
W = (1  )MC

K
H

Fix H = 0:33, and solve for K :
K =
K
H
H
Y =

K
Y
 1
K
And then calculate:
I = K
NWE =

NWE
QK

K
NW F =

NW F
QK

K
V E =

1   E  !EREQK
V F =

1   F  !F RF  QK  NWE
Then I can back out E and F :
E =
(NWE   (1  )
E MC  YH)
V E
F =
(NW F   (1  )
F MC  YH)
V F
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CE =
 
1  E 1   E  !EREQK
CF =
 
1  F  1   F  !F RF  QK  NWE
Steady state monitoring costs incurred by entrepreneurs and FIs are given by:
M = EG
 
!E

REQK + FG
 
!F

RF
 
QK  NWE
Now use the goods market clearing conditions for the Home and Foreign coun-
tries to solve for the steady state Home and Foreign consumption:
CF =
1h
(1  )  (1 )

i
8>><>>:
YF   (1  )
 
IF + C
E
F + C
F
F
 
(1  ) n
(1 n)
 
IH + C
E
H + C
F
H
 GF  MF
  n
(1 n)
(1 )


YH  GH   
 
IH + C
E
H + C
F
H
 
MH    (1 n)n
 
IF + C
E
F + C
F
F
 
9>>=>>;
CH =
1


YH   IH  GH    (1  n)
n
 
CF + IF + C
E
F + C
F
F
  CEH  MH   CFH
Now I can solve for the remaining variables:
Kp = MC
YH
(1  H)
F p =
YH
(1  H)
~PH =
"H
"H   1
Kp
F p
 =
1
CH(1  h)
H =
"w   1
"w

H'
W
P
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Kw =
"w   1
"w
HW
(1  w)
Fw =
HH
'
(1  w)
~W = W
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5.A.5 Impulse-responses in the Foreign country
Figure 5.9: Responses of Foreign country to a 1 percent foreign interest rate shock
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Figure 5.10: Responses of Foreign country to a 1 percent productivity shock
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Figure 5.11: Responses of Foreign country to a 1 percent F shock
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Figure 5.12: Responses of Foreign country to a 1 percent E shock
Flexible exchange rate in H country
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
Output F
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
GDP F
0 10 20
-0.02
0
0.02
Nominal R F
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Inflation F
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Consumption FH
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Consumption FF
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Net Worth Ent F
0 10 20
-2
0
2
Net Worth Bank F
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Asset price F
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
RLE - RLB F
0 10 20
-5
0
5
x 10-3 RLB - R F
No cross-border borrowing
Full cross-border borrowing
Bank cross-border borrowing
Fixed exchange rate in H country
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
Output F
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
GDP F
0 10 20
-0.02
0
0.02
Nominal R F
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Inflation F
0 10 20
-0.05
0
0.05
Consumption FH
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Consumption FF
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Net Worth Ent F
0 10 20
-2
0
2
Net Worth Bank F
0 10 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Asset price F
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
RLE - RLB F
0 10 20
-5
0
5
x 10-3 RLB - R F
No cross-border borrowing
Full cross-border borrowing
Bank cross-border borrowing
Note: Responses are represented in percentage deviations from the steady state268
Essays on Financial Integration and Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies
5.A.6 Impulse responses: nominal credit contract
Figure 5.13: Responses to a 1 percent foreign interest rate shock
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Figure 5.14: Responses to a 1 percent foreign interest rate shock
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Figure 5.15: Responses to a 1 percent foreign interest rate shock
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Figure 5.16: Responses to a 1 percent foreign interest rate shock
Flexible ER Fixed ER
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Figure 5.17: Responses of Home country to a 1 percent foreign productivity shock:
n = 0:5;  = 0:8
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Figure 5.18: Responses of Home country to a 1 percent foreign productivity shock:
n  0;  = 0:1
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has explored several issues related to monetary policy in small open
economies, taking as reference the experience of the new EU member states of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. During the transition process, these countries became more
and more integrated with Western Europe, and benefited from large capital inflows
from this region as well as increased trade flows. On one side, tighter trade and fi-
nancial integration led Eastern European economies to be increasingly influenced by
Western european developents. On the other hand, the availability of cheap capital
flowing from the West enabled them to increase their consumption and investment be-
yond levels that would have been achieved using internal savings only. Rapid credit
growth was directed to both households and firms, and loans were granted, in large
part, in foreign currency. In this dissertation, I analysed three aspects of the interplay
between monetary policy and economic and financial openness, which can be of use-
ful input for policymaking in small open economies sharing similar characteristics.
The first essay focussed on the interplay between stock prices and monetary
policy (both domestic and Euro Area) in four NMS. The results reveal that in these
economies stock prices are more influenced by Euro Area, rather than domestic, mon-
etary policy shocks. The results reveal that, while domestic monetary policy shocks
do not exert a significant impact on stock prices, unexpected changes in Euro Area
monetary policy do. Specifically, a contraction in foreign monetary policy reduces
stock prices in the NMS. Furthermore, variables associated with international finance
and trade (namely the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate) are the main de-
terminants of the variability of stock prices in the considered countries. This seems
to suggest that in small economies characterized by a high degree of openness, stock
markets are more sensitive to shocks related to international trade and finance.
274
Chapters 4 and 5 adopt a more theoretical standpoint, modeling the salient
characteristics of the CEECs in a DSGE framework and modeling frictions on credit
markets embracing the financial accelerator framework of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999). Both essays examine the conduct of monetary policy in response
to real and financial shocks, but from different points of view. While chapter 4 fo-
cusses on a booming phase, where capital inflows fuel domestic credit growth to
households and firms characterized by liability dollarization, chapter 5 studies the
isolating properties of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a small open econ-
omy engaging in cross-border borrowing and lending. In both cases, results are
consistent with the existing literature, affirming the inferiority of a fixed exchange
rate regime as a monetary policy strategy. More specifically, chapter 4 concludes
that small open economies pegging the exchange rate are characterized by a more
marked macro-financial overheating following capital inflow shocks, reflected in a
greater credit growth and expansion of aggregate demand, and a stronger increase
in inflation. Furthermore, I find that in the case the monetary authority is not con-
cerned with financial stability, steering the interest rate responding only to inflation
and output deviations (i.e. following a standard Taylor rule) is optimal. Adding fi-
nancial stability to the central bank’s objectives does not result in an optimal reaction
to credit growth, while some degree of reaction to exchange rate depreciation is op-
timal. In fact, reacting to credit growth implies a too sharp tightening of monetary
policy in response to capital inflow shocks, which results in further exchange rate
appreciation and further strengthens borrowers’ balance sheet encouraging more for-
eign borrowing. This seems to suggest that in a small open and dollarized economy,
a the central bank with financial stability objectives but equipped with one instru-
ment, namely the nominal interest rate, cannot simultaneously achieve macroeco-
nomic and financial stability. Finally, chapter 5 confirms the superiority of a flexible
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exchange rate regime in stabilizing the economy facing adverse foreign shocks. Fur-
thermore, a flexible exchange rate regime ranks higher from the perspective of both
the small open economy’s central bank and households’ welfare. From the point of
view of the small open economy’s monetary authority, the relative cost of pegging
the currency increases the larger its concerns for financial stability, since it involves a
stronger monetary policy reaction to preserve the parity, which has repercussions on
the volatility of financial variables. On the other hand, tighter cross-border lending
relationships decrease the relative cost of pursuing a fixed exchange rate strategy.
This thesis offers a twofold contribution to the existing literature. First, it sheds
light on three different issues related to monetary policy and its interaction with fi-
nancial variables in small open economies. Secondly, the analysis in the last two
chapters is performed considering specific characteristics of Eastern European small
open economies and fitting them in state-of-the-art macroeconomic models featuring
a prominent role of credit market imperfections.
While being the end of a journey, this dissertation marks the starting point
for new ideas and projects, now that the relationship between monetary policy and
financial linkages is, hopefully, clearer.
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